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

Feminine-Perspective Magazine Research Department

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Signed at Washington December 8, 1987
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate May 27, 1988
Instruments of ratification exchanged June 1, 1988
Entered into force June 1, 1988
Proclaimed by U.S. President December 27, 1988

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term

"ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment

area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

Article V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

Article VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Article VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of the type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site

from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

Article IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

Article X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force

of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years.

Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be

implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Mikhail Gorbachev *General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU*

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR I NTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of November 1, 1987, on ntermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

I. Definitions

For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection:

1. The term "missile production facility" means a facility for the assembly or production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs.

2. The term "missile repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

3. The term "launcher production facility" means a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles.

4. The term "launcher repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

5. The term "test range" means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate- range or shorter-range missiles takes place.

6. The term "training facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located.

7. The term "missile storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles or stages of such missiles are stored.

8. The term "launcher storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles are stored.

9. The term "elimination facility" means a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated.

10. The term "support equipment" means unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate- range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in

Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

11. The term "support structure" means a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

12. The term "research and development launch site" means a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched.

II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the Treaty

1. The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	USA	USSR
Deployed missiles	429	470
Non-deployed missiles	260	356
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	689	826
Aggregate number of second stages	236	650
Deployed launchers	214	484
Non-deployed launchers	68	124
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	282	608

2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	USA	USSR
Deployed missiles	0	387
Non-deployed missiles	178	539
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	178	926
Aggregate number of second stages	182	726
Deployed launchers	0	197
Non-deployed launchers	1	40
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	1	237

III. Intermediate-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Structures and Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

1. Deployed

The following are the deployment areas, missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and the support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated by specifying geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, to include national boundaries, rivers, railroads or highways.

[1] For information on the availability of site diagrams and accompanying photographs, call or write: Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520 (202-647-6575).

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures/Equipment	
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA				
(i) Pershing II				
Deployment Area One The Federal Republic of Germany Boundaries: The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude;on the east by 012 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and within the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany.				
Missile Operating Bases				
Schwaebisch-Gmuend 48 48 54 N 009 48 29 E	40 (includes 4 spares)	36	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 24
Neu Ulm 48 22 40 N 010 00 45 E	40 (includes 4 spares)	43 (includes 7 spares)	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 24
Waldheide-Neckarsulm 49 07 45 N 009 16 31 E	40 (includes 4 spares)	36	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 24
(ii) BGM-109G				
Deployment Area One The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Boundaries:				

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 52 degrees 40 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 003 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by the English Channel; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea.				
Missile Operating Base				
Greenham Common 51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W	101 with launch canister (includes 5 spares)	29 (includes 5 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 7
Deployment Area Two				
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Boundaries: The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 53 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 002 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by 51 degrees 05 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea.				
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Missile Operating Base				
Molesworth 52 23 00 N 000 25 35 W	18* with launch canister	6*	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 7
Deployment Area				
The Republic of Italy Boundaries: The territory of the Republic of Italy within the boundaries of the Island of Sicily.				
Missile Operating Base				
Comiso	108	31	Training Missile	0

36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E	with launch canisters (includes 12 spares)	(includes 7 spares)	Training Launch Canister	7
Deployment Area The Kindgom of Belgium Boundaries: The territory of The Kingdom of Belgium.				
Missile Operating Base				
Florennes 50 13 35 N 004 39 00 E	20 with launch canister (includes 4 spares)	12 (includes 8 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 7
Deployment Area Two The Federal Republic of Germany Boundaries: The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 25 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 009 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 43 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the west by the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany.				
Missile Operating Base				
Wueschheim 50 02 33 N 007 25 06 E	62 with launch canister (includes 14 spares)	31 (includes 9 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	1 10
Deployment Area The Kingdom of the Netherlands Boundaries: The territory of The Kingdom of the Netherlands bounded on the north by 52 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds north latitude and within the national boundaries of The Kingdom of the Netherlands.				
Missile Operating Base				
Woensdrecht 51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E	0 with launch	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 0

canister

* In preparation for operational status.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures/Equipment	
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS				
(i) SS-20				
Deployment Area Postavy 55 12 13 N 027 00 00 E 54 52 47 026 41 18 54 43 58 026 04 07 55 01 13 026 03 43				
Missile Operating Base Postavy 55 09 47 N 026 54 21 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area Vetrino 55 28 44 N 028 42 29 E 55 01 03 028 15 03 55 01 16 027 48 46 55 16 22 027 49 05				
Missile Operating Base Vetrino 55 24 19 N 028 33 29 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area Polotsk 55 37 36 N 028 23 49 E 55 28 07 029 20 25 54 32 15 029 09 47 54 39 32 028 10 40				
Missile Operating Base Polotsk 55 22 34 N 028 44 17 E	9	9	LaunchCanister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area Smorgon' 54 37 43 N 026 52 34 E 54 22 37 026 52 37 54 37 18 025 41 58 54 45 21 026 15 13				

Missile Operating Base				
Smorgon'	9	9	Launch Canister	9
54 36 16 N 026 23 05 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Smorgon'				
54 29 01 N 026 26 40 E				
54 05 04 025 53 59				
54 24 14 025 31 18				
54 35 27 026 19 10				
Missile Operating Base				
Smorgon'	9	9	Launch Canister	9
54 31 36 N 026 17 20 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Sructure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area				
Lida				
53 45 24 N 025 29 02 E				
53 34 00 024 49 35				
53 42 25 024 38 15				
53 58 05 025 10 17				
Missile Operating Base				
Lida	9	9	Launch Canister	9
53 47 39 N 025 20 27 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Gezgaly				
53 38 53 N 025 25 38 E				
53 23 48 025 26 12				
53 12 46 025 08 38				
53 22 57 024 35 43				
Missile Operating Base				
Gezgaly	6	6	Launch Canister	6
53 32 50 N 025 16 48 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6
			Training Missile	0
Deloyment Area				
Slonim				
52 58 15 N 025 55 42 E				
52 45 02 025 31 08				
53 04 08 025 09 00				
53 08 45 025 30 20				
Missile Operating Base				
Slonim	9	9	Launch Canister	9

52 55 54 N 025 21 59 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Ruzhany				
52 55 21 N 024 58 40 E				
52 46 32 024 48 25				
52 45 52 024 16 26				
53 07 34 024 22 14				
Missile Operating Base				
Ruzhany	6	6	Launch Canister	6
52 49 29 N 024 45 45 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Zasimovichi				
52 37 55 N 024 48 50 E				
52 22 00 024 10 52				
52 32 36 023 56 54				
52 45 52 024 16 26				
Missile Operating Base				
Zasimovichi	6	6	Launch Canister	6
52 30 38 N 024 08 43 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6
			Training Missile	0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area				
Mozyr'				
52 05 31 N 029 13 04 E				
51 39 05 029 39 31				
51 42 00 029 01 30				
51 52 57 028 51 32				
Missile Operating Base				
Mozyr'	9	9	Launch Canister	9
52 02 27 N 029 11 15 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Petrikov				
52 16 29 N 029 03 04 E				
52 08 06 028 48 40				
52 08 33 028 13 37				
52 27 47 028 28 17				
Missile Operating Base				
Petrikov	6	6	Launch Canister	6
52 10 29 N 028 34 52 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Zhitkovichi
52 23 40 N 028 10 31 E
52 08 35 028 10 07
52 08 55 027 14 01
52 24 01 027 14 06

Missile Operating Base				
Zhitkovichi 52 11 36 N 027 48 07 E	6	6	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	6 0 6 0

Deployment Area
Rechitsa
52 26 34 N 030 21 10 E
52 05 27 030 43 26
51 47 47 030 23 27
52 13 08 030 00 53

Missile Operating Base				
Rechitsa 52 11 58 N 030 07 11 E	6	6	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	6 0 6 0

Deployment Area
Slutsk
53 28 29 N 027 57 50 E
53 02 31 028 07 59
53 13 35 027 25 09
53 28 40 027 28 55

Missile Operating Base				
Slutsk 53 14 20 N 027 42 15 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	

Deployment Area
Lutsk
51 08 14 N 025 54 51 E
50 50 45 025 34 49
51 16 24 025 16 49
51 20 51 025 26 59

Missile Operating Base				
Lutsk 50 56 07 N 025 36 26 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0

Deployment Area
Lutsk
51 10 05 N 025 27 21 E

50 43 54 025 07 49
50 47 35 024 33 38
51 11 22 024 35 49

Missile Operating Base				
Lutsk	9	9	Launch Canister	9
50 50 06 N 025 04 02 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Brody
50 14 00 N 025 29 11 E
50 00 46 025 09 30
50 17 32 024 41 55
50 22 10 024 58 33

Missile Operating Base				
Brody	9	9	Launch Canister	9
50 06 09 N 025 12 14 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Chervonograd
50 41 07 N 024 33 58 E
50 13 10 024 38 45
50 19 02 024 11 30
50 36 26 024 17 15

Missile Operating Base				
Chervonograd	9	9	Launch Canister	9
50 22 45 N 024 18 16 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Slavuta
50 18 55 N 027 03 22 E
50 08 07 027 03 21
50 07 59 026 16 22
50 29 38 026 29 34

Missile Operating Base				
Slavuta	9	9	Launch Canister	9
50 17 05 N 026 41 31 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	

Deployment Area
Belokorovichi
51 10 19 N 028 12 04 E
50 51 05 027 51 07
51 21 28 027 01 43
51 21 22 027 37 54

Missile Operating Base				
Belokorovichi	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 10 45 N 028 03 20 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Lipniki				
51 11 38 N 029 10 28 E				
50 52 28 028 55 56				
51 05 53 028 22 14				
51 20 57 028 26 07				
Missile Operating Base				
Lipniki	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 12 22 N 028 26 37 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Vysokaya Pech'				
50 29 13 N 028 21 10 E				
50 09 49 028 20 37				
50 10 10 027 40 19				
50 29 33 027 43 58				
Missile Operating Base				
Vysokaya Pech'	6	6	Launch Canister	6
50 10 11 N 028 16 22 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6
			Training Missile	0
Development Area				
Vysokaya Pech'				
50 13 33 N 029 01 05 E				
49 56 07 029 10 23				
49 52 42 028 06 47				
50 07 39 028 20 33				
Missile Operating Base				
Vysokaya Pech'	6	6	Launch Canister	6
50 05 43 N 028 22 09 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Korosten'				
50 54 31 N 029 02 51 E				
50 41 34 029 02 16				
50 42 05 028 28 20				
50 55 01 028 28 44				
Missile Operating Base				
Korosten'	6	6	Launch Canister	6
50 52 22 N 028 31 17 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	6

			Training Missile	0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area Lebedin 50 35 26 N 034 41 41 E 50 12 10 034 00 31 50 14 25 033 50 28 50 35 42 034 21 21				
Missile Operating Base Lebedin 50 33 06 N 034 26 02 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area Glukhov 52 02 16 N 033 52 28 E 51 36 21 033 55 26 51 34 22 033 27 42 52 02 21 033 38 28				
Missile Operating Base Glukhov 51 41 00 N 033 30 56 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area Glukhov 51 42 59 N 033 27 47 E 51 23 31 033 37 56 51 23 37 032 56 33 51 43 02 033 10 25				
Missile Operating Base Glukhov 51 36 44 N 033 29 17 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area Akhtyrka 50 17 58 N 034 54 32 E 49 49 59 034 50 05 50 10 03 033 57 06 50 18 24 034 24 13				
Missile Operating Base Akhtyrka 50 16 01 N 034 49 53 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area				

Akhtyrka
50 10 43 N 035 34 34 E
49 54 08 035 00 16
50 18 14 034 24 13
50 26 42 034 48 07

Missile Operating Base				
Akhtyrka 50 21 59 N 034 57 03 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area				
Novosibirsk 55 51 09 N 083 52 28 E 55 14 33 083 49 49 55 21 52 083 08 41 55 30 29 083 09 09				
Missile Operating Base				
Novosibirsk 55 22 05 N 083 13 52 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area				
Novosibirsk 55 06 17 N 083 34 11 E 54 57 40 083 33 38 55 04 53 082 52 45 55 24 16 082 53 40				
Missile Operating Base				
Novosibirsk 55 22 57 N 082 55 16 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area				
Novosibirsk 55 31 47 N 084 08 57 E 55 13 26 082 56 55 55 20 01 082 49 41 55 40 13 084 00 42				
Missile Operating Base				
Novosibirsk 55 19 32 N 082 56 18 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0
Deployment Area				
Novosibirsk 55 08 01 N 083 53 07 E 54 52 56 083 52 02				

55 11 17 082 56 49
55 22 00 083 01 07

Missile Operating Base				
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch Canister	9
55 18 44 N 083 01 38 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Novosibirsk
55 03 58 N 084 18 27 E
54 53 12 084 19 10
55 04 49 082 56 30
55 22 00 083 01 07

Missile Operating Base				
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch Canister	9
55 19 07 N 083 09 59 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	

Deployment Area
Drovyanaya
51 44 02 N 113 08 33 E
51 22 28 113 07 32
51 22 49 112 46 52
51 44 16 112 54 39

Missile Operating Base				
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 27 20 N 113 03 42 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Drovyanaya
51 37 34 N 113 08 14 E
51 22 28 113 07 32
51 18 39 112 36 23
51 27 14 112 40 08

Missile Operating Base				
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 26 10 N 113 02 43 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Drovyanaya
51 24 52 N 112 53 51 E
51 20 36 112 50 13
51 18 54 112 15 44
51 23 13 112 15 51

Missile Operating Base				
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 22 59 N 112 49 55 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Drovyanaya				
51 26 54 N 113 00 50 E				
51 18 13 113 03 54				
51 18 47 112 26 03				
51 29 39 112 19 29				
Missile Operating Base				
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 20 18 N 113 00 54 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Drovyanaya				
51 33 19 N 113 04 35 E				
51 22 32 113 04 05				
51 22 49 112 46 52				
51 33 36 112 47 17				
Missiles Operating Base				
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch Canister	9
51 23 49 N 112 52 13 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area				
Barnaul				
53 54 32 N 084 01 02 E				
53 43 46 084 01 48				
53 35 30 083 43 07				
53 44 16 083 36 24				
Missile Operating Base				
Barnaul	9	9	Launch Canister	9
			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area				
Barnaul				
53 29 21 N 084 31 45 E				
52 58 43 083 47 57				
53 13 47 083 48 56				
53 29 02 084 17 18				
Missile Operating Base				
Barnaul	9	9	Launch Canister	9
53 18 21 N 084 08 47 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0

			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area Barnaul 53 16 38 N 084 43 16 E 52 59 32 084 51 20 52 55 09 084 47 58 53 16 02 084 14 31				
Missile Operating Base				
Barnaul 53 13 29 N 084 40 10 E	9	9	Launch Canister	9
			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area Barnaul 53 27 33 N 084 49 55 E 53 16 42 084 46 52 53 16 02 084 14 31 53 26 58 084 21 02				
Missile Operating Base				
Barnaul 53 18 47 N 084 30 27 E	9	9	Launch Canister	9
			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
Deployment Area Kansk 56 32 14 N 096 12 14 E 56 15 16 095 34 54 56 28 30 095 20 13 56 34 39 095 36 13				
Missile Operating Base				
Kansk 56 22 31 N 095 28 35 E	9	9	Launch Canister	9
			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area Kansk 56 30 47 N 095 12 33 E 56 19 53 095 19 41 56 13 45 094 59 58 56 31 03 094 56 58				
Missile Operating Base				
Kansk 56 20 09 N 095 16 34 E	9	9	Launch Canister	9
			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
			Training Missile	0

Deployment Area
Kansk
56 19 29 N 096 20 56 E
56 08 43 096 21 41
56 08 17 096 02 24
56 19 14 095 50 42

Missile Operating Base				
Kansk 56 11 19 N 096 03 13 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0

Deployment Area
Kansk
56 14 50 N 096 05 46 E
55 59 57 096 14 35
55 59 41 096 03 03
56 15 00 095 46 30

Missile Operating Base				
56 02 19 N 096 04 58 E	9	9	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	9 0 9 0

(ii) SS-4

Deployment Area
Sovetsk
55 05 33 N 021 52 38 E
55 03 22 021 56 20
54 57 04 021 29 58
55 01 23 021 26 16

Missile Operating Base				
Sovetsk 54 59 07 N 021 36 36 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	11 7 52 6

Deployment Area
Gusev
54 46 02 N 022 07 07 E
54 24 14 022 28 42
54 20 01 022 21 10
54 43 58 021 55 53

Missile Operating Base				
Gusev 54 43 59 N 022 03 27 E	5	7 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 7 52 7

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	

Deployment Area

Malorita
51 53 50 N 024 05 39 E
51 43 09 024 09 49
51 42 59 023 57 07
51 53 45 023 57 50

Missile Operating Base				
Malorita 51 51 47 N 024 01 55 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	14 7 48 5

Deployment Area
Pinsk
52 15 03 N 025 49 43 E
52 04 09 025 39 30
52 03 56 025 22 00
52 14 54 025 35 40

Missile Operating Base				
Pinsk 52 10 56 N 025 41 27 E	5	5 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	13 6 47 6

Deployment Area
Vyru
57 49 33 N 027 00 00 E
57 43 05 027 00 00
57 43 04 026 43 54
57 49 32 026 43 51

Missile Operating Base				
Vyru 57 45 47 N 026 47 13 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	11 5 51 6

Deployment Area
Aluksne
57 25 51 N 026 56 00 E
57 21 32 026 56 01
57 17 12 026 40 06
57 25 49 026 40 01

Missile Operating Base				
Aluksne 57 25 04 N 026 49 46 E	5	7 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 6 45 7

Deployment Area
Ostrov
57 38 21 N 028 20 22 E
57 21 04 028 23 43
57 21 14 028 07 47

57 38 28 028 08 19

Missile Operating Base				
Ostrov 57 31 53 N 028 12 19 E	5	8 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 7 48 6
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area				
Karmelava 55 06 12 N 024 22 04 E 54 57 49 024 33 51 54 55 00 024 04 05 55 01 28 024 03 36				
Missile Operating Base				
Karmelava 55 00 51 N 024 14 16 E	5	5 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	13 6 47 6
Deployment Area				
Ukmerge 55 17 41 N 024 59 06 E 55 04 25 024 40 58 55 08 35 024 33 12 55 19 43 024 51 26				
Missile Operating Base				
Ukmerge 55 07 51 N 024 38 36 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	14 7 50 6
Deployment Area				
Taurage 55 18 07 N 022 30 42 E 55 09 30 022 30 22 55 03 10 022 18 52 55 13 35 022 21 01				
Missile Operating Base				
Taurage 55 04 58 N 022 19 38 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 6 47 6
Deployment Area				
Kolomyya 48 45 01 N 024 55 59 E 48 36 23 024 56 20 48 36 04 024 40 04 48 44 42 024 39 40				
Missile Operating Base				

Kolomyya 48 39 32 N 024 48 04 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 6 46 7
Development Area Stryy 49 19 59 N 023 58 46 E 49 11 22 023 58 29 49 21 09 023 31 57 49 29 46 023 32 24				
Missile Operating Base Stryy 49 25 23 N 023 34 56 E	5	7 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 7 49 7
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Deployment Area Skala-Podol'skaya 48 54 37 N 026 17 26 E 48 48 09 026 17 32 48 48 02 026 01 12 48 54 30 026 01 04				
Missile Operating Base Skala-Podol'skaya 48 51 02 N 026 08 36 E	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 6 46 5

2. Non-Deployed

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA				
(i) Pershing II				
Missile Production Facilities: Hercules Plant #1 Magna, Utah 40 39 40 N 112 03 14 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Launcher Production Facilities: Martin Marietta Middle River, Maryland 39 35 N 076 24 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0

Missile Storage Facilities:				
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	111	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 4
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 36 N 086 38 W	1	0	Launch Pad ShelterTraining Missile Stage	0 20
Weilerbach Federal Republic of Germany 49 27 N 007 38 E	12	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Launcher Storage Facilities:				
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 35 N 086 37 W	0	1	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:				
NONE				
Missile Repair Facilities:				
Pueblo Depot Activit Pueblo, Colorado 38 18 N 104 19 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Launcher Repair Facilities:				
EMC Hausen, Frankfurt Federal Republic of Germany 50 08 N 008 38 E	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 37 N 086 38 W	0	10	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	 0 0
Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 40 N 098 24 W	0	2	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:				
NONE				
Test Ranges:				
Complex 16 Cape Canaveral, Florida 28 29 N 080 34 W	3	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
Training Facilities:				
Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 41 N 098 34W	0	39	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 78

Elimination Facilities:
(Not determined)

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:	0	0	Training Missile Stage	4
(ii) BGM-109G				
Missile Production Facilities: McDonnell-Douglas Titusville, Florida 28 32 N 080 40 W	52 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 0
General Dynamics Kearney Mesa, California 32 50 N 117 08 W	48 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	00
Launcher Production Facilities: Air Force Plant 19 San Diego, California 32 45 N 117 12 W	2 with launch canister	4	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 0
Missile Storage Facilities: NONE				
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE				
Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE				
Missile Repair Facilities: SABCA Gosselies, Belgium 50 27 N 004 27 E	16 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 0
Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE				
Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE				
Test Ranges: Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah 40 22 N 113 04 W	0 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 0
Training Facilities: Davis-Monthan AFB Tucson, Arizona	0 with	7	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	2 27

32 11 N 110 53 W	launch canister			
Ft. Huachuca Ft. Huachuca, Arizona 31 29 N 110 19 W	0 with launch canister	6	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 8
Elimination Facilities: (Not determined)				
Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:	15 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 2
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS				
(i) SS-20				
Missile Production Facilities: Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E	36*	0	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	36 0 0 0
Launcher Production Facilities: Barrikady Plant Volgograd 48 44 N 044 32 E	0	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	0 0 0 0

* In various stages of manufacture.

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	
Missile Storage Facilities: NONE				
Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE				
Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: Postavy 55 10 N 026 55 E	2	3	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	3 10 0 1
Gezgaly 53 36 N 025 28 E	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	6 10 0 4
Mozyr' 52 03 N 029 11 E	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle	4 10

			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
Lutsk	1	1	Launch Canister	3
50 53 N 025 30 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	10
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
Belokorovichi	2	2	Launch Canister	4
51 09 N 028 00 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	10
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
Lebedin	2	1	Launch Canister	5
50 36 N 034 25 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	10
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	3
Novosibirsk	1	1	Launch Canister	3
55 16 N 083 02 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	10
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
Drovyanaya	2	2	Launch Canister	4
51 30 N 113 03 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	10
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
Kansk	1	1	Launch Canister	2
56 16 N 095 39 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	1
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	1
Barnaul	1	1	Launch Canister	1
53 34 N 083 48 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	3
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0
Kolosovo	144	0	Launch Canister	144
53 31N 026 55 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0
Zherebkovo	20	0	Launch Canister	21
47 51 N 029 54 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	1
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**	

Missile Repair Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:

Bataysk 47 08 N 039 47 E	0	11	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	2 4 0 2
Test Ranges:				
Kapustin Yar 48 37 N 046 18 E	0	11	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	0 3 1 0
Training Facilities:				
Serpukhov 54 54 N 037 28 E	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	4 1 0 4
Krasnodar 45 03 N 038 58 E	0	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	2 1 0 2
Training Center at Test Range Kapustin Yar 48 38 N 046 10 E	0	7	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	12 1 3 12
Elimination Facilities:				
Sarny 51 21 N 026 35 E	29	68	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	32 35 0 3
Aral'sk 46 50 N 61 18 E	0	0	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	0 0 0 0
Chita 52 22 N 113 17 E	0	0	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	0 0 0 0
Kansk 56 20 N 095 06 E	0	0	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile	0 0 0 0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:
NONE

(ii) SS-4

Missile Production Facilities:

NONE

Launcher Production Facilities:
NONE

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures/Equipment	
Missile Storage Facilities:				
NONE				
Launcher Storage Facilities:				
NONE				
Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:				
Kolosovo	35	1	Missile Transporter Vehicle	9
53 31 N 026 55 E		(Launch	Missile Erector	10
		Stand)	Propellant Tank	59
			Training Missile	31
Zherebkovo	56	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle	5
47 51 N 029 54 E		(Launch	Missile Erector	4
		Stand)	Propellant Tank	11
			Training Missile	30
Missile Repair Facilities:				
Bataysk	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
47 08 N 039 47 E		(Launch	Missile Erector	0
		Stand)	Propellant Tank	0
			Training Missile	6
Launch Repair Facilities:				
NONE				
Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:				
NONE				
Test Ranges:				
Kapustin Yar	14	2	Missile Transporter Vehicle	4
48 35 N 046 18 E		(Launch	Missile Erector	2
		Stand)	Propellant Tank	4
			Training Missile	1
Training Facilities:				
NONE				
Elimination Facilities:				
Lesnaya	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
52 59 N 025 46 E		(Launch	Missile Erector	0
		Stand)	Propellant Tank	0
			Training Missile	0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:NONE

(iii) SS-5

Missile Production Facilities
NONE

Launcher Production Facilities:
NONE

Missile Storage Facilities:

Kolosovo 53 31 N 026 55 E	6	0

Launcher Storage Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:
NONE

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Structures/Equipment**

Missile Repair Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Test Ranges:
NONE

Training Facilities:
NONE

Elimination Facilities:

Lesnaya 52 59 N 025 46 E	0	0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:
NONE

3. Training Launchers
In addition to the support equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, the Parties possess vehicles, used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, which shall be considered for purposes of this Treaty to be training launchers. The number of such vehicles for each Party is:

(a) for the United States of America-29; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-65.

Elimination of such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with procedures set forth in the Protocol on

Elimination.

IV. Shorter-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

1. Deployed
The following are the missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party, of all deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment	
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA				
(i) Pershing IA				
Missile Operating Base				
NONE				
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS				
(i) SS-12				
Missile Operating Bases:				
Koenigsbrueck German Democratic Republic 51 16 40 N 013 53 20 E	19	11	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	9 10
Bischofswerda German Democratic Republic 51 08 33 N 014 12 18 E	8	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	0 4
Waren German Democratic Republic 53 32 40 N 012 37 30 E	22	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	9 7
Wokuhl German Democratic Republic 53 16 20 N 013 15 50 E	5	6	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	0 7
Hranice Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 49 33 00 N 017 45 00 E	39	24	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	15 13
Pashino 55 16 37 N 082 59 42 E	0	4	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	1 5
Gornyy 51 33 10 N 113 01 30 E	36	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	4 10
Lapichi 53 25 30 N 028 30 00 E	9	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	1 10
Kattakurgan	9	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle	1

39 38 18 N 065 58 40 E			Training Missile	6
Saryozek 44 31 58 N 077 46 20 E	36	15	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	3 16
Novosysoyevka 44 11 58 N 133 26 05 E	37	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	5 17
	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Equipment**	
(ii) SS-23				
Missile Operating Bases:				
Weissenfels German Democratic Republic 51 11 50 N 011 59 50 E	6	4	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	3 18
Jena-Forst German Democratic Republic 50 54 55 N 011 32 40 E	47	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	8 3
Stan'kovo 53 38 30 N 027 13 20 E	40	18	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	18 10
Tsel' 53 23 38 N 028 28 06 E	26	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	11 9
Slobudka 52 30 30 N 024 31 30 E	37	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	5 17
Bayram-Ali 37 36 18 N 062 10 40 E	0	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	12 0
Semipalatinsk 50 23 00 N 080 09 30 E	22	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	12 4

2. Non-Deployed

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Equipment**	
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA				
(i) Pershing IA				
<Missile Production Facilities: Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant Marshall, Texas 32 39 N 094 08 W	0	0	Training Missile Stage	0
Launcher Production Facilities: Martin Marietta Middle River, Maryland 39 35 N 076 24 W	0	0	Training Missile Stage	0

Missile Storage Facilities:				
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	169	0	Training Missile Stage	53

Launcher Storage Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE

Missile Repair Facilities: NONE

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Equipment**	
Launch Repair Facilities:				
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	0	1	Training Missile Stage	0

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Test Ranges:
NONE

Training Facilities:
NONE

Elimination Facilities:
(Not determined)

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:	1	0>	Training Missile Stage	0

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SS-12

Missile Production Facilities:				
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	0 0
Launcher Production Facilities:				
Barrikady Plant Volgograd 48 44 N 044 32 E	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	0 0
Missile Storage Facilities:				
Lozovaya 48 55 N 036 22 E	126	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	0 12
Ladushkin 54 35 N 020 12 E	72	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	0 18
Bronnaya Gora	170	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0

52 37 N 025 04 E			Training Missile	3
Balkhash	138	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
46 50 N 075 36 E			Training Missile	47
Launcher Storage Facilities:				
Berezovka	0	15	Missile Transporter Vehicle	10
50 20 N 028 26 E			Training Missile	0

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE

Missile Repair Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Equipment**	
Test Ranges:				
NONE				
Training Facilities:				
Saratov	0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
51 34 N 046 01 E			Training Missile	0
Kazan'	0	2	Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
55 58 N 049 11 E			Training Missile	0
Kamenka	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
53 11 N 044 04 E			Training Missile	0
Elimination Facilities:				
Saryozek (Missiles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
44 32 N 077 46 E			Training Missile	0
Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
53 38 N 027 13 E			Training Missile	0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:
NONE

(ii) SS-23

Missile Production Facilities:				
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR			Training Missile	0
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E				
Launcher Production Facilities:				
V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
Petropavlovsk			Training Missile	0
54 51 N 069 09 E				

Missile Storage Facilities:				
Ladushkin	33	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
54 35 N 020 12 E			Training Missile	42
Launcher Storage Facilities:				
Berezovka	0	13	Missile Transporter Vehicle	5
50 20 N 028 26 E			Training Missile	0

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:
NONE

Missile Repair Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Test Ranges:
NONE

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Equipment**	
Training Facilities:				
Saratov	0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
51 34 N 046 01 E			Training Missile	0
Kazan'	0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
55 58 N 049 11 E			Training Missile	0
Kamenka	0	1		
53 11 N 044 04 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	1
			Training Missile	0
Elimination Facilities:				
Saryozek (Missiles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
44 32 N 077 46 E			Training Missile	0
Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
53 38 N 027 13 E			Training Missile	0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:
NONE

V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry into Force of the Treaty
The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	**Launchers**	**Support Equipment**

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(i) Pershing IB

Missile Production Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Production Facilities:
NONE

Missile Storage Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Storage Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:
NONE

Missile Repair Facilities:
NONE

Launch Repair Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment

Test Ranges:
NONE

Training Facilities:
NONE

Elimination Facilities:
NONE

Missile, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:
NONE

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SSC-X-4

Missile Production Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Production Facilities:

Experimental Plant of the Amalgamated	0	0

Production with Works "M.I. Kalinin Machine Building Plant" Sverdlovsk 56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E	with launch canister	

Missile Storage Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:

Jelgava 56 40 N 024 06 E	84 with launch canister	6

Missile Repair Facilities:
NONE

Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:
NONE

Test Ranges:
NONE

Training Facilities:
NONE

Elimination Facilities:

Jelgava 56 40 N 024 06 E	0 with launch canister	0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:
NONE

VI. Technical Data
Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	P-II	**BGM-109G**	**SS-20**	**SS-4**	**SS-5**	**SSC-X-4**
1. Intermediate-Range Missiles **(a) Missile Characteristics:**						
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	3	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.61	6.40	16.49	22.77	24.30	8.09

(iii) Length of	3.68	-	8.58	18.60	21.62	-
1st stage (meters)	2.47	-	4.60	-	-	-
2nd stage (meters)						
(iv) Maximum diameter of	-	0.53	-	1.65	2.40	0.51
1st stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.79	-	-	-
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.47	-	-	-
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty weight)	6.78	-	-	3.35	4.99	-
1st stage	4.15	-	26.63	-	-	-
2nd stage	2.63	-	8.63	-	-	-
Missile in canister	-	-	42.70	-	-	-
(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons (with fuel)						
In canister	-	1.71	-	-	-	2.44
Without canister	-	1.47	-	-	-	1.70
(b) Launcher Characteristics:						
(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.60	10.64	16.81	3.02	-	12.80
	2.49	2.44	3.20	3.02	-	3.05
	2.86	2.64	2.94	3.27	-	3.80
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	4	1	1	-	6
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	12.04	14.30	40.25	6.90	-	29.10
(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers						
Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):	-	-	27.70	-	-	-
(i) Fixed structure for a launcher			9.07			
			6.82			
(ii) Launch pad shelter	74.00	-	-	-	-	-
	14.60					
	10.00					
(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers						
Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):	-	6.94	19.32	-	-	8.39
(i) Launch canister	-	0.53	2.14	-	-	0.65
(Diameter)						
	P-II	**BGM-109G**	**SS-20**	**SS-4**	**SS-5**	**SSC-X-4**
(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	-	-	17.33	22.85	-	
			3.20	2.72	-	
			2.90	2.50		
			(1)	(1)		
(iii) Missile erector	-	-	-	15.62	-	-

				3.15 3.76		
(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable)	-	-	-	11.38	-	-
Fuel	-	-	-	2.63 2.96	-	-
Oxidizer	-	-	-	10.70 2.63 3.35	-	-

	Pershing IA	**Pershing IB**	**SS-12**	**SS-23**
2. Shorter-Range Missiles				
(a) Missile Characteristics:				
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.55	8.13	12.38	7.52
(iii) Length of				
1st stage (meters)	2.83	3.68	4.38	5.17
2nd stage (meters)	2.67	-	5.37	-
(iv) Maximum diameter of				
1st stage (meters)	1.02	1.02	1.01	0.97
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.01	-
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section)	4.09	4.15	8.80	3.99
1st stage	2.45	-	4.16	-
2nd stage	1.64	-	4.64	-
(b) Launcher Characteristics:				
(i) Dimensions) maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.98 2.44 3.35	9.60 2.49 2.86	13.26 3.10 3.45	11.76 3.13 3.00
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	1	1	1
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	8.53	12.04	30.80	24.07
(c) Characteristic of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers:				
Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):				
Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	-	-	13.15 3.10 3.50 (1)	11.80 3.13 3.00 (1)

VII. Research and Development Booster Systems

Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research and development booster systems.

Number

	of Launchers
1. Research and Development Launch Sites	
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
Eastern Test Range, Florida 28 27 N 080 42 W	1
Eglin AFB, Florida 30 36 N 086 48 W	5
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 32 30 N 106 30 W	4
Green River, Utah 38 00 N 109 30 W	2
Poker Flats Research Range, Alaska 65 07 N 147 29 W	6
Roi Namur, Kwajalein 09 25 N 167 28 E	3
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii 22 06 N 159 47 W	4
Western Test Range, California 34 37 N 120 37 W	1
Cape Cod, Massachusetts 42 01 N 070 07 W	1
Wake Island 19 18 N 166 37 E	2
Wallops Island, Virginia 37 51 N 075 28 W	1
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	
Plesetskaya 62 53 N 040 52 E	3
Kapustin Yar 48 32 N 046 18 E	2

Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained herein.
This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral pad of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ronald Reagan

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

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PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to Elimination

The specific items for each type of missile system to be eliminated are:

1. For the United States of America:

Pershing II:	missile, launcher and launch pad shelter;
BGM-109G:	missile, launch canister and launcher;
Pershing IA:	missile and launcher; and
Pershing IB:	missile.

2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

SS-20:	missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle and fixed structure for a launcher;
SS-4:	missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand and propellant tanks;
SS-5:	missile;

SSC-X-4:	missile, launch canister and launcher;
SS-12:	missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle; and
SS-23:	missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle.

3. For both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers shall be subject to elimination.

4. For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination.

5. For both Parties, all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles shall be subject to elimination.

II. Procedures for Elimination at Elimination Facilities

1. In order to ensure the reliable determination of the type and number of missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, indicated in Section I of this Protocol, being eliminated at elimination facilities, and to preclude the possibility of restoration of such items for purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall fulfill the requirements below.

2. The conduct of the elimination procedures for the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the name and coordinates of the elimination facility at which the on-site inspection may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

3. Prior to a missiles arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.

4. Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The initiation of the elimination of the items of missile systems subject to this Section shall be considered to be the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section.

6. Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters.

7. A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

8. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, except those for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, along with the type and number of items of missile systems for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party. The elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

9. The Parties agree that all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles shall be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles shall, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section.

10. The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

For the Pershing II:

Missile:

(a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the BGM-109G:

Missile:

(a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IA:

Missile:

(a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IB:

Missile:

(a) missile stage shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

For the SS-20:

Missile:

(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

launch canister shall be destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile, or shall be destroyed separately by explosion, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;

(c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS-4:

Missile:

(a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;

(b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(d) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Stand:

launch stand components shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Erector:

(a) jib, missile erector leveling supports and missile erector mechanism shall be cut off missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(b) jib and missile erector leveling supports shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

mounting components for a missile and for a missile erector mechanism as well as supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher shall be cut off transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the SS-5:

Missile:

(a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;

(b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the SSC-X-4:

Missile:

(a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) the launcher chassis shall be severed at a location determined by measuring no more than 0.70 meters rearward from the rear axle.

For the SS-12:

Missile:

(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning missile stages;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;

(c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS-23:

Missile:

(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning the missile stage;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher body;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment shall be removed from launcher body;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher body;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(f) each environmental cover of the launcher body shall be removed and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(g) a portion of the launcher body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;

(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle body;

(c) all components of mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;

(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle body and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

11. The specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows:

Training Missile and Training Missile Stage:

training missile and training missile stage shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launch Canister:

training launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launcher:

training launcher chassis shall be cut at the same location designated in paragraph 10 of this Section for launcher of the same type of missile.

III. Elimination of Missiles by Means of Launching

1. Elimination of missiles by means of launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. Immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

2. All missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor.

3. Missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched one at a time, and no less than six hours shall elapse between such launches.

4. Such launches shall involve ignition of all missile stages. Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

5. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party.

6. A missile shall be considered to be eliminated by means of launching after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and upon notification required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

IV. Procedures for Elimination *In Situ*

1. Support Structures

(a) Support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) The initiation of the elimination of support structures shall be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 1(d) of this Section.

(c) The elimination of support structures shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(d) The specific elimination procedures for support structures shall be as follows:

(i) the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;

(ii) the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion;

(iii) the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty; and

(iv) upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures shall be considered to have been completed.

2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 Missiles

Fixed and transportable propellant tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be removed from launch sites.

3. Training Missiles, Training Missile Stages, Training Launch Canisters and Training Launchers

(a) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers not eliminated at elimination facilities shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers being eliminated *in situ* shall be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of this Protocol.

(c) Each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.

(d) The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 3(c) of this Section may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

(e) Elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon the completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this Section.

V. Other Types of Elimination

1. Loss or Accidental Destruction

(a) If an item listed in Section I of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a result of an accident, the possessing Party shall notify the other Party within 48 hours, as required in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, that the item has been eliminated.

(b) Such notification shall include the type of the eliminated item, its approximate or assumed location and the circumstances related to the loss or accidental destruction.

(c) In such case, the other Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the specific point at which the accident occurred to provide confidence that the item has been eliminated.

2. Static Display

(a) The Parties shall have the right to eliminate missiles, launch canisters and launchers, as well as training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers, listed in Section I of this Protocol by placing them on static display. Each Party shall be limited to a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 launchers on such static display.

(b) Prior to being placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and erector-launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative.

(c) The Party possessing a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher that is to be eliminated by placing it on static display shall provide the other Party with the place-name and coordinates of the location at which such a missile, launch canister or launcher is to be on static display, as well as the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may take place.

(d) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection of such a missile, launch canister or launcher within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in paragraph 2(c) of this Section.

(e) Elimination of a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher, by placing it on static display shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RONALD REAGAN
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
M.S. GORBACHEV
General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have agreed on the following measures relating to its implementation.

I

1. The Parties understand the requirements contained in paragraph 2 of Article IX and paragraph 2(a) of Article XIII of the Treaty to mean that all updates of data shall be exchanged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC).

2. The Parties understand that the updated data required pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article IX of the Treaty shall include data only for those elements of the missile systems and the facilities that have changed since the preceding data exchange or are in the process of being changed.

3. The Parties agree that when the notification required pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty is provided, the Party making such a notification shall also provide a site diagram of the new facility to the other Party through diplomatic channels.

4. The Parties understand that each Party shall be permitted to reschedule activities notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty. The Parties agree that such changes shall be made in accordance with the principle of minimizing hardship on the inspecting Party. The Parties understand that if the scheduled date referred to in paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty is delayed for more than five days, then the Party that has provided the notification referred to above shall provide an additional notification specifying the new scheduled date to the other Party within a short period of time. The period of time between the transmission date of the additional notification and the new scheduled date indicated in that notification shall not be less than ten days.

5. The Parties understand that each Party shall be permitted to change information contained in a notification provided pursuant to paragraph 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty.

6. The Parties understand that notifications provided by each Party pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, specifying the number of missile systems eliminated as well as the date and location of their elimination, shall be provided by each Party after it has completed the process of elimination of all systems declared in a particular notification pursuant to paragraph 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty. Such notifications shall also be provided after completion of the inspection report compiled in accordance, with paragraph 1(d) of Part F of Section III of this Memorandum.

7. The Parties agree that in the case of a delay of an activity notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty:

(a) If the delay is five days or less and the inspection team is either en route to the point of entry or has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall decide whether the inspection team should be located at the point of entry or at the inspection site for the period of the delay.

(b) If the delay is more than five days and the inspection team has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, then such an inspection team shall leave the territory of the inspected Party unless the Parties agree otherwise.

8. The Parties understand that in the course of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to weigh and measure each item listed in Section VI of the memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, to confirm its technical data. A list of specialized equipment and procedures used to conduct these inspections is contained in Annex VI to this memorandum.

9. The Parties understand the term "calendar year" as used in paragraph 5 of Article XI and paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty and paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as ,the Protocol on Inspection, to mean a period of 12 months commencing at entry into force of the Treaty.

10. The Parties understand that the obligation contained in paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, which concerns ensuring that the inspecting Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system within six months after entry into force of

the Treaty, does not preclude the installation of agreed equipment for the permanent continuous monitoring system either before or after the end of the sixth month after entry into force of the Treaty, or the replacement of it with new agreed equipment after that time.

11. The Parties agree that in conducting inspections of the former SS-20 missile launcher production facility, one of the features allowing the inspecting Party to distinguish SS-20 missile launchers from launchers of other types of missiles shall be the number of axles of the chassis, with the understanding that the chassis of the SS-20 missile launcher has six axles.

12. The Parties agree that all notifications transmitted through the NRRC shall be made with reference to Greenwich Mean Time.

13. The Parties agree that, unless otherwise specified in this Memorandum, the Parties shall use the NRRC for all notifications referred to in this Memorandum.

II

1. The Parties, referring to paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Elimination, agree upon different procedures for eliminating the front section and of the SS-20 missile, and the front sections of the BGM-109G missile the SS-4 missile, and the SSC-X-4 missile. Such procedures, while differing from the procedures contained in subparagraph (c) of the BGM-109GV SS-20 and SSC-X-4 missile elimination procedures and subparagraph (d) of the SS-4 missile elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, achieve the same result as the procedures contained in those subparagraphs.

(a) Different procedures for the elimination of the front sections of the BGM-109G missile and the SSC-X-4 missile are as follows: front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces.

(b) Different procedures for the elimination of the front section and the instrumentation compartment of the SS-20 missile are as follows: front section including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be destroyed by explosion.

(c) Different procedure for the elimination of the front section of the SS-4 missile is as follows: front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be destroyed by explosion.

2. The Parties agree that in implementing the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination for eliminating the BGM-109G missile and the SSC-X-4 missile, the inspected Party shall be permitted to separate the missile airframe into sections before it is cut longitudinally into two pieces.

3. The Parties understand paragraph 2 of section IV of the Protocol on Elimination to mean that transportable propellant tanks for the SS-4 missile are considered to be eliminated when removed from the SS-4 missile operating bases and the SS-4 missile test range launch site that are indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. The Parties understand that equipment and structures that are located at training sites and are not related to systems covered by the Treaty are not subject to elimination and may stay at these sites after the completion of elimination of the facility.

III

A. Pre-Inspection Requirements

1. The Parties understand that each of the three lists exchanged pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection may contain fewer than 200 individuals and may be supplemented pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection.

2. The Parties agree that inspection team members shall wear civilian clothes throughout the in-country period and shall wear unique badges while at the inspection site and while at other locations as agreed by the inspection team leader and the in-country escort team leader. The inspecting Party shall provide its inspectors with such badges.

3. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with unique baggage tags and that both Parties shall use such unique tags to identify the baggage of both the inspection team and the aircrew members.

4. The Parties agree that the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes, which are required pursuant to paragraph 8 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, shall be those indicated in Annex I to this memorandum.

5. The Parties agree that since, as is indicated in paragraph 8 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, inspection airplanes shall arrive at and depart from the point of entry along established international airways, representatives of the inspected Party

need not be on board such airplanes as escorts. The Parties shall use the airplane routes which are listed in Annex II to this memorandum to and from each of the points of entry. Alternate airfields shall be designated in accordance with International Civil Aviation organization regulations.

6. The Parties agree to have on board their inspection airplanes navigation equipment of the types listed in Annex II to this Memorandum.

7. The Parties agree that-inspection airplanes may include military transport airplanes with standard markings and paint schemes, to include camouflage. The inspection airplanes which may be used are:

(a) for the United States of America, airplanes known as the C-130# C-141, C-9 and T-43; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, airplanes known as the IL-62, TU-134 and TU-154.

8. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that the United States of America shall be permitted to use the airplane known as the C-5 as an inspection airplane and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be permitted to use the airplane known as the AN-124 as an inspection airplane. The Parties agree to use these airplanes only for flights into and out of Moscow and San Francisco points of entry; such flights shall not be routine and shall be used for the delivery or removal of inspection equipment listed in Section I of Annex V to this Memorandum. Whenever either Party deems it necessary, these airplanes shall be permitted, at the same-time that they are delivering or removing inspection equipment, to carry inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. In order to use the C-5 and AN-124 airplanes as inspection airplanes:

(a) Each Party, not later than 20 days prior to the scheduled date of arrival of the airplane at the point of entry, shall notify the other Party of its intention to carry out such a flight and shall provide lists of the aircrew members and inspectors for the scheduled flight.

(b) The Parties agree that the limit on aircrew members set forth in paragraph 1 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that the number of aircrew members for each of such flights shall not exceed 25. This number shall include personnel for loading and unloading the cargoes that are being transported.

(c) The Parties agree that the period for conveying agreement to the designation of each aircrew member set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that each Party, within 15 days after receipt of the notification of the intention of the other Party to carry out such a flight, shall review the proposed list of aircrew members for this airplane and inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each aircrew member proposed.

(d) The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the fulfillment of the provisions of subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, the overall limit on the number of aircrew members, that is 200 individuals, set forth in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights.

(e) The Parties agree that the visa requirements set forth in paragraph S of section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that the inspected Party, within the 15-day period provided for in subparagraph (c) above, shall ensure the granting of a single-entry visa to each aircrew member to whose entry it has agreed on the basis of the submitted list of aircrew members.

(f) The Party carrying out a flight for delivering equipment to a continuous monitoring inspection site shall so notify the other Party in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Part D of this Section.

The Parties agree that, except as provided for above, the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection and this memorandum that apply to inspection airplanes also shall apply to flights of the C-5 and AN-124 airplanes.

9. The Parties understand that they shall be permitted to use regularly scheduled commercial flights to deliver inspectors to those points of entry that are served by airlines. The Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to regularly scheduled commercial flights or to aircrews serving such flights used for delivering inspectors to points of entry.

B. Notifications

1. The Parties understand paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection to require the inspecting Party to file the flight plan for an inspection airplane in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization procedures and to notify the inspected Party of the content of that flight plan.

2. The Parties agree to assign the call sign "info-XXX" (three digits) to inspection airplanes. Odd hundred call signs shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the United States of America (for example, 1XX, 3XX, 5XX) and even hundred call signs

shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (for example, 2XX, 4XX, 6XX).

C. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The Parties, referring to paragraph 1 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection, understand that the diplomatic aircrew escort shall meet and accompany an inspection team arriving on a regularly scheduled commercial flight. The Parties understand that the diplomatic aircrew escort shall not be permitted to accompany the inspection team beyond the point of entry.

2. The Parties agree that if an inspection team arrives at the San Francisco point of entry on an inspection airplane, it shall land at Travis Air Force Base. The diplomatic aircrew escort, comprised of one or two accredited diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet socialist Republics in San Francisco, shall be permitted to travel to and have access to Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting the inspection airplane, aircrew members and inspectors arriving there. In order to gain access to the Base, the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco:

(a) shall contact the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone and report the name or names of the personnel involved and the license plate number of the vehicle involved; and

(b) shall ensure that such information is provided not less than four hours before the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane at Travis Air Force Base.

The diplomatic aircrew escort shall not be permitted to leave the free movement zone, as that zone is defined in the Notes of the United States Department of state of March 18, 1983, and of November 16, 1983, en route to Travis Air Force Base more than four hours before the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane. If such notification is made in accordance with these procedures, then the diplomatic aircrew escort shall be granted access to Travis Air Force Base not less than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the inspection airplane at the Base.

3. The Parties agree that if an inspection team arrives at San Francisco International Airport on a regularly scheduled commercial flight, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to Travis Air Force Base. In this case, the diplomatic aircrew escort, comprised of one or two accredited diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco, shall be permitted to accompany the inspection team to Travis Air Force Base. In order to gain

access to the Base, the Consulate General of the union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco:

(a) shall contact the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone and report the name or names of the personnel involved and the license plate number of the vehicle involved; and

(b) shall ensure that such information is provided not less than two hours before the arrival of the inspection team at San Francisco International Airport.

If such notification is made in accordance with these procedures, then the diplomatic aircrew escort accompanying the inspection team from San Francisco International Airport to Travis Air Force Base shall be granted access to the Base along with the inspection team.

4. If during the course of the examination of inspection equipment pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection the inspection team leader disagrees with the conclusion of the inspected Party that an item of equipment either (a) is not equipment agreed by the Parties pursuant to paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection or (b) can perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty, and thus should not be cleared for use, the inspection team leader shall be permitted to explain to the in-country escort the appropriateness of the item of equipment to the inspection requirements contained in Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties agree that if the in-country escort remains unconvinced, such equipment shall not be taken to an inspection site by the inspection team, both the in-country escort team leader and the inspection team leader shall record their views in writing, and each of them shall transmit both views for review by appropriate authorities.

5. The Parties agree that if the inspected Party establishes that the equipment can perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty and the explanation referred to in paragraph 4 above is not persuasive, then the disputed item or items of equipment shall be returned to the inspection airplane. If no such airplane is available, the equipment shall be impounded and shall be stored in the secure facility provided for storage of inspection equipment at the point of entry.

6. The Parties understand the term "tamper-proof containers" as used in paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection to mean containers used to transport and store inspection equipment that are locked and sealed by means of locks and seals belonging to the inspecting Party. Such seals may be, for example, tamper- indicating tape seals.

7. The Parties understand paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection to mean, with respect to inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, that:

(a) The inspecting Party shall provide routine medical care for inspectors and that the inspected Party shall ensure availability of emergency medical care for inspectors.

(b) If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, the inspected Party shall provide emergency evacuation services for inspectors from the inspection site to a point of entry.

(c) If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, it shall evacuate at its own expense inspectors out of the territory of the inspected Party.

8. The Parties understand that the meals provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection for the inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol, including at the sites where elimination occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be paid for by the inspected Party. These meals shall be in the form of prepared meals either in a dining facility or at a location agreed to by the inspection team leader and the in-country escort team leader.

9. The Parties understand that the lodging provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection for the inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol shall be paid for by the inspected Party, and that such lodging can be of various types depending on the location and kind of inspection. The Parties agree that:

(a) The lodging provided for inspectors and aircrew members at the point of entry, and for inspectors conducting inspections of the process of elimination at sites where elimination occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be hotel-like accommodations.

(b) The lodging provided for inspectors conducting inspections in accordance with Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, and for inspectors conducting inspections of the process of elimination at elimination sites not subject to subparagraph (a) above, shall be sufficient to permit inspectors to sleep and need not be separate from the work space provided at the inspection site.

10. The Parties agree that the lodging provided for inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on a temporary basis, shall be in existing buildings and, on a permanent basis, shall be in buildings that will be built by

the inspected Party for the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 5 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection. In this regard, the inspected Party shall permit inspectors at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna to remain in their temporary housing until construction of their permanent housing is completed.

11. The Parties understand that the transportation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection for inspectors conducting inspections in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol shall be paid for by the inspected Party and shall encompass transportation at the point of entry, to and from the inspection site, and at the inspection site. In this regard, the Parties agree that, at the inspection site, the inspected Party shall provide a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the entire inspection team as well as up to five vehicles, depending on the number of subgroups into which the inspection team leader divides the inspection team.

12. The Parties understand that transportation between the point of entry and the inspection site for inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of that Protocol, shall be provided by the inspected Party at the expense of the inspecting Party. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that the inspected Party shall provide at its own expense transportation at the point of entry and at the continuous monitoring inspection site for inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section IX of that Protocol. In this regard, all expenses associated with the transportation of inspectors at the point of entry and within 50 kilometers of the continuous monitoring inspection sites at Magna and Votkinsk shall be borne by the inspected Party, and the drivers of the vehicles shall be considered to be in-country escorts.

13. The Parties understand that, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspecting Party shall bear all expenses associated with the construction of the structure for installation and operation of its non-damaging image producing equipment at its continuous monitoring inspection site.

14. The Parties agree to follow the current practices used by their embassies in Moscow and Washington, D.C., both for reimbursing expenses that are incurred by the inspected Party and that are subject to reimbursement pursuant to paragraph 5 or 6 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, and for reimbursing other expenses as agreed by the Parties.

15. The Parties agree to use the list of inspection sites and their associated points of entry contained in Annex III to this Memorandum in order to fulfill the requirements in paragraph 7 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection.

16. The Parties agree that in conducting sequential inspections as permitted by paragraph 16 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, they shall inspect only those inspection sites associated with the point of entry from which the inspection team commenced inspection activities.

17. The Parties, referring to paragraph 7 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, understand that:

(a) Although the inspecting Party shall be permitted to indicate the inspection site prior to the time for specification of the inspection site provided in the notification of the intention to conduct an inspection, the nine-hour period for transporting the inspectors referred to in paragraph 2 of section VII of the Protocol on Inspection shall commence at the time for specification of the inspection site that was provided in the notification.

(b) The indication referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be transmitted in written form by the inspection team leader to the in-country escort team leader.

(c) If the indication referred to in subparagraph (a) above is made at the time for specification of the inspection site provided in the notification rather than before that time, then it shall be made at the airport associated with the point of entry. If, however, such indication precedes this time, the inspection team leader shall be permitted to indicate it elsewhere.

18. The Parties agree to permit representatives of the mass media to take photographs of inspection teams at the points of entry and to be present at one of the first eliminations of missiles. The Parties agree to organize the presence of representatives of the mass media so that it does not interfere with either the inspection activities or the process of elimination. The United states of America shall permit representatives of the mass media to be present at the entrance of an inspection site in its basing countries during the first inspections, and opportunities for photographs might be provided in such cases. The Parties agree that representatives of the mass media shall not be permitted to accompany inspectors during inspections.

D. General Rules for Conducting Inspections 1. The Parties, referring to the phrase "and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties" contained in paragraph 9 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to add to the list of agreed equipment the following: hand-held flashlights and batteries for such flashlights, and hand-held

magnetic compasses. A description of the equipment to be used is contained in Annex IV to this Memorandum.

2. The Parties, referring to paragraph 9 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to use linear measurement devices, cameras, portable weighing devices and radiation detection devices in accordance with the procedures, set forth in Annex IV to this Memorandum. The list of agreed equipment, including its characteristics, is contained in Annex IV to this memorandum.

3. The Parties agree that during an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups. The Parties agree that such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party.

4. The Parties agree that the result of each measurement of the weight or dimensions of a missile, missile stage, launcher, support structure or an item of support equipment subject to the Treaty that deviates, by less than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty shall be considered acceptable.

5. The Parties understand that, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspected Party shall conduct a safety briefing for the inspection team in the inspected Party's language. This briefing shall be translated into the inspecting Party's language.

6. The Parties understand that the pre-inspection movement restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Protocol on inspection shall remain in effect until the pre- inspection procedures referred to in paragraph 14 of Section VI of that Protocol are completed.

7. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that in order to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, each continuous monitoring inspection team shall be permitted to have up to four deputy team leaders rather than the one deputy team leader provided for in paragraph 15 of Section VI of that Protocol.

8. The Parties agree that for inspections conducted sequentially, as provided for in paragraph 16 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection:

(a) The inspection team, before departing the point of entry to conduct an initial inspection, shall be permitted to declare that it intends to conduct sequential inspections.

(b) In the event that inspection sites are in close proximity to one another, the inspection team shall not normally return to the point of entry before conducting sequential inspections, but the inspection team shall be permitted to return to the point of entry when, in the judgment of the inspection team leader, circumstances require it.

(c) In the event that after returning to the point of entry from an inspection site the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall so notify the inspected Party within one hour of its return to the point of entry and shall indicate the time of the specification of the inspection site. The time of the specification of the inspection site shall be not less than four hours and not more than 24 hours after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry.

(d) During sequential inspections, the inspected Party shall provide modest sleeping accommodations for the inspection team at the site where an inspection has been completed, at the sequential inspection site, or at another site that is mutually agreed.

9. The Parties agree that the inspection team shall be permitted to store equipment during the course of its stay at the inspection site in the work space for inspectors at that site. Such equipment shall be under the direct control of the inspection team for the period of inspection.

10. Cargoes of inspection equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites, or for maintenance or repair of equipment already installed, which are on an airplane indicated in paragraph 7 or 8 of Part A of this Section, shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 11 below. individual items of inspection equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites or for maintenance or repair of equipment, already installed, which are brought onto the territory of the inspected Party by an inspector and which thus are not part of a shipment, shall be subject to examination only in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part C of this Section.

11. In accordance with paragraph 10 above, the Parties agree to use the following procedures for delivering and examining cargoes of equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites or for maintenance or repair of equipment already installed throughout the entire period during which such inspections are conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty:

(a) Not less than ten days before the delivery of equipment and supplies to the point of entry for a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party, through the embassy of the inspecting Party in the capital of the inspected Party, an inventory of the equipment and supplies, with an indication of the

following: (i) the weight and dimensions of each separate palletized or oversize unit of cargo, including modular structures;

(ii) whether modular structures are being shipped to the inspection site;

(iii) the contents of each shipping container on a pallet and of each modular structure, by means of the description set forth in section I of Annex V to this memorandum, so that the inspected Party is able to correlate each item to a specific entry in that Annex; and

(iv) the location at the portal or at the exits where each major item on the inventory of equipment and supplies, as set forth in Annex V to this Memorandum, is to be installed or used.

In addition, if it is necessary for facilitating transportation of equipment, of oversize items, or of any other items from the point of entry to a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with black-and-white photographs or clear facsimile copies of photographs of such equipment and items.

(b) Each separate shipping container on a pallet included on the inventory mentioned in subparagraph (a) above shall be marked with the appropriate freight marking and shall have a complete packing list attached. One copy of such a packing list shall be appended also to the inventory mentioned in subparagraph (a) above.

(c) The inspected Party shall examine cargoes containing equipment and supplies delivered to the point of entry. At the discretion of the inspected Party, specific items of equipment and specific supplies may be examined either at the point of entry or at the continuous monitoring inspection site. If the examination is carried out at the point of entry, it shall be carried out in the presence of the aircrew members. Inspectors shall be permitted to be present during all such examinations.

(d) If the examination of the cargoes is carried out at the point of entry, upon completion of the examination procedures the inspecting Party shall repack the equipment and supplies, using the same type of packing material and the same markings referred to in subparagraph (b) above. The inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall assist the inspecting Party in packing the equipment and supplies, in providing for their security during loading and unloading operations, and in fastening the cargoes for shipment. Upon completion of packing procedures, cargoes shall be sealed with seals of both the inspecting and the inspected Parties. At the continuous monitoring inspection site, the seals shall be examined jointly and

afterwards the inspectors shall open each shipping container and modular structure in the presence of the in-country escort.

(e) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe palletized cargoes and modular structures at the point of entry and at each point where they are transferred from one vehicle to another, including: observation of them being loaded onto the vehicle that will transport them to the inspection site or to an intermediate transfer point, observation of the transfer of them at an intermediate transfer point, and observation of them at the inspection site once the vehicle carrying such cargoes arrives there. In the event of unforeseen delays, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe the palletized cargoes and modular structures inside the vehicle while they are in transit.

(f) The contents of each shipping container, including modular structures, shall be checked against the description contained in Section I of Annex V to this memorandum and provided in accordance with subparagraph (a) above. Based on the results of the examination of the contents of all of the shipping containers, including modular structures, a joint inventory shall be drawn up, and if the equipment included on the inventory corresponds to the equipment described in section I of Annex V to this Memorandum, the inventory shall be signed by both Parties. When the inventory is signed, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to begin installing and using the equipment and supplies at the continuous monitoring inspection site. Until the document is signed, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing security for the, cargoes and protecting them from inclement weather.

(g) The inspected Party shall be permitted to observe the equipment during installation, testing and operation at the continuous monitoring inspection site.

(h) If at any time during the examination, installation, testing or operation of inspection equipment at the point of entry or at the continuous monitoring inspection site it is established that the inspection equipment can perform, or does perform, functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty, then either such equipment shall not be installed or its use shall be discontinued, and it shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party.

12. The Parties agree to use the following procedures for examining radiation detection devices at the point of entry as provided for in paragraph 4 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection:

(a) Prior to the conduct of the benchmark radiation measurements required by paragraph 2 of Part D of Section III of Annex IV to this Memorandum, the inspecting Party shall bring into the territory of the inspected Party three radiation detection devices whose composition is listed in paragraph 1 of Part A of Section II of Annex

IV to this Memorandum. The inspected Party shall select one of those devices to purchase. The two other devices intended for use in conducting benchmark radiation measurements shall be stored at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph (d) below. Thirty days after the inspected Party has received the device it purchased, it shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use such devices for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(b) The examination of the two radiation detection devices that are intended for use in taking the benchmark radiation measurements shall commence on a date agreed by the Parties, which shall be not less than 30 days and not more than 90 days after delivery of the devices referred to in subparagraph (a) above to the inspected Party. This examination shall be completed within five days after the date agreed for its initiation.

(c) During the examination referred to in subparagraph (b) above, as well as during subsequent examinations of radiation detection devices, the inspected Party shall be permitted in the presence of the inspecting Party to dismantle partially such devices and examine them using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection devices to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Prior to departing the point of entry to conduct benchmark radiation measurements or an inspection, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to test the radiation detection devices to be used to establish that their capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty has not been impaired by the inspected Party's examination of the radiation detection devices.

(d) Except as specified in subparagraph (f) below, any additional radiation detection device delivered to the point of entry for the purpose of conducting benchmark radiation measurements or inspections shall be subject to examination within five days in accordance with the procedures set forth in subparagraph (c) above and shall be stored at the point of entry for use in conducting benchmark radiation measurements or inspections. These devices shall be stored in tamper-proof containers, provided by the inspecting Party within a dual-key secure facility pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring replacement batteries and a neutron calibration source into the point of entry for use during each inspection and these shall be examined pursuant to paragraph 4 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection.

(e) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to commence the process of conducting benchmark radiation measurements within 48 hours after completion of the examination referred to in subparagraph (b) above.

(f) The radiation detection devices stored at the point of entry, as required by subparagraph (a) above and pursuant to subparagraph (d) above, shall be used for conducting inspections in accordance with section VII of the Protocol on Inspection. The inspecting Party shall store no fewer than two radiation detection devices, the use of which is permitted pursuant to subparagraph (a) above and which have been examined pursuant to subparagraph (b) or (d) above, in the tamper-proof containers referred to in subparagraph (d) above. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team shall be permitted to examine, in the presence of the in-country escort, the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection devices are stored, and the devices in those containers, for a period not to exceed four hours:

(i) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the radiation detection devices have not been tampered with, and that this device is functioning properly then this device shall be used for conducting the inspection.

(ii) If either Party determines that the containers for all stored radiation detection devices have been tampered with, then a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party according to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection shall be used for conducting the inspection.

(iii) If either Party determines that all containers that have not been tampered with contain devices that are not functioning properly, then a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party shall be used for conducting the inspection. In this case, the time for specification of the site to be inspected provided pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection shall be delayed, if necessary, until the inspected Party completes its examination of the radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team. In no case shall that delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for specification of the site to be inspected beyond the 24-hour limit set forth in paragraph 2(a) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection. Once the inspected Party completes its examination of the radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team, the inspection team shall provide, within the above-mentioned 24-hour time limit, the inspected Party with a new date and time for specification of the site to be inspected.

(g) If there is no evidence that containers have been tampered with, and the radiation detection device stored in them is not functioning properly, then the inspecting Party shall return this device and its containers to the territory of the inspecting Party and inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to

preclude such malfunctions in the future. If a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team is not used for conducting the inspection, then it shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspecting Party once the inspection has been completed.

13. In order to ensure that the inspecting Party is able to exercise its right at a continuous monitoring inspection site to install and operate a permanent continuous monitoring system pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that:

(a) During the installation of equipment at a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspection team shall provide the inspected Party, as soon as they are available to the inspection team at that continuous monitoring inspection site, with installation drawings, installation manuals and other documentation, including any changes to that documentation as they occur, to be used by the inspection team at that site to install or test the equipment there. such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party as the installation work proceeds, but prior to the commencement of the work described by that documentation.

(b) The inspection team shall provide the inspected Party, at that continuous monitoring inspection site, with manuals and any other documents, including any changes to that documentation as they occur, to be used by the inspection team at that site to operate, maintain, repair or perform additional testing of the equipment there. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to its use at the site.

E. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties understand that when the pre-inspection movement restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection cease to be in force, that is, not later than one hour after the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the inspection team leader shall designate not less than one subgroup from among the members of the inspection team to inspect vehicles that are leaving the inspection site so that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, the operation of the inspected facility shall not be hampered or delayed.

2. The Parties agree that in carrying out their obligations under paragraph 6 of section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, when an inspection team arrives at a missile operating base, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team of all missiles, missile stages, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at the missile operating base being inspected, as well as the missiles, missile stages,

launchers and support equipment associated with that base and located in the deployment area within which that missile operating base is located.

3. The Parties agree that roads joining non-contiguous areas of a missile support facility are part of that facility. In this connection:

(a) movement along such roads of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, does not mean that such systems have left the missile support facility and does not require notification pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of the Treaty.

(b) During inspections of the missile support facility, the inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle on such roads that is capable of containing:

(i) for the United States of America, the second stage of the Pershing II missile, or the BGM-109G cruise missile;

and (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the first stage of the SS-12 missile, the stage of the SS-23 missile, the SSC-X-4 cruise missile or the launch stand of the SS-4 missile.

(c) Vehicles capable of containing items listed in subparagraph (b) above that cross roads joining non-contiguous areas of a missile support facility, and vehicles that travel on such roads without entering the non-contiguous areas of the missile support facility these roads join shall not be considered to be leaving an inspection site, as is indicated in paragraph 12 of Section VII of the Protocol on inspection, when they exit from such roads.

4. The Parties agree that for the purpose of paragraph 7 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, the dimensions of a structure, container, vehicle or covered object shall be deemed to be greater than the dimensions of a missile, missile stage, launcher or item of support equipment subject to the Treaty, if each of its measured linear dimensions (length, width, height, diameter) is determined to be 99 percent or more of the corresponding dimensions of the missile, missile stage, launcher or item of support equipment indicated in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding. Such a structure, container, vehicle or covered object shall be subject to the inspection procedures set forth in paragraphs 8 through 14 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The Parties understand that if the inspection team is unable to carry out the measuring or weighing procedures set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on

Inspection either because it has failed to bring agreed equipment to the inspection site or because through no fault of the inspected Party, that equipment cannot function, then the inspected Party shall not be required to demonstrate through other agreed procedures, including by visual observation of the interior, that a container sufficiently large to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty does not contain such a missile or missile stage.

6. The Parties agree that for the purpose of paragraphs 8 and 14 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, except in a case when a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty is declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5(a) of Article XI of. the Treaty, the in-country escort shall permit the use of portable weighing devices in those cases where the inspected Party decides not to permit visual observation of the interior of a container declared not to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty.

(b) A container or covered object that is large enough to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain such a missile or missile stage shall be deemed heavy enough to contain such a missile or missile stage,if its weight is determined to be 97 percent or more of the weight of such a missile or missile stage that it is large enough to contain. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty, containers that are deemed to be heavy enough to contain such a missile or missile stage shall be subject to inspection by interior visual observation.

F. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties agree that during inspections conducted in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, each Party shall be permitted to replace inspectors conducting an inspection of the elimination of missile systems in accordance with a schedule determined by the inspecting Party. In so doing, the Parties shall be guided by the following provisions:

(a) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out not more than once every three weeks and the number of inspectors subject to rotation in each case shall not be less than 50 percent of inspectors present at the inspection site.

(b) The inspecting Party shall notify the inspected Party of its intention to rotate inspectors not less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of new inspectors at the point of entry. This notification shall contain the information

specified in paragraph 1(b) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection, with an indication of whether the inspection team leader is being rotated. In a case when the inspecting Party cannot provide in that notification the information required by paragraph 1(b)(iv) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection, it shall notify the inspected Party not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of such inspectors at the point of entry of the list of inspectors and aircrew members arriving on that flight.

(c) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out at the elimination site or, if necessary to ensure that not more than 20 inspectors are present at the site at any one time, at the airport nearest the elimination site.

(d) Before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader, the Parties shall complete an inspection report covering the period since the arrival of that inspection team leader, with an indication of the number of items of each type for which elimination procedures have been completed. To facilitate the preparation of the inspection report by the outgoing inspection team leader, the specific procedures for eliminating the items undergoing elimination at that site shall be completed before the time the outgoing inspection team leader departs the inspection site.

(e) The inspected Party shall not initiate elimination of items until pre-inspection procedures, referred to in paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, for the newly arrived inspectors have been completed. Any delay in the initiation of elimination procedures for the above-mentioned items caused by the arrival of a new inspection team leader shall not exceed three hours.

2. The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the exercise of the duties of inspectors pursuant to paragraphs 1(c) and 1(d) of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspected Party shall provide binoculars to inspectors at those sites where missiles are being eliminated by means of launching, burning or explosive demolition, and agree that visual observation of the indicated processes shall be ensured by means of adequate binoculars. The Parties understand that during such elimination, the inspection team shall observe the elimination procedures from a safe distance indicated by the inspected Party.

G. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties understand that:

(a) at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, the portal has one rail line and one road, and there is no other exit; and

(b) at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, the portal has one road, and there are two other exits.

2. The Parties agree that, on the basis of reciprocity, the telephone lines provided pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection shall include:

(a) for the United States of America, two dedicated direct telephone lines for communications between the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk and the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow, and one non-dedicated telephone line for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, two dedicated direct telephone lines for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, D.C., and one non-dedicated telephone line for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco, the AMTORG Corporation in New York, and the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna.

All expenses associated with the use of the non-dedicated telephone lines shall be borne by the inspecting Party. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that all expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines shall be borne by the inspected Party.

3. The Parties, referring to paragraph 6 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to use the equipment listed in Annexes IV and V to this Memorandum, and agree to use this equipment as indicated in Annex V to this Memorandum.

4. The Parties agree that either Party is permitted, at a later date, to install data authentication devices, as provided for in paragraph 6(f) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, at the continuous monitoring inspection site on the territory of the other Party. Before installation of such devices, their characteristics and methods of use shall be agreed by the Parties.

5. In accordance with paragraph 9 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree to the following arrangement for using systems of radio communication to permit inspectors patrolling the perimeter of a continuous monitoring inspection site to communicate with the Data Collection Center:

(a) Inspectors shall, while inspecting the perimeter of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, use their own systems of radio communication that do not contain components permitting them to operate on other than a single, agreed operating frequency.

(b) Inspectors shall, while inspecting the perimeter of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, use their own systems of radio communication that do not contain components permitting them to operate on other than a single, agreed operating frequency.

(c) The Parties shall agree upon the frequencies to be used for the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above prior to the use of such systems.

(d) The inspected Party shall be permitted to examine the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above at any time, including at the points of entry and at the continuous monitoring inspection sites, to ascertain that they are capable of operating only on the single, agreed operating frequency.

(e) Until such time as the inspection teams are provided with the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the inspected Party shall make systems of radio communication available to the inspection team but shall maintain such systems under its own control.

6. The Parties agree that, on the basis of reciprocity, the inspected Party shall provide temporary portal facilities for the inspectors conducting continuous monitoring inspections prior to the completion of construction or installation of the permanent buildings provided for in paragraph 6(a) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection. Such temporary facilities shall be provided at the expense of the inspecting Party.

7. The Parties agree that the building for storage of supplies and equipment referred to in paragraph 6(a) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection shall, on the basis of reciprocity, be constructed by the inspected Party, not the inspecting Party.

8. The Parties agree that:

(a) The inspection team shall notify the inspected Party in advance of its intention to conduct an inspection of the agreed perimeter of a continuous monitoring inspection site.

(b) During such an inspection of the agreed perimeter, the inspection team shall only:

(i) ascertain that the integrity of the agreed perimeter is maintained by the inspected Party and that the inspected Party does not take non-agreed actions to change the agreed perimeter, including repair, of the fence; and

(ii) ascertain that the inspected Party has not moved or attempted to move objects over or through the agreed perimeter.

9. The Parties agree that:

(a) In accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, there shall be not more than 30 inspectors at a continuous monitoring inspection site at any one time.

(b) The schedule for the rotation of inspectors at a continuous monitoring inspection site shall be decided by the inspecting Party.

(c) The inspecting Party shall notify the inspected Party not less than seven days in advance of its intention to rotate inspectors, with an indication of the number and the names of the inspectors rotating into and out of the continuous monitoring inspection site.

(d) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out at the airport nearest the continuous monitoring inspection site, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Izhevsk and in the United States of America at Salt Lake City.

10. The Parties agree that the inspected Party shall bear the expenses of the construction at a continuous monitoring inspection site on its territory of a temperature-controlled and humidity- controlled inspection building to be used for visual observation conducted pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection and this Memorandum.

11. The Parties agree that in order to implement the procedures related to the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna set forth in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of Part G of this section and those contained in Part A of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum, the inspected Party shall use 3.25 meters, not the length of the longest stage of an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party as specified in section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding, as the length criterion for making the declaration referred to in paragraph 11 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

12. The Parties agree that at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk:

(a) vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall not be weighed; and

(b) all railcars with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be opened for visual observation of the interior in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 6(c) of Part B of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate this arrangement upon six months' notice. Provided that the Parties have agreed on the characteristics and methods of use of weight sensors, six months after such notice is given, such vehicles shall no longer be opened, except as is provided for in section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, and the Parties shall begin to use weight as a criterion for inspection for vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk.

13. The Parties agree that at the-continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna:

(a) vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall not be weighed; and

(b) all vehicles that can contain cargoes with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be opened for visual observation of their interior in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraphs 5(e) and 5(f) of Part A of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate this arrangement upon six months' notice. Provided that the Parties have agreed on the characteristics and methods of use of weight sensors, six months after such notice is given, such vehicles shall no longer be opened, except as is provided for in section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, and the Parties shall begin to use weight as a criterion for inspection for vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at magna.

14. The Parties, referring to the declaration required by paragraph 11 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection that begins the inspection process at the portal of a continuous monitoring inspection site, agree to permit the inspecting Party to measure, using the linear measurement devices listed in Section I of Annex IV to this memorandum, missiles and missile stages not contained in launch canisters or shipping containers, as well as those that are contained in launch canisters or shipping containers opened for visual observation of their contents pursuant to paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section, that leave through the portal of its continuous monitoring

inspection site, that are declared by the inspected Party to be missiles or missile stages, and that have the following dimensions:

(a) for the United states of America at its continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, missiles and missile stages that have a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at its continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, missiles and missile stages that have a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters.

15. The Parties agree that:

(a) the inspecting Party shall be permitted to have access to all missiles and missile stages with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna for visual observation and, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Part G of this section, dimensional measurement of them if the vehicle transporting such a missile or missile stage has been declared to contain a missile or missile stage of those dimensions; and

(b) non-damaging image producing equipment shall not be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate the arrangement set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Parties agree that the provisions contained in subparagraph (a) above shall cease to be in effect either nine months after the Party making the decision to terminate it notifies the other Party of such a decision or after non-damaging image producing equipment installed at the portal of the continuous monitoring inspection site at magna becomes operational, if such equipment becomes operational more than nine months after the aforementioned notification has been provided.

16. The inspecting Party shall use the time period specified in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section for installation, pursuant to paragraph 6(d) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, of non-damaging image producing equipment having the technical characteristics set forth in paragraph 1(j) of Part B of section I of Annex V to this memorandum at the portal of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. The installation of such equipment shall commence as soon as the following requirements are met:

(a) The inspecting Party has provided information on the design features of the non-damaging image producing equipment that permits the inspected Party to ascertain

that the imaging equipment to be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty and to ascertain that it meets all applicable safety standards. In particular, such information shall include the following:

(i) a description both of the features incorporated into the design of the equipment and into its operation that preclude it from imaging portions of a missile or missile stage that the Parties have excluded from imaging as well as a description of the system for storing and reviewing the data collected by the equipment; and

(ii) a description of the safety features of the imaging system, including complete descriptions of safety control and interlock systems, personnel protection and warning systems, and shielding design requirements.

(b) The Parties have agreed on the methods of use of the non- damaging image producing equipment referred to above.

(c) The building for the use of the non-damaging image producing equipment has been completed.

17. Not later than nine months after the notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section is provided, the Parties shall agree on the methods of use of the non-damaging image producing equipment to be installed pursuant to paragraph 16 of Part G of this Section. Such agreed methods of use shall be applied to types of missiles and missile stages.the inspecting Party is permitted to image pursuant to paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, unless the Parties agree upon different methods of use.

18. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a detailed description of the requirements for the building in which the non-damaging image producing equipment shall be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. Such a description shall include the documentation needed to design and construct the building in which the proposed non-damaging image producing equipment shall be housed, including information on the distance from the source to the detectors, the geometry and size of the detector array, the overall dimensions of the system, and the requirements for electrical and mechanical connections between the non-damaging image producing equipment of the inspecting Party and systems provided by the inspected Party. Once the notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section is made and the detailed description referred to above of the requirements for the building is provided, the inspected Party shall design and then, after reaching agreement with the inspecting Party on the design, shall construct the aforementioned building.

19. The Parties agree that in order to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, the leader or any one of the deputy leaders of each continuous monitoring inspection team shall be permitted to make trips between the continuous monitoring inspection site and the embassy of the inspecting Party and to be accompanied by any other member of the inspection team such trips shall be organized upon request of the inspecting Party and shall be made not more than once a week. The Parties understand that during such trips only the papers of the inspectors shall enjoy inviolability; all personal baggage shall be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the inspected Party shall bear responsibility for the organization of such trips, and that expenses associated with such trips shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

20. The Parties agree that the delivery of supplies to the continuous monitoring inspection sites shall be carried out without unreasonable delay. 21. The Parties understand that the portal and exit monitoring areas at the continuous monitoring inspection sites shall have sufficient lighting to permit monitoring functions to be carried out at night. At the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, such lighting systems shall be provided by the inspecting Party. At the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, such lighting systems shall be provided by the inspected Party.

IV

1. Annexes I, II, III, IV, V and VI to this Memorandum are an integral part of, and have the same force as, this Memorandum.

2. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Memorandum. Agreed amendments shall enter into force on the date of their signature.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Agreement.

Done at Geneva on December 21, 1989, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the For the Government of the United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative of the Representative of the United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist to the Special Verification Republics Special Verification Commission Commission

ANNEX I
STANDING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE NUMBERS FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANES

I. For United States of America's Flights to: The Union of Soviet AI 1988 (89 et cetera) Socialist Republics The German Democratic ET 400 Republic The Czechoslovak CZ-444444 Socialist Republic II. For Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Flights to: The United States INF 88-1, 2, et cetera of America 89-1, 2, et cetera The Kingdom of the INF 89-1 (for 1989) Netherlands The Kingdom of CD 2-16-89 (for 1989) Belgium The United Kingdom USSR/001/100 of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The Federal Republic INF-429-4001 (for 1989) of Germany The Republic of Italy ITFNI-289 (for 1989)

ANNEX II

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT AND AIRPLANE ROUTES

I. Navigation Equipment

The airplanes listed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Part A of Section III of this Memorandum are equipped with on-board navigation systems of the following types:

A. For the United States of America:

1. ILS--Instrument Landing System;

2. INS--Inertial Navigation System;

3. TACAN--Tactical Air Navigation System (short-range and medium-range radio air navigation system);

4. ADF--Automatic Direction Finder; and

5. VOR--Very High Frequency OMNI Range Station.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. IL-62 and IL-62M. airplanes:

(a) Navigation set:

(i) Precision heading system, TKS-P2;

(ii) Doppler velocity and drift indicator, DISS-013;

(iii) Air data system, SVS-PN-15;

(iv) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-7s;

(v) Short-range navigation system and localizer, KURS MP-2;

(vi) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67; and

(vii) Navigation computer, NV-PB-Ir series 04.

(b) Individual navigation systems and instruments:

(i) Inertial navigation system, I-11;

(ii) Airplane radio reception display, ONS-7;

(iii) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15;

(iv) Radar, GROZA-62;

(v) Radio altimeter, RV-5;

(vi) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(vii) Barometric altimeter, VEM-72 or UVID-30-15; (viii) Barometric altimeter, VM-13 or VD-20;

(ix) Jeger barometric altimeter;

(x) Combined velocity indicator, KUS-730/1100;

(xi) Velocity indicator, US-I;

(xii) Mach number indicator, MS-IK;

(xiii) Magnetic compass, KI-13;

(xiv) Rate-of-climb indicators, VAR-30MK and VAR-75; and

(xv) Outside air temperature indicator, TNV-15.

2. TU-154 airplane:

(a) Navigation set NK-154:

(i) Precision heading system, TKS-P2;

(ii) Doppler velocity and drift indicators, DISS-3P or DISS-013;

(iii) Air data system, SVS-PN-15-4;

(iv) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-2SA;

(v) Short-range navigation system and localizer, KURS MP-2; and
(vi) Navigation calculator, NVU-53.

(b) Individual navigation systems and instruments:

(i) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15;

(ii) Radar, GROZA-154;

(iii) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(iv) Radio altimeter, RV-5;

(v) Barometric altimeter, VM-15;

(vi) Altimeter, UVID-15F;

(vii) Velocity indicators, KUS-730/1100 and US-I;and
(viii) Magnetic compass, KI-13.

3. TU-134 airplane:

(a) Navigation equipment:

(i) Heading system, KS-8;

(ii) self-contained navigation system, NAS-lA or NAS-1A 6K;

(iii) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-2s;

(iv) Automatic radio compass, ARK-11;

(v) Radar, ROZ-1;

(vi) Navigation and localizer equipment, KURS MP;

(vii) Velocity indicator, KUS-1200 or KUS-730/1100;

(viii) Altimeter, VD-20;

(ix) Altimeter, UVID-30-15;
(x) Rate-of-climb indicator, VAR-30M;

(xi) Low-altitude radar altimeter, RV-UM; and
(xii) Magnetic compass, KI-13.

(b) Depending upon the modification of the airplane, the following additional equipment may be installed:

(i) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(ii) Self-contained navigation system, NAS-1-134;

(iii) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15; and
(iv) Low-altitude altimeter, RV-5.

4. AN-124 airplane:

(a) Navigation-piloting set, A-820;

(b) Self-contained navigation system (three-channel inertial, system), A-826M;

(c) Short-range navigation system and localizer,A-827M;

(d) Long-range radio-navigation system, A-723; and
(e) Two on-board radars, A-822-10 and A-822-20.

II. Airplane Routes

A. For United States of America's Inspection Airplane Flights to:

COUNTRY ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY

The Union To Moscow: Same as inbound of
Soviet G.T.SORLA,
Socialist Ventspils, Belyy,
Republics Gagarin, Sheremet'yevo

To Ulan Ude: Same as inbound
G.T.SQUID,
Yedinka, Yekimchan,
Bomnak;

G.T.LEMUR;

G.T.NALIM, Vitim;

G.T.RAMIS, Kirensk;

G.T.PIKET, Bratsk;

G.T.DOMOR, Osa, Irkutsk,
Bol'shoye Goloustnoye,
Mukhino

The German To Leipzig: Same as inbound
Democratic G.T.SEGAL, TRT, FLD,
Republic ANKER, STENA, FWE,
NUF, RSF, Schkeuditz

The Czechoslovak To Prague: Same as inbound
Socialist Cheb, Rakovnik,
Republic Ruzyne

B. For Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Inspection
Airplane Flights to:

COUNTRY ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY

The United States To Washington, D.C. Radar Vectors
of America (Dulles International ENO271R
Airport): Canadian SWANN V268
routing to DAVES BROSS OOD235R
J585 STOOL OOD J42 RBV
J150 HTO SAX J62 ACK
J228 LRP V143
ROBRT AML

To San Francisco, Radar Vectors
California (Travis SUU PYE ENI
Air Force Base): REDOO A342 CDB
5600N/17200E NUKKS SPY NUKKS
SPY CDB A342 REDOO 5600N/il7200E
ENI PYE SUU

The Kingdom of ATS route (U)R1 Via Spijkerboor
the Netherlands or (U)A7 to EELDE (SPY), ATS
(EEL) and then via route (U)RI2
route (U)R1 and only
PAMPUS (PAM)
to Schiphol

The Kingdom WOODY UB31 NICKY NICKY VA24 STAD
of Belgium BRUNO

The United Kingdom From East: PAMPUS- GAT route as of
Great Britain (U)R1 REFSO-LONGSAND- required and

Northern LAMBOURNE-NORRY-RAF depending on
Ireland Greenham Common destination

From West: STRUMBLE- Same as inbound
(U)G1 KENET-RAF
Greenham Common

The Federal OKG-R11-EEL1A BAYIS-RII-OKG
Republic of
Germany

The Republic PUNTO KERAB/AI5 Same as inbound
of Italy BOLSENA Roma(Ciampino)
or PUNTO TUNAL/UG 23/
Roma(Ciampino)

ANNEX III

INSPECTION SITES AND THEIR ASSOCIATED POINTS OF ENTRY

I. For the United States of America:

A. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Moscow:

Missile Operating Bases:

Postavy, Vetrino, Polotsk, Smorgon', Lida, Gezgaly, Slonim,
Ruzhany, Zasimovichi, Mozyr', Petrikov, Zhitkovichi,
Rechitsa, Slutsk, Slutsk, Lutsk, Brody, Chervonograd,
Slavuta, Belokorovichi, Lipniki, Vysokaya Pech', Korosten',
Lebedin, Glukhov, Akhtyrka, Sovetsk, Gusev, Malorita, Pinsk,
Vyru, Aluksne, Ostrov, Karmelava, Ukmerge, Taurage, Kolomyya,
Stryy, Skala-Podol'skaya, Lapichi, Kattakurgan, Stan'kovo,
Tsel', Slobudka, Bayram-Ali.

Missile Support Facilities:

Votkinsk, Volgograd, Postavy, Gezgaly, Mozyr', Lutsk, Belokorovichi, Lebedin, Kolosovo, Zherebkovo, Sarny, Bataysk, Kapustin Yar, Serpukhov, Krasnodar, Lesnaya, Kazan', Kamenka, Petropavlovsk, Stan'kovo, Jelgava, Aral'sk, Sverdlovsk.

B. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Ulan Ude:

Missile operating Bases:

Novosibirsk, Drovyanaya, Barnaul, Kansk, Pashino, Gornyy, Novosysoyevka, Semipalatinsk, Saryozek.

Missile Support Facilities:

Novosibirsk, Drovyanaya, Kansk, Barnaul, Chita, Balkhash, Saryozek.

II. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Washington, D.C.:

Missile Support Facilities:

Martin Marietta, Middle River, Maryland; Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama; Ft. Sill, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma; Complex 16, Cape Canaveral, Florida; Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas.

B. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry San Francisco, California:

Missile Support Facilities:

Hercules Plant #1, Magna, Utah; Air Force Plant 19, San Diego, California; Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah; Ft.

Huachuca, Ft. Huachuca, Arizona; Pueblo Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado; Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona.

ANNEX IV

CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS OF USE OF EQUIPMENT INTENDED FOR USE DURING INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

I. Characteristics of Equipment

A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 20 meter measuring tape, ZRKZ-20AUT/I;
(b) 1 10 meter measuring tape, ZRKZ-10BUL/I; and
(c) 1 5 meter measuring tape, IVDZ-5BUL/I.

2. Portable weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 4 Heavy-duty portable scales, General Electrodynamics, Model 500B (9 metric-ton load capacity);

(b) 1 Readout device; and
(c) 1 Cable set.

3. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;
(b) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix-3;

(c) 1 Tripod, Susis, Model 520 with carrying case
Model Number 251; and
(d) 1 Assortment of photographic film.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Model FKB-2M;

(b) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(c) 1 Sealing device with a set of tamper-indicating
wire and seals; and
(d) 1 Officer's Ruler.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Linear measurement Devices (quantity for each
inspector):

(a) 1 30 meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model HY30cm;

(b) 1 3 meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(c) 1 24 ounce (680 gram) plumb bob, Thorpe-Smith;

(d) 1 50 yard (46 meter) plumb-bob cord, Duraplex;

(e) 4 Plumb-bob target, Leitz, model 126-25; and
(f) 1 pi tape, pi Tape Corporation.

2. Portable Weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection
team):

4 Heavy-duty portable scales, General Electrodynamics, model 500B (9 metric-ton load capacity).

3. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera body, Polaroid, Model 60OSE;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;
(c) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;
(d) 1 Flash, Vivitar, 285-HV;

(e) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter;
(f) 1 Spare 6OOSE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;
(g) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release;

(h) 1 20 inch (51 centimeter) cable release, Velbo, Model Vel-27-1035;

(i) 8 Eight-pack of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 1 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;
(l) 1 Aluminum case, Zero-Halliburton, 110-121;
(m) 1 Package of lens paper, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5 meter range rod, Leitz, model 8078-42; and

(p) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Kidde Bright Star (safety approved);

(b) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic; and
(c) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals.

II. Additional equipment for use during inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The following equipment shall be used only to inspect launch canisters associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty that are declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Radiation detection device for use during inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty consisting of:

(a) 2 Neutron detector with signal/power cables;
(b) 2 Electronic counter with instruction manual, Eberline, model ESP-2 modified,
(c) 10 Plastic bag for weather protection;

(d) 1 Coordinate grid and aluminum frame;

(e) 1 Calibration source;

(f) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;

(g) 30 Miscellaneous spare batteries, sizes C and D;

(h) 1 Tripod, Airlift, model BG modified;

(i) 1 Measuring tape;

(j) 1 Plumb bob and line, Thorpe-smith;

(k) 1 9 inch (23 centimeter) level, master mechanic, model 9MTT-9;

(l) 2 Battery-powered light, Maglight, Model ML-2;

(m) 3 Programmable calculator with instruction manual, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27S; and
(n) 2 Thermometer.

2. Equipment for use during benchmark radiation measurements conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Part D of Section III of this Annex:

(a) 2 Radiation detection device, the composition of which is indicated in paragraph 1 above;
(b) 2 Portable computer (Toshiba, Model T1100 Plus) with printer (Diconix, Model 150), with instruction manuals and voltage changers, Interpower; and
(c) 1 Software package, Golden Software, surfer (graphics program for contour maps).

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Radiation detection device, SRPS-2, consisting of:

(a) Neutron detector unit;

(b) Electronic unit; and
(c) Voltage changer and charger unit.

2. The SRPS-2 shall have the following basic characteristics:

(a) Sensitivity to fission spectrum neutrons is not lower than 100 pulses per neutron per square centimeter;
(b) Three periods of exposure: 0.5 second, 5 seconds and 50 seconds;

(c) Error in exposure time: 4 percent;

(d) Time of collection of background pulses for each period: 8 seconds, 80 seconds and 50 seconds, respectively; and
(e) Power source: 24-30 volt direct current (battery) or 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz.

3. The Parties agree that, prior to use by an inspection team of the radiation detection device, the Parties shall agree on additional characteristics of that device.

III. Methods of Use of Equipment

A. The Parties agree to use linear measurement devices in the following manner:

1. Linear measurement devices shall be used to determine length, width and height of objects by measuring the straight-line distance between the extreme points of such objects or, if it shall be required, between tangents drawn perpendicular to the direction of measurement from the outside points of curved surfaces.

2. The diameter of a missile, a missile stage or any other cylindrical object shall be determined by measuring the circumference, by directly measuring the diameter, or by measuring the distance between parallel lines that are vertical tangents to the cylindrical surface of the object and that lie in a plane perpendicular to the axis of the object. Such measurements shall be taken at several points along the length of that object.

3. In determining the dimensions of an object, each dimension shall be measured at least two times. If the results of the first two measurements are within one percent of each other, then the results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object. If the results of the first two

measurements are not within one percent of each other, additional measurements shall be taken until results from two measurements are obtained that are within one percent of each other. The results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object.

B. The Parties agree to use cameras in the following manner:

1. The Parties understand the phrase "camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints contained in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, to allow the use of one camera mounted on a tripod and the taking of two photographs in sequence with that camera.

2. The Parties agree that before the inspected Party takes photographs, one copy of which shall be given to each of the Parties, the inspected Party shall be permitted to take test photographs that shall be the property of the inspected Party.

3. The Parties agree that photographs taken during an inspection shall show a range rod next to the object or building being photographed.

4. The Parties understand that the procedures agreed upon with respect to the taking of photographs shall apply at all inspection sites, including at continuous monitoring inspection sites.

C. The Parties agree to use portable weighing devices in the following manner:

1. The inspected Party shall facilitate the inspection team's use of the portable weighing devices.

2. Before weighing an object during an inspection, the inspected Party shall be permitted to test and calibrate the portable weighing devices of the inspecting Party by using them to weigh its own calibrated reference load.

3. The equipment of the inspected Party shall be used to lift the object being weighed and to position it on the portable weighing devices. The inspected Party shall operate such equipment.

4. In determining the weight of an object first a test weighing of the object shall be conducted. Then that object shall be weighed two times. If the results of these two weight measurements are within two percent of each other then the results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the weight of the object. If the results of these two weight measurements are not within two percent of each other, the portable weighing devices shall be calibrated and the object shall be weighed two more times. If after this the difference between the results of the two weight measurements still exceeds two percent, then the portable weighing devices shall be replaced and the weighing procedures shall be repeated.

5. The inspection team shall be permitted continuous visual observation of portable weighing devices, calibrated reference loads and the object weighed throughout all testing, calibrating and weighing processes.

6. If weighing is done by the compression method using the portable weighing devices listed in Section I of this Annex, then the inspected Party shall position the object being weighed on the portable weighing devices. Before taking any reading from a portable weighing device, the inspection team shall ascertain that

the entire weight of the object being weighed is borne by the platform of the portable weighing device, or in the case of the use of several devices, that the entire weight of the object being weighed is borne by the platforms of those portable weighing devices. If the object being weighed is a launcher or other vehicle, then before the inspected Party positions that launcher or other vehicle on the portable weighing devices, it shall ensure that the tires are inflated to the maximum air pressure for which the tires are designed.

7. If while weighing an object by the compression method using the portable weighing devices listed in Section I of this Annex more than one portable weighing device is used, the weight of the object shall be determined by adding together the readings indicated on all portable weighing devices. To the extent possible, the readings of all portable weighing devices shall be taken simultaneously.

8. If the inspected Party decides that an object must be weighed on a weight-bearing device, then it shall be weighed together with the weight-bearing device, and then removed from it. Then the weight-bearing device shall be weighed separately. The weight of the object shall be determined by taking the difference of the results of these two weight measurements.

D. Radiation Detection Devices

1. The Parties agree to use the radiation detection devices of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the following manner:

Prior to the use of radiation detection devices, the Parties shall agree on the methods of use of the devices.

2. The Parties agree to use the radiation detection devices of the United States of America in the following manner:

(a) Radiation detection devices shall be used to measure fast neutron flux intensity emanating from a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile.

(b) Prior to the use of radiation detection devices during inspections, benchmark radiation measurements shall be taken. Such measurements shall be taken on two SS-20 missiles and two SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters. Benchmark radiation measurements shall be taken on launch canisters chosen by the inspecting Party from nine launch canisters of each type presented by the inspected Party. These measurements shall be used to determine that the fast neutron fluxes associated with these systems differ significantly in both level and contour patterns. The results of each benchmark radiation measurement on the SS-25 missile shall be used as the basis for comparison with the result of the corresponding measurement taken during inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(c) Before taking benchmark radiation measurements, the radiation detection devices shall be calibrated using a standard neutron source. For the SS-20 and SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters, benchmark radiation measurements shall be taken by the inspected Party on a horizontal plane located at a distance no greater than 0.5 meter below the launch canister, itself in a

horizontal position. The area of this horizontal plane for both the SS-20 and the SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters shall be that portion of a four-meter-by-four-meter plane that can, considering the physical limitations of the type of launcher involved in the measurement, be utilized for the taking of such measurements. The center of this horizontal plane shall be located below the axis of the launch canister at a point corresponding to the joint between the front cover of the launch canister and its body near the location of maximum neutron flux.

(d) Benchmark radiation measurements for both the SS-20 and the SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters shall be taken:

(i) at the 57 points accessible for both the SS-20 and SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters at the junctions of a 0.5-meter grid on the four-meter-by-four-meter plane described in subparagraph (c) above, and at up to 24 additional points on this plane at positions to be agreed by the Parties during the taking of such measurements;

(ii) at 0.5-meter intervals along the top of the cylindrical portion of the launch canister from the location of the joint of the front cover of the launch canister and its body to a point located at a distance of approximately-six meters from the front of the launch canister (a total of nine points); and

(iii) along a vertical line located to the left side of the launch canister in the plane of the joint between the front cover of the launch canister and its body, perpendicular to the

horizontal plane on which measurements were taken, and no more than 0.5 meter from the launch canister (a total of seven points).

(e) Two readings shall be taken at each point. If the higher reading differs by more than 30 percent from the lower reading, then a third reading shall be taken. If the third reading differs from each of the two previous readings by more than 30 percent, then the radiation detection device shall be recalibrated. The average of two readings that are within 30 percent of each other and whose values are closest to each other shall be recorded as the measurement for that point. The result of the benchmark radiation measurement for that point shall be the average of the corresponding measurements for the two missiles of each type selected for measuring.

(f) For the entire period during which the benchmark radiation measurements are being taken, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe the measurement process to assure itself that the process corresponds to the agreed procedures. Recording, processing, and graphic representation of data shall be carried out jointly by the Parties.

(g) upon completion of the measurements on two SS-20 missiles and two SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters, the inspecting Party shall select one SS-20 missile launch canister and one SS-25 missile launch canister to be opened. The inspecting Party, by visual observation, shall confirm that the corresponding type of missile is located in each launch canister.

(h) The results of the benchmark radiation measurements shall be signed by both Parties and each of the Parties shall retain one copy. If the results of the benchmark radiation measurements confirm that the fast neutron fluxes associated with the SS-20 and the SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch canisters differ sufficiently from each other in both level and contour patterns, then the result of each benchmark radiation measurement on the SS-25 missile shall be used as the basis for comparison with the result of the corresponding measurement taken during inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(i) Before taking measurements during an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the radiation detection devices shall be calibrated using a standard neutron source, and then measurements shall be taken on a horizontal plane whose location corresponds to the location of the horizontal plane described in subparagraph (c) above. Such measurements shall be taken on that plane at up to ten points chosen by the inspection team such points shall be selected from points common to the benchmark radiation measurements taken on the SS-20 and SS-25 missiles on the four-meter-by-four-meter horizontal plane. In addition, measurements shall be taken at up to four points along the top of the cylindrical portion of the launch canister from the location of the joint of the front cover of the launch canister and its body to a point located at a distance of approximately six meters from the front of the launch canister.

(j) Two readings shall be taken at each point. If the

higher reading differs by more than 30 percent from the lower reading, then a third reading shall be taken. If the third reading differs from each of the two previous readings by more than 30 percent, then the radiation detection device shall be recalibrated. The average of two readings that are within 30 percent of each other and whose values are closest to each other shall be recorded as the measurement for that point.

(k) If during an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty the result of each measurement obtained for a particular launch canister differs by not more than 50 percent from the result of the corresponding benchmark radiation measurement on the SS-25 missile contained in its launch canister, then the missile shall not be considered to be a missile subject to the Treaty.

(l) If during an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty the result of any measurement differs from the result of the corresponding benchmark radiation measurement on the SS-25 missile contained in its launch canister by more than 50 percent, then the launch canister shall be opened by the inspected Party in order that the inspecting Party be able to confirm by visual observation of the interior portion that the missile inside the launch canister is not a missile subject to the Treaty. In any event, after the radiation detection measurements are taken on all launch canisters subject to inspection at the inspection site, the inspection team shall select one launch canister that must be opened by the inspected Party in order that the inspecting Party be able to confirm by visual observation of the interior portion that the missile inside the launch canister is not a missile

subject to the Treaty. The Parties shall agree on specific visual observation procedures that permit this confirmation. Until such time as the Parties agree to such procedures, they shall, during the conduct of inspections using radiation detection devices, use, on all missile launch canisters opened for visual observation of their interior portion, both visual observation methods demonstrated during the taking of benchmark radiation measurements, that is, the removal of the front cover of the SS-25 launch canister and the opening of the portholes in the front section of the SS-25 launch canister.

ANNEX V

CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS OF USE OF EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

I. Characteristics of Equipment

A. Listed below is the equipment, including its characteristics, to be installed initially at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk. If the inspected Party reopens the previously existing exit or opens another exit at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, then the equipment listed in paragraph 2 below shall be installed at that exit. The inspecting Party shall be permitted, as required for maintenance, repair or replacement of the equipment listed below, to substitute for specific items of equipment other equipment that, as agreed at the time of substitution by the Parties, has a similar purpose and characteristics similar to the characteristics of the equipment

listed below. Such substitution shall not be deemed to be an amendment to this Memorandum.

1. Portal:

(a) Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment: Infrared profiler consisting of a horizontal and vertical array of infrared lights and sensors:

(i) Infrared light and sensor pairs, Pulnix, Model PH-30, assembled with address boards in vertical and horizontal arrays;

(ii) Data processing computer, Zenith, Model ZWL 184-02 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy disk drive (road profiler);

(iii) Data processing computer, Zenith, Model ZWL 0200-04 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy disk drive (rail profiler);

(iv) Printer, IBM, model Pro Printer II for data of a parallel type;

(v) Junction box, Hoffman, Model A3OH24DLB with profiler preprocessor, power supply, heater and fiber-optic transmitter and receiver; and

(vi) Fiber-optic cable, AT&T Model 3DFX-012 (connecting the junction box to the Data Collection Center or the inspector's exit shelter).

(b) weight sensors:

(i) single-axle, weigh-in-motion scales with a

maximum capacity of 91 tons, PAT Equipment, model DAw 400;

(ii) Data processing computer, Zenith, model ZWL 184-02 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy 'disk drive;

(iii) Printer, IBM, Model Pro Printer II for data of a parallel type;

(iv) Portable scales, U.S. Scale, Model 760 RES; and

(v) Scale transport trailer, U.S. Scale, Model TLR-7KZ.

(c) Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) X-ray imaging system, Bechtel National, Inc., CARGOSCAN that includes:

- Imaging system, American Science and Engineering;

- X-ray source--Varian Associates x-ray linear accelerator, Linatron, Model 3000; and
- Vehicle transport system, control system, data processing equipment, data display system, safety system and radiation protection structures.

(ii) Technical characteristics of the non-damaging image producing equipment:

- Nominal radiation energy spectrum of the CARGOSCAN system:

Photon Energy Relative Number of Photons
Interval (Mev) per Interval

0.0-0.2 30
0.2-0.5 75
0.5-0.9 100
0.9-2.0 60
2.0-3.0 40
3.0-4.0 20
4.0-6.0 8
6.0-8.0 3
8.0-9.0 1

- The nominal number of x-ray pulses per second shall be:

-- 60 pulses per second for 60 hertz electrical power; or
-- 50 pulses per second for 50 hertz electrical power;

- Each pulse shall have a nominal duration of 4.2 microseconds at 50 percent of peak power;

- Maximum average x-ray irradiation dose rate generated by the Linatron accelerator measured at a distance of 1.0 meter from the anode along the central axis shall be no more than:

-- 780 rads per minute for 60 hertz electrical power; or
-- 670 rads per minute for 50 hertz electrical power;

- For a railcar with a width less than or equal to 3.1 meters, the distance from

the anode of the accelerator along the central axis to the near wall of the railcar shall be no less than 3.0 meters;

- The nominal value of the angle of the x-ray beam in the vertical plane shall be 28.5 degrees; the width of the maximum intensity portion of the collimated ray in front of the near wall of the railcar shall be less than or equal to 1.0 centimeter, and the full width at half maximum amplitude of the beam at that location shall be less than or equal to 1.6 centimeters; the Linatron x-ray source and sensors of the image producing system shall be securely fastened in a fixed position during the exposure period; the pulse length, amplitude and energy distribution of any pulse shall be within 20 percent of their respective nominal values;

- The nominal resolution of the system, which corresponds to information depicted by one pixel, is 7.2 millimeters at the vertical midplane along the length of the inspected railcar;

- The beam shall be mechanically controlled by means of a shutter opaque to x-ray radiation

- The speed of the railcar past the beam shall be:

-- 18 centimeters per second plus or minus 20 percent for 60 hertz electrical power; or 15 centimeters

per second plus or minus 20 percent
for 50 hertz electrical power, and

- The number of pulses per pixel required
to obtain the image is three.

(d) System for measuring the length and diameter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile:

The Parties shall agree on equipment for measuring the length and diameter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile inside its launch canister.

(e) Surveillance systems:

(i) Character inserter, VCS, Model CI-100;

(ii) Monochrome cameras with a fixed field of view, Cohu, model 4835-2050/ESO8L (exterior) with model SS-300 sunshield and model 4815-2050/ESO8 (interior);

(iii) Adjustable mounting heads, Vicon, Model V24OOAH (exterior) and Pelco, model CM 1400 (interior);

(iv) Camera tower assembly for 7.6 meter camera mounting height Tri-Ex, model T-15;

(v) Tower junction box assembly;

(vi) Video distribution amplifier, Grass Valley, model 8501 and rack mount framer model 85OOT2-120;

(vii) 9 inch (23 centimeter) television monitor, Conrac, Model 2640/C9;

(viii) Time-lapse video recorder, RCAI model TC3930;

(ix) Video foredrop (fixed measuring rods for video imaging);

(x) Fiber-optic transmitters, American Fibertek, Model MT-10 (exterior) and Model RT-10 (interior);

(xi) Fiber-optic transmitter power module, American Fibertek, model PS-24;

(xii) Fiber-optic cable, AT&T, Model 3DFX-012;

(xiii) Fiber-optic receivers, American Fibertek, Model MR-10 (exterior) and Model RR-10 (interior);

(xiv) Mounting frame for fiber-optic devices, American Fibertek, Model SR-20/1;

(xv) Exterior lighting mounting poles or towers, 12.2 meter mounting height;

(xvi) Coaxial cable, RG 11;

(xvii) Quartz halogen lighting, Sylvania, Model 500

PAR 56Q/WFL and lampholder, Stanco, model 5600E;

(xviii) Low-pressure sodium lighting, Quality Lighting, Part Number 210-30F-24OLPs-180-50H;

luminaire support, Quality Lighting, Model 22-6;

(xix) Manual video switcher, Pelco, Model VS 520 B/RKS-20;

(xx) Synchronization generator, Lenco, Model PSG 412; and

(xxi) Video switcher, Grass Valley, Model 20-TEN.

(f) Vehicle sensors and control equipment:

(i) Induction loop sensor:

- Induction loop wire, 14 AWG (American wire Gauge), Belden, Model 9438; - Lead-in wire, 14 AWG (American Wire Gauge);

- Rail induction loop sensor assembly, including 1.0 inch (2.54 centimeter) conduit;

- Digital control modules and cables (road), Detector Systems, Model 810A and model 801A; and

- Analog control modules and cables (rail), Sarasota, Model 215B and Model SB;

(ii) Traffic lights, Econolite, Model T-26G1AP1A and Model T-A26B3APA; and

(iii) Semaphore gate, John Green, Model P-5000.

(g) Data Collection Center:

(i) Color graphics display monitor (for the portal operator's console), Mitsubishi, Model HJ-6905;

(ii) Plasma display (for the exit operator's console), Deeco, Model M3-P1-EV;

(iii) Exit traffic control panels;

(iv) Portal traffic control panels;

(v) Video printer (for the data review console), Tektronix, Model HCO2;

(vi) Printer, IBM, Model Pro Printer II for data of a serial type;

(vii) Console frame (for the exit operator's console).

(viii) Console frame (for the portal operator's console);

(ix) Console-frame (for the data review console);

(x) Central processing unit board, Force, Model SYS68K/CPU-5A;

(xi) Serial input/output board, Force, model SYS68K/SIO-2;

(xii) Video digitizing board, Imaging Technologies, model FG-100 1024-3-U-V-O;

(xiii) Dynamic RAM board (2 megabyte), Force, Model SYS68K/DRAM-2;

(xiv) Static RAM/ROM/EPROM board, Force, Model SYS68K/RR-1;

(xv) Winchester/floppy disk drive controller, Force, Model SYS68K/WFC-I;

(xvi) Winchester/floppy disk drive and cable, Force, Model SYS68K/WFMOD-80;

(xvii) Winchester/floppy disk drive and cable, Force, Model SYS68K/WFMOD-20;

(xviii) Digital input board, XYCOM, Model XVME-212;

(xix) Digital output board, XYCOM, Model XVME-220;

(xx) System controller unit clock module, Force, Model SYS68K/ASCU-2;

(xxi) Magnetic-tape controller card and cable, Micro Computer Technology, Model MCT-6020-02;

(xxii) Computer, IBM, 7532 Industrial model 111 with 512K RAM, 1.2 megabyte floppy drive, 20 megabyte hard disk unit with controller card, and keyboard;

(xxiii) Chassis, I.M. Systems, Model IMS-88-SNL-05;

(xxiv) Extender cards, Dawn VME Systems, Models VMEXB-JIS, VMEXV-12D, and VMEXB-J2S;

(xxv) Display adapter, IBM, Model Feature Code 6257;

(xxvi) Expansion memory card, AST, Model ADVP-512 Advantage Premium (with daughter card) with two megabyte RAM and two serial and one parallel ports;

(xxvii) Tape controller card, Flagstaff Engineering, Part Number 8820-T;

(xxviii) Video digitizing board, Matrox, Part Number PIP-512B;

(xxix) Hard disk unit, Core International, Part Number.AT 150;

(xxx) Disk controller card, Core International, Part Number CNT-HCF;

(xxxi) Streaming tape drive with controller, Core International, Model CT 150-IB;

(xxxii) Magnetic-tape drive, Kennedy, Model 9610;

(xxxiii) Graphics adaptor, Metheus, Model UGA 1104;

(xxxiv) Display monitor, IBM, Model 7544;

(xxxv) Input/output panel assembly including fiber-optic modems, AT&T, Model ODL-Rs232-2; and

(xxxvi) Fiber-optic transceiver set, Positronix, Model 1132A.

(h) Communications equipment:

(i) Facsimile equipment, Xerox, Model 7010;

(ii) Telephone system, GTE, Starlog SBCS "C" Package;

(iii) Intercom system, Executone, Model CB800;

(iv) Base station radio, Motorola, Flexar Series Model L23TRK 3102H (indicates where the manufacturer's lot number will be included);

(v) Fiber-optic cable for interprocessor communications, AT&T, Model 3DFXO12;

(vi) Hand-held radio, Motorola, Expo Series Model

H99SP/021H; and

(vii) Antenna, Cushcraft, model ARX-2.

(i) Power equipment:

(i) Back-up power generator (250 kilovolt-ampere, 50 hertz), MBI Services, Model DMT-250C;

(ii) 800 ampere automatic transfer switch, 0NAN, Model OT III;

(iii) Portal uninterruptible power supply (15 kilovolt-ampere, 50 hertz - 60 hertz), Custom Power, Series 4-120-15K3NT;

(iv) Exit uninterruptible power supply (6 kilovolt-ampere, 50 hertz - 60 hertz), Custom Power, Series 4-120-6K3NT;

(v) Generator fuel storage tank, 500 gallons (1890 liters);

(vi) 300 kilovolt-ampere main transformer, MGM, Model T-30OHA-3;

(vii) 75 kilovolt-ampere transmission line transformer, Stiles and Associates, Model T75HA120-4;

(viii) Distribution panel, Stiles and Associates, Model SRE4-25w; and

(ix) 37.5 kilovolt-ampere remote transformer, Stiles and Associates, Model T37HA4-120.

(j) Cables, as required.

(k) Office equipment, as required.

2. Exit:

(a) Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment (as described in paragraph 1 above);

(b) Weight sensors: Weigh-in-motion scale (as described in paragraph 1 above);

(c) Surveillance systems (as described in paragraph 1 above);

(d) Vehicle sensors and control equipment: Induction loop sensors, traffic lights and semaphore gates (as described in paragraph 1 above);

(e) Elements of the inspector's exit shelter: Data collection equipment and exit operator's console (as described in paragraph 1 above); and

(f) Cables, as required.

B. Listed below is the equipment, including its characteristics, to be installed initially at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. The inspecting Party shall be permitted, as required for maintenance, repair or replacement of the equipment listed below, to substitute for specific items of equipment other equipment that, as agreed at the time of substitution by the Parties, has a similar purpose and characteristics similar to the

characteristics of the equipment listed below. such substitution shall not be deemed to be an amendment to this Memorandum.

1. Portal:

(a) Technical surveillance system for remote measurement of vehicle dimensions:

(i) Television camera with a fixed field of view, KT-2;

(ii) Camera control unit with controller, BUK YBM 3.558.040;

(iii) Camera switching unit, BKK YBM 3.613.004;

(iv) Control console, PU-I;

(v) Multi-channel power source, MIP-I; and

(vi) Video monitors, models VK5OVlOO and Standard.

Power is supplied by a 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz system. Illumination of the monitored object must be between 100 and 10,000 lux.

(b) Kontrol'-1 system for monitoring the passage of vehicles at the portal:

(i) Small infrared transmitter, MI 6.03.000;
(ii) Small infrared receiver, MP 6.02.000;

(iii) Magnetometric modules for detecting the presence of vehicles, B1 E1-1106 and B2 E1-1107;

(iv) Data collection console, PI E1-1105.02.000;

(v) Equipment for connecting and processing data from infrared receivers and magnetometric modules, BE E1-1105.01.000;

(vi) Metal supports with mountings for installing sensors;

(vii) Footings for setting up supports;

(viii) Junction box, 6.04.000, for connecting infrared receivers, infrared transmitters and magnetometric modules; and

(ix) Lightning protection units BGZ 6.05.000 and BGZ 6.05.000-02.

Wavelength of the infrared transmission by the infrared transmitter is 0.9 micrometer; the power of the transmitted pulse is no greater than 0.1 watt. The magnetometric modules are passive, non-transmitting sensing elements.

Power is supplied by a 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz system, and by a 24 volt direct current system.

(c) Closed-circuit television system:

(i) Television cameras with a fixed field of view, KTP-63 and KTP-63-1;

(ii) Camera decoder units (units for controlling the cameras), BKD-2 and BKD-2-1;

(iii) Control console, PU-85;

(iv) Aiming device (device for mounting and orienting a camera in a fixed position), UN-18; and

(v) Video monitor, VK50V100.

Power is supplied by a 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz system. Illumination of the monitored object must be between 50 and 5,000 lux.

(d) Equipment for, indicating gate position and controlling traffic lights:

(i) Gate position indicating sensor, DKV EA 837.24.000;

(ii) Traffic light, Type 211;

(iii) Central console for indicating gate position and controlling traffic lights, TsPU EA 837.21.000; and

(iv) Traffic light control unit (unit for switching the traffic lights), BUS EA 837.23.000.

(e) Data Collection Center: Container-type building consisting of four interconnected containers:

(i) Personal computer with printer;

(ii) Video recorder, Elektronika, VM 12;

(iii) Fire alarm system equipment, KSP-019-20/60-2;

and

(iv) Portable measuring rod and tape measure.

(f) Power supply system:

(i) Transformer, TSZM-63.74OM5;

(ii) Static converter, 6DK.294.126;

(iii) Uninterrupted power supply unit, ABP-24-230-2.5-50 UKhL4;

(iv) Power distribution panel, PR11-30552-21TZ, including automatic cutoff switches, A-3716 FUZ and AP50V-3MG;

(v) Power distribution panel, PR11-3046-2lTZ, including AYe2O.46-10B-00U3 UKhL4 automatic cutoff switches;

(vi) Power distribution panel, Shch03l-41 UKhL4;

(vii) Uninterrupted power supply unit, ABP-1-16x5Ox3 UKhL4;

(viii) Master switch, YaV 332;

(ix) Automatic cutoff switch, AYe2Ol6-10NUZ;

(x) Junction boxes, K316 and K3NA16;

(xi) Step-down transformer, YaTP-0.25,220/36 V;

(xii) Rotary switch, PPZ-100/N2-56B;

(xiii) Distribution panel, OPV-6;

(xiv) Storage battery, 6ST190L; and

(xv) Storage battery housing with connector.

(g) Communications equipment:

(i) Internal telephone communication system, Kaskad-106;

(ii) Base station radio, Angstrom; and

(iii) Hand-held radio, Angstrom.

(h) Cables, as required, and metal cable stands no more than 140 centimeters high.

(i) Office equipment, as required.

(j) Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) Automated system that includes:

- A scanning device (manipulator);

- A radiation source;

- Receiving devices;

- Process control equipment;

- Equipment for processing, viewing and recording the results of measurements; and,

- Electrical equipment.

(ii) Two of the basic technical characteristics of the non-damaging image producing equipment are as follows:

- Nominal resolution of the system--not better than 10.0 millimeters;

- Operating modes:

-- Overall two-dimensional imaging of the object; and

-- Accurate dimensional measurement of the object.

(iii) The type of a radiation source and other related technical characteristics of the non-damaging image producing equipment shall be agreed by the Parties.

2. Exits:

(a) Devices for measuring linear dimensions of vehicles:

(i) Fixed measuring rod;

(ii) Portable measuring rod; and

(iii) Measuring tape (tape measure).

(b) Kontrol'-1 system for monitoring the passage of vehicles at the exits:

(i) Small infrared transmitter, MI 6.03.000;

(ii) Small infrared receiver, MP 6.02.000;

(iii) Magnetometric modules for detecting the presence of vehicles, B1 E1-1106 and B2 E1-1107;

(iv) Metal supports with mountings for installing sensors;

(v) Footings for setting up supports; and

(vi) Junction box, 6.04.000, for connecting infrared receivers, infrared transmitters and magnetometric modules.

(c) Weight sensors:

(i) Portable scales, RENTON, Model 760 RES (Series Number A-888);

(ii) Scale transport trailer, RENTON, Model TLR-7;

and

(iii) Heavy-duty portable scales, General Electrodynamics, model 500B (9 metric-ton load capacity).

(d) Closed-circuit television equipment:

(i) Television cameras with a fixed field of view, KTP-63 and KTP-63-1;

(ii) Camera decoder units (units for controlling the cameras), BKD-2 and BKD-2-1; and

(iii) Aiming device (device for mounting and orienting a camera in a fixed position), UN-18.

(e) Equipment for indicating gate position and controlling traffic lights:

(i) Gate position indicating sensor, DKV EA 837.24.000;

(ii) Traffic light, Type 211;

(iii) Portable console for indicating gate position and controlling traffic lights, VPK EA 837.22.000; and

(iv) Traffic light control unit (unit for switching the traffic lights), BUS EA 837.23.000.

(f) Container-type shelters for inspectors, one at each exit.

(g) Cables, as required, and metal cable stands no more than 140 centimeters high.

C. The inspecting Party shall be permitted to keep spare parts at its continuous monitoring inspection site for the agreed equipment in quantities appropriate to the activities being conducted at that site.

II. Methods of use of Equipment: General Procedures for the Operation of the Continuous Monitoring Inspection System

A. The Parties agree to use the following general procedures for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. If the Parties reach preliminary agreement upon different or additional procedures that achieve the same results as these procedures, the Parties shall be permitted to use such procedures on an interim basis, until agreement is reached in the Special Verification Commission on the different or additional procedures.

1. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall proceed directly to either the portal or exit monitoring areas for measurement of their dimensions. Traffic control lights in the monitoring areas shall normally indicate red. There shall be only one vehicle at any one time in the portal monitoring area and only one vehicle at any one time in each of the exit monitoring areas.

2. All personnel operating a vehicle that leaves the continuous monitoring inspection site shall obey both the traffic lights and the directions given by the inspection team. Oral directions by inspectors to stop a vehicle for, inspection

purposes shall be communicated to the vehicle driver through the in-country escort. The inspection team shall change the traffic control lights from red to green upon the completion of the inspection procedures set forth in paragraphs 5 and 7 below. Vehicles shall be permitted to enter the continuous monitoring inspection site unimpeded. Gates installed by the inspected Party at the portal and exits shall be opened and closed by the inspected Party during movement of vehicles through these locations.

3. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall travel through the portal and exit monitoring areas at a speed not to exceed ten kilometers per hour.

4. All vehicles that can contain cargoes whose length is equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and whose diameter is equal to or greater than 1.02 meters shall leave the continuous monitoring inspection site only through the portal.

5. Except for vehicles subject to the inspection procedures in paragraph 8 below, vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site through the portal shall be subject to the following procedures:

(a) The inspected Party shall notify the inspection team at least 30 minutes before a vehicle indicated in paragraph 4 above arrives at the portal. This notification shall state the estimated time of arrival of the vehicle at the portal and information concerning whether the vehicle contains a missile stage with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters.

(b) After entering the portal monitoring area, a vehicle shall stop at the stop line when the traffic light is red.

(c) The vehicle shall be observed and its dimensions shall be measured remotely or, as necessary, measured manually.

(d) A vehicle that can contain only cargoes with a length less than 3.25 meters or a diameter less than 1.02 meters shall leave through the portal without further inspection after the traffic light turns green.

(e) A vehicle that can contain cargoes with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters, but which is not declared to contain a missile stage of those dimensions shall remain at the stop line in an open area or, if requested by the inspected Party, shall proceed to the inspection building. The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually the interior of the cargo area and to measure the dimensions of the cargo contained therein. If it can be determined by visual observation and dimensional measurement that the vehicle does not contain the longest stage of the Pershing II missile, the vehicle shall leave through the portal when the traffic light turns green. If, as a result of visual observation and dimensional measurements of cargoes, the inspection team is unable to determine that the vehicle does not contain the longest stage of the Pershing II missile, the inspection team shall use the procedures set forth in paragraph 13 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

(f) Until non-damaging imaging of the contents of shipping containers is implemented as an inspection procedure, as indicated in paragraph 15 of Part G of Section III of this Memorandum, a vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site that is declared to contain a missile stage with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters shall be presented for visual observation of the interior of the vehicle and for visual observation and dimensional measurement of the object or objects declared to be missile stages and, in accordance with paragraph 14(d) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, all

containers and shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an item of the above dimensions.

6. Vehicles that do not meet the criteria set forth in paragraph 4 above shall be permitted to leave the continuous monitoring inspection site through either the portal or the other exits.

7. Except for vehicles subject to the inspection procedures set forth in paragraph 8 below, vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site through an exit other than the portal shall be subject to the following inspection procedures:

(a) After entering the exit monitoring area, a vehicle shall stop at the stop line when the traffic light is red.

(b) The vehicle shall be observed visually either by inspectors at the exit or remotely by inspectors in the Data Collection Center. If necessary, vehicles and cargoes not inside these vehicles shall be measured automatically or manually. This procedure shall not apply to passenger cars, passenger minibuses or, by mutual agreement between the Parties at the inspection Site, to other vehicles. vehicles shall leave through the exit when the traffic light is green.

(c) If the inspection team determines that the vehicle meets the criteria set forth in paragraph 4 above, it shall be permitted to direct such a vehicle to the portal.

8. The following vehicles shall be subject to the procedures set forth below when leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site either through the portal or through the other exits:

(a) For specially equipped vehicles which contain

explosive cargoes, including nitroglycerin transporters:

(i) The inspecting Party shall be given one opportunity to measure each type of vehicle;

(ii) The inspected Party shall notify the inspection team of the arrival of one of these vehicles at the portal or an exit not less than 30 minutes in advance of its arrival;

(iii) The vehicle shall be identified at the portal or an exit on the basis of information that has been provided to the inspection team; and

(iv) The vehicle shall proceed through the portal or the exit without stopping.

(b) For forklifts carrying cargoes: The inspected Party shall notify the inspection team of the arrival of one of these vehicles at the portal or an exit not less than 30 minutes in advance of its arrival.

9. Until the inspecting Party installs equipment for the permanent continuous monitoring system in the portal and exit monitoring areas, or should the dimensional measuring equipment at the portal or exits fail to operate properly, all dimensional measurements of vehicles shall be performed manually at that location. For this purpose, as required by the inspection team, each vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall stop in the portal monitoring area or in an exit monitoring area.

10. In the course of inspection of vehicles and cargoes, the Parties shall observe all safety regulations, including those related to the handling of explosive cargoes.

11. All recorded data intended for use in the monthly inspection report shall be signed by an inspector and an in-country escort.

B. The Parties agree to use the following general procedures for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk. If the inspected Party reopens the previously existing exit or opens another exit at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, then the procedures set forth below shall be used for monitoring such exits. If the Parties reach preliminary agreement upon different or additional procedures that achieve the same results as these procedures, the Parties shall be permitted to use such procedures on an interim basis, until agreement is reached in the special Verification Commission on the different or additional procedures.

1. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall proceed directly to either the portal or exit monitoring area. There shall be only one road vehicle at any one time in the portal monitoring area and only one road vehicle at any one time in the exit monitoring area.

2. All railcars with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters shall leave the continuous monitoring inspection site through the portal.

3. The inspected Party shall notify the inspection team at least 30 minutes before a Vehicle, indicated in paragraph 2 above, arrives at the portal. This notification shall state the estimated time of arrival of the vehicle at the portal and information concerning whether the vehicle contains a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile.

4. All personnel operating a vehicle that enters or leaves the continuous monitoring inspection site shall obey the traffic lights, the semaphore gates and the directions given by the inspection team. Oral directions by inspectors, including directions for a vehicle to stop for inspection purposes, shall be communicated to the vehicle driver through the in-country escort.

(a) At the portal, the semaphore gate immediately in front of the main gate normally shall be in the closed position and the corresponding traffic light shall normally be red. All other semaphore gates normally shall be open and all other traffic lights normally shall be green. Whenever a vehicle leaves through the portal, the inspection team shall ensure that the area enclosed by the semaphore gates is clear of other vehicles. Then the semaphore gates that are open shall be closed, and the semaphore gate at the main gate shall be opened. Similarly, the traffic lights that are normally green will turn red, and the traffic light at the main gate will turn green. It shall be the responsibility of the inspection team to return the semaphore gates and traffic lights to their normal positions at the completion of the inspection procedures set forth in paragraph 6 below.

(b) At the exit, the semaphore gates normally shall, be in a closed position and the traffic lights normally shall be red.

It shall be the responsibility of the inspection team to control the semaphore gates and switch the traffic lights to allow a vehicle to enter and leave the exit monitoring area and to return the semaphore gates and traffic lights to their normal position at the completion of the inspection procedures described in paragraph 6 below.

5. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall travel through the portal monitoring area or the exit monitoring area at a speed not to exceed ten kilometers per hour.

6. Inspection procedures for vehicles:

(a) The dimensions of all vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be measured as they pass through the portal monitoring area or the exit monitoring area.

(b) All railcars whose length is less than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section whose length is less than 14.00 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be allowed unimpeded passage through the semaphore gates.

(c) All railcars whose length is equal to or greater than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section whose length is equal to or greater than 14.00 meters that leave the continuous monitoring inspection site and that are not declared by the inspected Party to contain a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile shall be subject to inspection of their interior in accordance with paragraph 13 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection and in accordance with the Agreed Statement of December 8, 1988. At the discretion of the inspected Party, the inspection team shall be permitted to carry out the inspection in the inspection building.

(d) A vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site that is declared by the inspected Party to contain a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile shall proceed to the portal monitoring area, where the inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually the interior of the vehicle, measure the dimensions of the launch canister or shipping

container contained therein, and image the contents of the launch canister or shipping container in accordance with paragraph 3 of Part A of Section III of this Annex. In this same area, the inspected Party shall open the front end of the launch canister or cover of the shipping container at the request of the inspection team, as provided for in paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, so that the inspectors may observe visually the missile contained therein and measure the length and diameter of its second stage in accordance with paragraph 4 of Part A of Section III of this Annex.

(e) If the inspection team determines that a vehicle at the exit meets the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 above, then it shall be permitted to direct such a vehicle to the portal.

7. Until the inspecting Party installs infrared vehicle dimensional measuring equipment in the portal monitoring area or the exit monitoring area, all dimensional measurements of vehicles shall be performed manually at that monitoring area. As required by the inspection team, all vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall stop in the portal monitoring area or in the exit monitoring area for this purpose.

8. Should automatic dimensional measuring equipment at the portal or exit fail to operate properly, all dimensional measurements of vehicles shall be performed manually at that location.

9. All recorded data intended for use in the monthly inspection report shall be signed by an inspector and an in-country escort.

10. The Parties agree that railcars that would be subject to inspection shall be permitted to leave the continuous monitoring inspection site for the purpose of reversing direction, provided that the following procedures are used:

(a) The inspected Party notifies the inspection team leader of its intent to move a railcar out through the portal for the purpose of reversing its direction no less than 30 minutes before the railcar arrives at the portal.

(b) Two inspectors accompany the railcar from the time it arrives at the portal until it returns through the portal after having reversed direction and such inspectors are permitted to observe this railcar throughout the entire procedure.

(c) No cargo is removed from the railcar between the time it leaves through the portal until it returns through the portal.

Provided that the entire procedure for reversing direction is completed without delay, such railcars shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection during the conduct of this procedure.

III. Methods of Use of Equipment: General Procedures for the Operation of the Equipment

A. General procedures for the United States of America for the operation of the equipment at the portal and at other exits, if opened, at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk:

1. Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment:

Infrared profiler equipment shall be installed along both sides of the rail and roadway at the portal and along both sides of the roadway at the exit. Vehicles shall travel on the rail or roadway along gin infrared profiler at a speed not to exceed ten kilometers per hour. The infrared profiler shall make dimensional measurements of the vehicle, which shall be transmitted to the Data Collection Center for recording.

2. Weight sensors:

If weight is used as an inspection criterion pursuant to paragraph 12 of Part G of Section III of this Memorandum, then weighing devices shall be installed in accordance with the following requirements and the following procedures shall be used:

(a) Road vehicle single-axle, weigh-in-motion scales shall be installed in the roadway at the portal monitoring area and at the exit monitoring area.

(b) Road vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall cross the scale platform at a speed not to exceed ten kilometers per hour. Measurement of vehicle weight shall be made automatically and transmitted to the Data Collection Center for analysis and recording.

(c) Portable scales shall be used on the roadway in the event that the primary weighing devices, that is, single-axle weigh-in-motion scales, are inoperative. The inspectors shall place these scales on the roadway in front of the vehicle to be weighed, and the vehicle shall be driven onto the scales. Vehicle weight shall be determined by adding the reading of all portable scales. Data shall be recorded by entering it manually into the Data Collection Center system.

(d) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to install fixed scales for weighing railcars on the rail spur. The rail scales to be installed and operating procedures for them shall be agreed upon by the Parties.

3. Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(a) The non-damaging image producing equipment shall be installed along a rail spur and shall be used to image the contents of launch canisters declared to contain a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile. The inspection team shall be permitted to calibrate the non-damaging image producing equipment daily.

(b) Imaging procedures:

(i) The inspected Party, having implemented the procedures contained in subparagraphs (c)(ii) and (c)(iii) below, shall ensure that the inspecting party receives an image of the top and bottom of the missile along the entire cylindrical length of the second stage of an SS-25 missile (307 centimeters), plus 25 centimeters on the side where the imaging begins and 7 centimeters on the opposite side. The image obtained shall be limited to the areas between the top and bottom of the outer surface of the launch canister and lines 69.5 centimeters on either side of the missile center line. The inspected Party assures the inspecting Party that the image described above meets the following conditions:

- The image obtained shall show the four points where the curvatures of the end sections of the Ss-25 missile second

stage motor casing intersect with the lines 69.5 centimeters on either side of the missile center line.

- The end points of the cylindrical portion of the second stage of the SS-25 missile and the points of intersection referred to above shall not appear at the extreme edges of the image obtained, where the quality of the image may be poor. The image obtained shall be sufficient to compensate for uncertainties in the position of the missile inside the railcar.

(ii) The boundaries of the zone irradiated by the non-damaging image producing equipment shall be monitored by both the inspected Party and the inspecting Party. Within three months after installation of the non-damaging image producing equipment at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, the Parties shall complete testing of ionization chambers and thermoluminescent sensors as potential detector systems for monitoring the boundaries of the zone irradiated by the non-damaging image producing equipment installed at the site. If the Parties do not agree on one or the other of these two detector systems for monitoring the boundaries of the zone irradiated by the non-damaging image producing equipment, the Parties shall be permitted to use both detector systems. The inspected Party shall be permitted to use a shielding device to exclude from irradiation those portions of the missile which are not referred to above. If the imaged zone exceeds the zone described in subparagraph (b)(i) above, the inspection team, under the observation of the inspected

Party, shall erase from the memory of the non-damaging image producing equipment the information received and shall repeat the procedures for imaging the contents of the launch canister. Such cases shall be explained and documented in the monthly inspection report. The Parties agree to the following procedures for the use of the detection system:

- The detectors shall normally be kept in a tamper-resistant container under the control of both Parties at the portal monitoring area.

- Prior to the use of detectors during the imaging of the contents of a launch canister, all detectors shall be set to a zero reading, and an inspector and an in-country escort shall confirm that the readings are zero. In addition, two detectors shall be selected at random, exposed to a predetermined radiation level, and read by both Parties to ensure the calibration of the detectors.

- The inspected Party shall place detectors on the railcar in the presence of the inspection team immediately prior to each imaging of the contents of a launch canister. The identifying number of each detector and its location on the railcar shall be recorded.

- The inspected Party shall place the detectors on the exterior of the railcar on the side closest to the x-ray source at locations inside and outside of the

area to be imaged. Some detectors shall be placed on the railcar in positions where background radiation levels can be determined during the imaging process.

- After each imaging of the contents of a launch canister, the inspected Party shall remove the detectors from the railcar and shall move them to the reading area.

- Both Parties then shall read all thermoluminescent detectors jointly. Ionization chamber readings shall be done sequentially, first by the inspected Party, then by the inspection team.

- Readings shall be included in the monthly inspection report only in cases where detector readings necessitate repeating the procedures for imaging the contents of a launch canister.

(iii) The non-damaging image producing equipment shall not be switched on, either in an operational or test mode, without prior notification of the inspected Party. The inspected Party shall be permitted to measure by an independent method, using its own equipment, the power characteristics, of the x-ray irradiation, and shall be permitted to confirm the times when the irradiation device is turned on and off. The inspected Party shall be permitted to conduct such measurements during installation, testing, calibration and imaging of the contents of a launch canister, provided that these

measurements do not interfere with the quality of the image, as specified above.

(c) Preparations for use of non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) Prior to imaging the contents of a launch canister, the inspection team, in the presence of the inspected Party, shall calibrate the equipment. If the equipment is faulty, the inspection team shall make appropriate adjustments and repairs, as necessary. If the equipment cannot be repaired within four hours, then the vehicle shall be permitted to leave through the portal without imaging procedures being conducted, unless the malfunction is due to force majeure or to actions of the inspected Party. in such cases, the vehicle shall not be permitted to leave the continuous monitoring inspection site until the equipment is repaired.

(ii) The inspected Party shall affix markers to points on the outside of the railcar to designate the vertical boundaries of the area to be irradiated. These markers shall be used to determine where the x-ray beam is turned on and off.

(iii) The inspected Party shall provide data to the inspection team for adjusting the x-ray detector array. Based on the data provided by the inspected Party, the inspection team, in the presence of the inspected Party, shall adjust the height of the x-ray detector array so that it will image only the area permitted pursuant to subparagraph (b)(i) above. The

inspected Party shall confirm that the proper adjustments have been made.

(d) Procedures for use of non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) The inspected Party shall open the railcar, containing the launch canister whose contents are to be imaged, for inspection of the interior of the railcar. Before opening the railcar, the inspected Party, at its discretion, shall be permitted to move the railcar into the inspection building. The inspection team shall observe visually the interior of this railcar, and measure the length and diameter of the launch canister contained therein. Then the inspected Party shall close the railcar.

(ii) The inspected Party shall move the railcar into position for attachment to the transport system associated with the non-damaging image producing equipment.

(iii) The inspection team shall attach the railcar to the transport system and shall thereafter control its movement during the imaging process.

(iv) During the movement of the railcar past the non-damaging image producing equipment, the inspection team shall turn on the x-ray beam when the first marker affixed pursuant to subparagraph (c)(ii) above moves into the field of view of the sensing device and shall turn off the x-ray beam when the second marker

moves into the field of view of the sensing device.

(v) If the agreed area of the SS-25 missile is not contained in the image obtained, the inspection team shall move the railcar back to the starting point and repeat the steps set forth above. If the inspection team determines that the image obtained is too poor to ascertain whether an SS-20 missile is inside the launch canister, the inspection team shall be permitted to check to ensure that the equipment is operating properly. This shall be done on the basis of objective criteria that shall be established jointly by the Parties upon installation of the non-damaging image producing equipment. If the equipment is working properly, the inspection team shall move the railcar to the starting position and repeat the steps set forth above. If the equipment is not working properly and cannot be repaired in four hours, the railcar shall be permitted to leave the continuous monitoring inspection site without repeating the procedures for imaging. Such cases shall be explained and documented in the monthly inspection report.

(vi) Images shall be displayed on a video screen and permanently stored at the portal. Two paper copies of each image shall be made. Each copy shall be assigned by an inspector and an in-country escort and included in the monthly inspection report.

(vii) All images taken and the results of all measurements shall be included in the monthly inspection report.

4. System for measuring the length and diameter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile:

The Parties shall agree on-the methods of use for the equipment referred to in paragraph 1(d) of Part A of Section I of this Annex for measuring the length and diameter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile inside its launch canister. Such equipment shall be used when such launch canisters are opened for inspection pursuant to paragraph 14 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

5. Surveillance systems:

Surveillance equipment shall be installed at the portal and exit of the continuous monitoring inspection site to provide surveillance and documentation of vehicles leaving that inspection site, and the surveillance and documentation of activities in the portal monitoring area, including the area where the non-damaging image producing equipment is installed, and in the exit monitoring area. Camera outputs shall be displayed on the video monitors in the operator's consoles at the portal, and at the exit. The equipment shall be operated by the inspection team. The field of view of the cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. The design of the surveillance system shall ensure that individual frames of automated and operator-requested video data may be stored. A data review console operator shall select from the stored video images those to be made into paper copies.

Paper copies of the video images to be used in the monthly inspection report shall be signed by both Parties. Area lighting is included as an integral element of the video surveillance system. If is designed to provide the uniform illumination required by the cameras.

6. Vehicle sensors:

This equipment shall be installed along or in the rail and roadways at the portal and along,or in the roadway at the exit.

Traffic lights shall signal and direct road and rail vehicles as they enter and leave the continuous monitoring inspection site.

Semaphore gates shall provide an additional indication to vehicle operators that they have or have not been cleared to enter or leave the portal monitoring area and exit monitoring area. Semaphore gate actions and activation of traffic lights shall be controlled from the portal operator's console and exit operator's console. Induction loop sensors shall be used to sense vehicle presence and direction of their motion and to alert inspectors of vehicular activity. Traffic lights and semaphore gates shall permit only one road vehicle in the portal monitoring area and one road vehicle in the exit monitoring area at any one time.

7. Data Collection Center:

The portal operator's console and the data review console shall be located in the Data Collection Center. The portal operator's console shall be used to monitor the activities at the rail and road portions of the portal and at the exit. The color graphics display monitor shall display the data about vehicles leaving through the portal and the exit. The color graphics display monitor also shall display system status data and system messages.

Traffic control panels in the portal operator's console shall be used to control operations along the road and rail segments of the portal and the exit. The data review console shall be used to review data and make paper copies of data selected by the data review console operator.

8. Exit:

The exit operator's console shall be located in the inspector's exit shelter and shall be used to monitor the activities at the exit. Exit sensor data, vehicle data and video images shall be presented on the exit operator's console and on the

portal operator's console in the Data Collection Center. Operations at the exit shall be controlled from the exit operator's console, or remotely from the portal operator's console.

9. Communications:

The intercom system shall provide primary voice communications between the Data Collection Center, inspector's exit shelter, structure for the installation and operation of non-damaging image producing equipment, warehouse, inspection team headquarters and inspection team's living quarters. The systems of radio communications shall provide primary voice communications between the inspectors at the Data Collection Center and the roving perimeter inspectors as well as back-up communications between the inspectors at the Data Collection Center and at the inspector's exit shelter. The base station radio shall be located in the Data Collection Center. Hand-held radios shall be located at the inspector's exit shelter and with each roving perimeter inspector. The inspected Party shall provide two dedicated telephone lines and terminal equipment.

Facsimile equipment shall be used on one of these telephone lines.

The inspection team's telephone system shall use the two dedicated telephone lines and the non-dedicated telephone line and shall provide for voice communications with locations outside the boundaries of the continuous monitoring inspection site and shall provide a second voice communication system between the Data Collection Center, inspector's exit shelters structure for installation and operation of the non-damaging image producing equipment, warehouse, sauna, inspection team headquarters and inspection team's living quarters within the boundaries of the continuous monitoring inspection site, and quarters for the in-country escort.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna:

1. Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment:

(a) After entering the portal monitoring area, vehicles shall stop at the stop line. The length and height of vehicles and cargoes leaving through the portal shall be measured remotely using the technical surveillance system installed in the Data Collection Center and controlled from it or, as necessary, measured manually.

(b) At each exit, Kontrol'-1 infrared sensors shall be placed in fixed positions along both sides of the road. The length and height of an exiting vehicle, shall be automatically compared with benchmark values using the Kontrol'-1 infrared sensor system. A signal shall be transmitted to the Data Collection Center if the length or height of the vehicle exceeds the benchmark value. After the vehicle has stopped at the stop line, its length and height shall be measured remotely, using a fixed measuring rod observed from the Data Collection center by means of a closed-circuit television system or, as necessary, measured manually. The measuring rod shall be placed at the side of the road.

2. Devices for measuring the linear dimensions of vehicles and cargoes: A portable measuring rod and a tape measure shall, as necessary, be used to measure the length, height and width of vehicles and cargoes. These devices shall be used in accordance with the methods set forth in Part A of Section III of Annex IV to this Memorandum.

3. Weight sensors: If weight is used as an inspection criterion pursuant to paragraph 13 of Part G of Section III of this Memorandum, then the Parties shall agree upon the characteristics and methods of use of weight scales.

4. Non-damaging image producing equipment: If non-damaging imaging is implemented as an inspection procedure pursuant to paragraph 15 of Part G of Section III of this Memorandum then, pursuant to paragraphs 16 and 17 of Part G of that Section the Parties shall agree upon the methods of use of non-damaging image

producing equipment and its characteristics as required by paragraph 1(j) of Part B of Section I of this Annex.

5. Surveillance systems: Closed-circuit television cameras shall be installed at the portal and at each of the two exits for surveying the portal area and exits and for remote inspection of vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site. Camera outputs shall be transmitted to the Data Collection Center and displayed on video monitors. The field of view of the cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.

6. Vehicle sensors:

(a) Sensors indicating the position of the gates shall be installed on the gates of the inspected Party at the portal and the exits, and Kontrol'-1 sensors shall be installed on both sides of the roads in the portal monitoring area and in the two exit monitoring areas. If a vehicle leaves the continuous monitoring inspection site, the sensors shall transmit, in sequence, signals to the Data Collection Center that the gates have been opened, that a vehicle has entered the portal or exit, that the vehicle is on the portion of the road designated for vehicle inspection, and that the vehicle has left through the portal or exit.

(b) Vehicle drivers shall obey the signals from the traffic lights. An inspector at the portal or an inspector at the exit shall control the operation of the traffic lights.

7. Data Collection Center and inspector's exit shelters:

(a) The Data Collection Center shall be installed in the portal monitoring area. Information received from the technical monitoring systems at the portal and exits shall be collected and displayed there. Traffic control of vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be carried out from the Data Collection Center or at the exits. Should the external power be interrupted, the Data Collection Center shall supply

reliable battery power to the inspecting Party's equipment at the continuous monitoring inspection site for up to 30 minutes.

(b) Two identical inspector's exit shelters, one at each exit, shall be installed. Sensors indicating the position of the gates shall transmit information to the inspector's exit shelters. The traffic lights can be operated from the inspector's exit shelter by an inspector.

8. Communications:

The internal telephone communication system shall provide primary voice communications between the Data Collection Center, the inspector's exit shelters and the warehouse. The radio communications equipment shall provide primary voice communications between the inspectors at the portal and the roving perimeter inspectors. This equipment shall also serve as backup communications between inspectors at the portal and exits. The base station radio shall be located in the Data Collection Center. Hand-held radios shall be located at the inspector's exit shelters and with each roving perimeter inspector. Communications between the Data Collection Center and the inspection team's living quarters shall be by means of the local telephone system.

ANNEX VI

CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS OF USE OF EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED TO VERIFY TECHNICAL DATA PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY AND PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE AGREED MINUTE OF MAY 12, 1988

I. Characteristics of Equipment

A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamp, CST, Model 040710;

(b) 2 0-30 pound (0-14 kilogram) tape tensioning scales, Lufkin, Model 586;

(c) 2 Magnifying glass, Charvoz;

(d) 2 Hand level, TOPCON, Model 56210;

(e) 2 String line level, Stanley;

(f) 2 200 millimeter calipers with micrometer screw, MSC, model 624777; and

(g) 2 18 inch (46 centimeter) combination square, MSC, Model 8640068.

2. Portable Weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 45 metric-ton capacity tension load cell, Dillon, Model SGMT;

(b) 1 Load cell readout device with associated 15 meter cable, Sensotec, Model NK;

(c) 2 45 metric-ton load capacity shackle/hook; and

(d) 12 Heavy-duty portable scales, General

Electrodynamics, Model 500B (9 metric-ton load capacity).

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Equipment listed in Annex IV to this Memorandum shall be used.

II. Methods of Use of Equipment

In order to verify technical data pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, the Parties shall check the data at the sites designated by the inspected Party and shall use the equipment listed in Annex IV and this Annex. The Parties shall use the equipment in accordance with the procedures set forth in Parts A and C of Section III of Annex IV as well as in accordance with the following procedures.

A. Additional Procedures:

1. The inspection team shall deliver to an inspection site a sufficient quantity of weighing devices of the appropriate type capable of weighing any missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

2. If the inspected Party chooses to weigh a missile or missile stage by the suspension method, then the inspected Party shall connect the tension load cell to the lifting device and to the fixture attached to the missile or missile stage to be weighed.

The inspected Party shall be permitted to connect its own tension load cell in series with the tension load cell of the inspecting Party so that both tension load cells measure the weight of the object simultaneously. Before a reading is taken, the inspection team shall ascertain that its tension load cell is bearing that object's entire weight.

3. During the process of weighing or determining the dimensions of a missile, stage of a missile, launcher, support structure or support equipment, it is permissible for the result of each measurement to deviate by not more than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty.

4. The inspection team shall be permitted continuous visual observation of its weighing,devices and the object weighed throughout all the testing, calibrating and weighing processes.

5. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site where technical data is to be checked the in-country escort shall indicate the specific places on each missile, stage of a missile, launcher, support structure or support equipment where measurements were taken to obtain the technical data provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty. If necessary, the in-country escort shall be permitted to use diagrams or sketches to indicate such places.

6. In order to check technical data with respect to the SS-20 missile:

(a) The inspected Party shall deliver a missile selected by the inspection team, contained in its launch canister, to a special enclosed area where the missile shall be removed from its launch canister and disassembled into stages.

(b) This enclosed area shall be located near the site where the inspection team selects the missile. The inspection team shall accompany the missile from the selection site to the enclosed area.

(c) The inspection team shall measure the length and diameter of the launch canister.

(d) The inspection team shall weigh the vehicle while it is carrying the SS-20 missile contained in its launch canister, and subsequently the inspection team shall weigh the vehicle without the missile and its launch canister. The weight of the SS-20 missile in the launch canister shall be calculated by taking the difference of the results of these two weight measurements. To check the result of weighing the SS-20 missile in the launch canister, the weight of the launch canister and the weights of the first and second stages obtained by means of the procedures set forth in subparagraph (f) below shall be added. The difference between the result of this addition and the result obtained from weighing the SS-20 missile in the launch canister must not exceed two metric tons. Otherwise, the inspection team shall be permitted to require repetition of the weighing process with a different SS-20 missile contained in its launch canister.

(e) After the removal of the SS-20 missile from its launch canister, the inspection team shall measure the length of the missile and the length of the missile's front section located at the measuring site.

(f) The inspected Party shall disassemble the SS-20 missile into stages, after which, along with the inspection team, it shall weigh the first and second stages of the missile as well as the launch canister. The inspection team shall measure the length and diameter of the first and second stages of the missile.

(g) The inspection team shall not observe directly the removal of the launch canister from the vehicle, the removal of the missile from its launch canister, or the disassembly of the missile into stages.

(h) Prior to each of the operations indicated in subparagraph (g) above, the inspection team shall inspect the enclosed area to ascertain that nothing is present in the enclosed area, including other missiles, stages of missiles, launch canisters or missile transporter vehicles, that could be used to distort the results of the weight and linear measurements.

(i) During each of the operations indicated in subparagraph (g) above, the inspection team shall observe continuously the fence enclosing the area in order to ascertain that nothing is brought into or removed from the enclosed area while these operations are taking place there.

B. Purpose Of Linear Measurement Devices:

1. Tape tensioning scales adjusted to a standard 5-kilogram load shall be used to place the measuring tape under tension.

2. Measuring tape clamps shall be used to hold the measuring tape firmly under tension.

3. String line levels and hand levels shall be used to establish necessary references to check that the measuring tape and the axis of the object are parallel.

4. Combination squares shall be used to establish

perpendicular lines and to measure the height of small protrusions that could affect the results of diameter measurements.

5. Magnifying glasses shall be used to facilitate the precise determination of the data at the intersection of the measuring tape markings with the plumb bob's target points.

6. A three-section range rod shall be used to assist in measuring the height of an object.

7. Calipers with a micrometer screw shall be used to measure the width of small protrusions that could affect the results of diameter measurements.

THE LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

INF Article-by-Article

I**NTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING**

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Together with the Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols, Signed at Washington on December 8, 1987

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

The White House, January 25, 1988

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection regarding the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty, together with the MOU and the two Protocols, was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. The Report of the Department of State on the Treaty is provided for the information of the Senate.

In addition, I am transmitting herewith, for the information of the Senate, the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement), which was signed at Brussels on December 11, 1987.

The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. The Report of the Department

of State discusses in detail the terms of the Basing Country Agreement. Also attached for the information of the Senate are the notes exchanged between both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and the United States. The notes acknowledge that these countries agree to the United States' conducting inspections, under the Treaty, on their territory. Identical notes also are being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries.

The Treaty is an unprecedented arms control agreement in several respects. It marks the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate, throughout the world, an entire class of their missile systems. Significantly, the elimination will be achieved from markedly asymmetrical starting points that favored the Soviet Union. The Treaty includes provisions for comprehensive on-site inspections, including the continuous monitoring of certain facilities, to aid in verifying compliance. To a much greater extent than in earlier arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, detailed information has been, and will continue to be, exchanged by the Parties in order to facilitate verification of compliance. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on cooperative measures to enhance verification by national technical means.

The missile systems to be eliminated consist of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles having a range capability between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The launchers for such missiles and unique elements of their related support structures and support equipment also will be eliminated. The shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under this Treaty are those with a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers. They must be eliminated within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Intermediate-range missiles, having a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, are to be eliminated in two phases within three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Elimination will take place at designated locations and will be subject to on-site inspection as an aid to verifying compliance.

In the MOU, the United States and the Soviet Union have provided detailed information on the location of all missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty. Each Party is required to provide updated information on a routine basis after the Treaty enters into force.

The Treaty provides that on-site inspections are permitted at specified locations in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in the Basing Countries in Western and Eastern Europe where U.S. or Soviet missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty are or have been located. The

different types of "short-notice" on-site inspections for which the Treaty provides are designed to contribute to our ability to verify Soviet compliance, while protecting all U.S.

and Allied nuclear and conventional forces not subject to the Treaty as well as other sensitive intelligence and defense facilities.

In addition to "short-notice" on-site inspections, the Treaty provides for other types of on-site inspections, including the continuous presence of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, and a continuous Soviet presence at the identified facility at Hercules Plant #1, located at Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced.

The Treaty is the culmination of six years of negotiations with the Soviet Union. To a large extent, the Treaty is the result of Allied solidarity in support of the fundamental objectives established by NATO's "dual-track" decision in 1979. Our Atlantic and our Asian and Pacific Allies have been closely involved throughout the period of negotiation, and they fully support the Treaty. The Treaty enhances our collective security by eliminating an entire class of Soviet missile systems that has been a major concern for over a decade. Our European Allies will continue to be well protected by the significant U.S. nuclear forces remaining in Europe, by the independent British and French nuclear deterrents, and by conventional forces, which include over 300,000 U.S.

troops.

I believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.

RONALD REAGAN

The White House, January 25, 1988

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

Department of State, Washington.

The President, The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

In addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for its information.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000 kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an entire class of weapon-delivery systems.

The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS- 20s threatening our Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development.

Throughout the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress, in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the United States in negotiating the Treaty.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the "dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to deploy a limited number of U.S.

Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue

arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a balance in intermediate- range nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level.

Under this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed, and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option" to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would have canceled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

Today, more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option" until July 1987.

Soviet shorter-range missiles--the SS-12 and SS-23--can fulfill many of the same military missions as the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Therefore, from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted the "zero option" for shorter- range missiles as well.

For much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global" approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.

During the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S. warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United States had insisted from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of

Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty.

Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation.

THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground- launched, weapon-delivery, ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support structures and support equipment.

The Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.

The Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations.

These are: The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems as of November 1, 1987;

The Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty; and

The Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting on-site inspections, including "short notice" inspections, "baseline" inspections, "close- out" inspections, "elimination" inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.

REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS

The Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediate-range missiles have a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.

The existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM-109G intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter-range ballistic missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. All shorter- range missile systems must be eliminated within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not listed in Article III as "existing types," range capability is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Upon entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter- range missiles. During the first six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediate-range or shorter-range missile systems.

Also, the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one

stage, and only one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing type of intermediate- range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors, to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.

VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS

The scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five basic categories:

- locational restrictions
- elimination requirements
- national technical means of verification
- data exchanges
- on-site inspections.

LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems during the elimination periods.

For example, pending elimination:

- All intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas or at support facilities, such as storage or repair facilities, or be in notified transit between them. All such areas and facilities must be named and their locations described. An intermediate- range missile or launcher located elsewhere (and not in a notified transit) would thus be in violation of the Treaty.
- Within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles, must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed shorter-

range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities within one year. Until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles and their launchers must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit.

- Transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between permitted locations must be completed within 25 days and, following the completion of transit, information regarding the transit must be provided within 48 hours.

ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS

Article X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection. The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures in situ are specified, including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental destruction are also included.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25 garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject to on-site inspections.

DATA EXCHANGES

The Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved and of any changes in the data base originally set forth in the MOU. Each Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities, the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the

completion of elimination activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline against which other observations can be measured.

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

The Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections.

The scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out include:

- "baseline" inspections, between 30 and 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help verify the initial update of data contained in the categories set forth in the MOU;
- "close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities;
- "elimination" inspections to observe actual elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment at elimination facilities;
- "elimination" inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination with respect to items lost or accidentally destroyed or placed on static display and with respect to training equipment;
- "short-notice" inspections of certain declared and formerly declared facilities, during the three-year elimination period and for a ten-year period thereafter, to aid in verifying that all Treaty-prohibited activity has ceased; and
- "continuous portal monitoring" by the United States at the designated portal and perimeter of the facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, to ensure that stages of the SS-20 are not covertly manufactured as stages of the SS-25 ICBM. The Soviet Union may install continuous portal monitoring at the designated portal and perimeter of the Hercules Plant #1 located in Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced. If, at any time after the initial two years of the Treaty, assembly of SS-25s ceases at Votkinsk, continuous portal monitoring would continue for another 12 months and then cease along with the monitoring of the plant at Magna, Utah. The United States could reestablish continuous portal monitoring if the Soviets resumed SS-25 missile assembly at Votkinsk or anywhere else.

The specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on Inspection.

Inspectors and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process, including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their person.

The Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry" for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry. Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry.

The Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.

In general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring and "elimination" inspections, the period of time an inspection team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours, with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously. Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection involved.

RATIFICATION

The Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter into force as part of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes, which are included herewith for the information of the

Senate, will also enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.

AMENDMENTS

Amendments to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical. It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take into account unforeseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures, which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not require ratification.

NON-CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

The Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces, short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers), or conventional forces.

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty, a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for on- site inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S. and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet missile systems are located.

Many of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement, the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located,

consent to inspections at facilities subject to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.

EXCHANGES OF NOTES

Each Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

INSPECTIONS OF SS-4 SILOS

In addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles. Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the Treaty.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.

I believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

Article-By-Article Analysis Of The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles Structure Of The Treaty

The Treaty consists of a Preamble and 17 Articles. The associated Memorandum of Understanding on Data (the MOU), Protocol on Elimination, and Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble identifies the United States and the Soviet Union as the Parties to the treaty and contains four paragraphs that set forth the general goals and objectives that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed are advanced by the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems.

The first paragraph recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second paragraph notes that the Parties are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability.

The third paragraph states the Parties' conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security.

The fourth paragraph acknowledges the obligations of the Parties set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

ARTICLE I--BASIC OBLIGATIONS

Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, not to have such systems after their elimination, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty. This Article also establishes that the MOU and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II--DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of terms used in the Treaty. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), (2) cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), (3) GLBM launcher, (4) GLCM launcher, (5) intermediate-range missile, (6) shorter-

range missile, (7) deployment area, (8) missile operating base, (9) missile support facility, (10) transit, (11) deployed missile, (12) non-deployed missile, (13) deployed launcher, (14) non-deployed launcher, and (15) basing country.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines a "ballistic missile" as a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. In addition, "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" is defined as a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon- delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a ballistic missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the ballistic missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the ballistic missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all ballistic missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLBMs are those types of ground-launched ballistic missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon- delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the ballistic missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLBM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines a "cruise missile" as a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. In addition, a "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" is defined as a ground-launched missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a cruise missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the cruise missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the cruise missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all cruise missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLCMs are those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the cruise missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability for intermediate- range and shorter-range GLCMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLCM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines a "GLBM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM. The technical data for each type of GLBM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines a "GLCM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLCMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM. The technical data for each type of GLCM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines an "intermediate-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. The existing types of intermediate-range missiles are specified in paragraph 1 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, III, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. The criteria for determining the range capability of intermediate-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VIII.

Paragraph 6 of Article II defines a "shorter-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. The existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties are specified in paragraph 2 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, IV, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. Criteria for determining the range capability of shorter-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines a "deployment area" as a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, may operate and within which one or more missile operating base are located. All deployment areas of inter-mediate-range missiles contain, by definition, at least one missile operating base. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all deployment areas be specified in the

MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. Each deployment area is described by name and boundaries in Section III of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article II, an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area is considered to be deployed. An intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area is considered to be a non-deployed missile in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article II. As provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII, intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as stages of such missiles, must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile, stage of such a missile, or launcher of such a missile in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty. There are no "deployment areas" for shorter-range missiles; rather, such missiles are deployed only at missile operating bases in order to restrict them to much smaller geographical areas and thus further constrain their operational capability. This additional constraint works to the advantage of the United States since the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles.

Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to intermediate-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located within a deployment area: (a) at which intermediate-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, (b) in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located, and (c) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile operating bases be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. The location of each intermediate-range missile operating base is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section III of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support structures and support equipment necessary to operate intermediate-range missiles. Definitions of the term "support equipment" and "support structure" are provided in paragraphs 10 and 11, respectively, of Section I of the MOU. In addition, since all missile operating bases for intermediate-range missiles located at missile operating bases are counted as deployed missiles in accordance with paragraph 11 of Article II [sic.].

Subparagraph 8(b) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to shorter-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located at any place: (a) at which shorter-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, and (b) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. The location of each shorter-range "missile operating base" is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section IV of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile

operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support equipment necessary to operate shorter-range missiles. The definition of the term "support equipment" is provided in paragraph 10 of Section I of the MOU. Since there are no deployment areas for shorter-range missiles, deployed shorter- range missiles are considered to be those shorter-range missiles located at missile operating bases. Paragraph 3 of Article VIII specifies that shorter-range missiles and their launchers may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit from such locations to elimination facilities. A shorter-range missile or launcher in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Article II defines a "missile support facility" as a missile production facility, a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility, a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility, a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility. These terms are defined in Section I of the MOU. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile support facilities be specified in the MOU and that their locations, except for elimination facilities, cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 or Article X. The location of each such facility and its center coordinates are specified in Sections III, IV, and V of the MOU. A site diagram of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as shorter-range missiles and their launchers, located at these facilities are considered to be non-deployed missiles and non-deployed launchers, respectively.

Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "transit," with respect to an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, as movement between: (a) missile support facilities, (b) a missile support facility and a deployment area, or (c) deployment areas. With respect to a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, "transit" is defined as a movement from either a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility. Thus, the only permitted movement of shorter-range missiles is to elimination facilities. Restrictions on the transit of shorter-range missiles complement the other measures that are intended to reduce as quickly as possible the Soviet advantage in the numbers of shorter-range missiles. Pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX, notifications of transits and information relating to the transit must be provided within 48 hours after the transit is completed. Such notifications will assist in determining whether there has been a violation if a missile is detected outside of deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities. All transits must be completed within 25 days in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article VIII. Intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in transit are counted as non-deployed missiles.

Paragraph 11 of Article II defines a "deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile that is located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile that is located at a missile operating base. Article IV requires the reduction and elimination of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles. Article V requires the elimination of deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles.

Paragraph 12 of Article II defines a "non-deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Paragraph 1 of Article VIII requires that an intermediate-range missile may only be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be "non-deployed." An intermediate-range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. As noted above, paragraph 3 of Article VIII states that, until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. A shorter-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be a non- deployed missile. A shorter-range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 of Article II defines a "deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. Deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. Deployed shorter-range missile launchers are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V.

Paragraph 14 of Article II defines a "non-deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Thus, "non-deployed launcher" is a term based upon the location of a launcher for intermediate- range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Non-deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are those launchers located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. An intermediate-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. Non-deployed shorter-range missile launchers are those located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V. A shorter-range missile launcher that is neither

deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 15 of Article II defines a "basing country" as a country, other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on whose territory U.S. or Soviet intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or support structures associated with intermediate- range missiles or their launchers, were located at any time after November 1, 1987. For the purposes of this definition, the term "located" does not include missiles or launchers in transit. The Basing Countries in which U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located are Belgium, the Federal Republic of German, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

ARTICLE III--EXISTING TYPES OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Paragraph 1 of Article III lists the existing types of intermediate-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the types of intermediate- range missiles listed as existing are the Pershing II ballistic missile and the GBM-109G cruise missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of intermediate-range missiles are the RSD-10 (SS- 20) ballistic missile, the RS-12 (SS-4) ballistic missile, and the RS-14 (SS-5) ballistic missile.

Pursuant to Article IV, all intermediate-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers, support equipment, and support structures, must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that intermediate-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the Soviet Union must eliminate all of its RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and their associated support equipment and support structures are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article III lists the existing types of shorter-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the type of shorter-range missile described as existing is the Pershing IA ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of shorter-range missiles are the OTR-22 (SS-12) ballistic missile and the OTR-23 (SS-23) ballistic missile. Pursuant to Article V, all of the existing

types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers and support equipment, must be eliminated within 18 months after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the United States must eliminate all of its Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating shorter-range missiles are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

ARTICLE IV--REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES

Article IV sets forth the basic obligations for the reduction and eventual elimination of all intermediate-range missile systems.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV requires the Parties to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. The types of items to be eliminated are listed in Section I of the Protocol on Elimination, while the numbers of such items as of November 1, 1987, are listed in Sections II and III of the MOU. After the three-year elimination period, such missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment may not be possessed by either Party. The procedures by which each type of missile, launcher, support structure, and support equipment must be eliminated are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that both deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, must be reduced and eliminated in two phases. It also provides that such elimination will occur throughout the duration of each phase, thus ensuring that the eliminations will not take place only in the final daysof each elimination phase.

Subparagraph 2(a) provides that by the end of the first phase, which will be no later than 29 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must have completed reductions so that:

- the number of its deployed launchers of intermediate- range missiles does not exceed the number of such launchers capable of carrying or containing missiles considered to carry a total of 171 warheads. Since this limit only applies to deployed launchers, only those intermediate-range missile launchers located in deployment areas are affected;

- the number of its deployed intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry a total of 180 warheads. Since this limit only applies to deployed intermediate-range missiles, only those missiles located in deployment areas are affected. The reason that 180 warheads on deployed missiles will be allowed, but only 171 warheads on deployed launchers, is so that a small number of extra missiles may be located in deployment areas for use as operational spares or for maintenance;
- the aggregate number of its deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number that is considered by the Parties to carry a total of 200 warheads. This provision places an aggregate limit on the number of deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missile launchers that are located in deployment areas, located at missile support facilities, and in transit. Thus, since intermediate- range missile launchers must be either deployed or non- deployed, all intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to reductions in the first phase;
- the aggregate number of its deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry a total of 200 warheads. This provision limits the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles to the number of missiles that are considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads. Thus, there is a limit on the number of intermediate-range missiles that are located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities, and are in transit. Since intermediate-range missiles must be either deployed or non-deployed, all such missiles are thus subject to reductions in the first phase; and
- the ratio of the total number of deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types to the total number of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the ratio that existed on November 1, 1987. This provision is intended to ensure proportional reductions of the types of intermediate-range missile systems possessed by each Party.

Subparagraph 2(a) of Article IV requires that numerical limits for missiles and launchers be calculated using warhead numbers. To facilitate verification, the number of warheads actually deployed on each missile and launcher is not counted; rather, the number of warheads on missiles and launchers is derived by using the counting rules set forth in Article VII. For missiles, the counting rule in paragraph 6 of Article VII of the Treaty provides that the number of warheads a GLBM or GLCM of an existing type carries is the maximum number of warheads for that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. For launchers, paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that the number of missiles that each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is capable of carrying or containing is the number specified for launchers of missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU.

In sum, 29 months after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must not have more deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 171 warheads, not have more deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 180 warheads, not have more combined deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 200 warheads, and not have more combined deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 200 warheads.

Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV provides that, by the end of the second phase, which will be no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, support structures, and support equipment of the categories listed in the MOU must be eliminated by the Parties.

ARTICLE V--ELIMINATION OF SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Paragraph 1 of Article V provides for the elimination of the shorter-range missiles of each Party, along with launchers of such missiles and associated support equipment, within a single period of 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, there is only one phase for reductions of shorter-range missiles during which shorter-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment must be eliminated. After elimination, the Parties are not permitted to possess any shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or associated support equipment.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V restrict the locations of shorter-range missiles and their launchers during the 18-month elimination period. Paragraph 2 requires that, within 90 days of entry into force of the Treaty, each Party move all of its deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as all of its deployed and non- deployed launchers of shorter-range missiles, to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and retain them there until they are destroyed in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination. Within 12 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall move all of its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and shall retain them there until they are destroyed, in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, during the 18-month elimination period. The requirement to move shorter-range missile systems to elimination facilities early in the elimination period is commonly referred to as the "corral" concept.

Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that shorter-range missiles and launchers of shorter-range missiles must not be located at the same elimination facility. Elimination facilities for shorter- range missiles and elimination facilities for launchers of shorter-range missiles must be separated from each other by at least 1000 kilometers.

The locational restrictions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V, together, with those in paragraph 3 of Article VIII, are intended to ensure that shorter-range missiles and their launchers are removed from operational status as soon as possible after entry into force of the Treaty. Given the fact that the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles, this provision will contribute significantly to NATO's security with respect to the threat posed by shorter-range missiles during the early stages of the implementation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VI--PRODUCTION AND FLIGHT-TEST BANS

Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that, upon entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, neither Party may produce or flight- test any intermediate-range missile, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. Paragraph 1 also provides that neither Party may produce, flight-test, or launch any shorter-range missiles, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. The term "produce" in this context means any industrial activity involving the construction of one or more missiles, stages, or launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The obligation not to produce intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their stages and launchers, prohibits the Parties from producing such items for third parties.

A flight-test ban is a natural element in any treaty that eliminates an entire class of missile systems. It serves to strengthen the production ban. Any covertly produced missile could not be adequately flight-tested without likely U.S. detection. Without realistic testing, a Party's confidence in the operational capability of any covertly-produced missile system would be degraded.

The reason launches of shorter-range missiles are prohibited, but allowed for intermediate-range missiles, is that intermediate- range missiles may be launched for the purpose of destroying them. Paragraph 5 of Article X provides that, within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to eliminate by means of such launching up to 100 of its intermediate- range missiles. This right is limited to this six-month period in order to preclude prohibited flight-testing under the guise of launching to destruction. Restrictions and conditions on eliminations by means of launching are provided for in Articles IX and XI of the Treaty and in Section III of the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI provides that, notwithstanding the paragraph 1 prohibition against producing stages of intermediate- range GLBMs, each Party has the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by the Treaty even if that missile uses one stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage. Paragraph 2 further

provides that a Party may not produce any other stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. This provision takes into account the outward physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the SS-20, which is an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. The effect of paragraph 2 is to make clear that the Treaty does not prohibit the Soviets from continuing to produce the SS-25 ICBM, which is not limited by this Treaty, on the basis that it has a first stage outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS-20. The United States has a reciprocal right with regard to one stage of its own Pershing missile system should it choose to exercise it. Paragraph 2 prohibits the parties from producing more than one stage that is outwardly similar to any stage of an existing type of intermediate- range GLBM.

ARTICLE VII--COUNTING RULES

Article VII contains counting rules and type rules that are critical to the operation of the Treaty. Counting rules in arms control agreements provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that specified items will be counted in a certain way. Type rules provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that once a specified object is counted in a certain way, then all objects of that type will be counted in that same way. Such rules are important because they provide a mechanism for verifying compliance with the provisions of an agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides that if a ballistic missile or cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, then all missiles of that type will be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. When read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article II, which defines a ground-launched ballistic missile in terms of a "weapon-delivery vehicle," paragraph 1 of Article VII defines a weapon-delivery vehicle in such a way as to relieve a Party from having to prove that every missile of a particular type has been tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle; rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that merely one missile of that type has been flight-tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle in order to establish for the purpose of the Treaty that all missiles of that type are weapon- delivery vehicles.

Paragraph 2 of Article VII states that if a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, then all GLBM or GLCMs of that type will be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. Similarly, if a GLBM or a GLCM is a shorter-range missile, then all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

Paragraph 2 works in conjunction with all of the other Treaty provisions that refer to intermediate-range missiles or shorter- range missiles; it has the effect of a type rule,

making such provisions applicable to all GLBMs and GLCMs if a single GLBM or GLCM of that type is an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile. "Intermediate-range missile" and "shorter-range missile" are defined in paragraphs 5 and 6, respectively, of Article II.

Paragraph 3 of Article VII provides that if a type of GLBM is developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not on the surface of the Earth, then it will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty. Paragraph 3 thus provides an explicit exception to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, and applies to such ground-launched ballistic missiles as anti-satellite missiles (ASATs), anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs), and air defense or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

Paragraph 4 of Article VII establishes criteria for defining the range capability of GLBMs and GLCMs not specified in Article III. For purposes of the Treaty, the range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III is defined as its maximum tested range.

The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III is defined as the maximum distance it can cover, while flying in its standard design mode, before it runs out of fuel. Distance is calculated by projecting the flight path of the GLCM onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Paragraph 4 also describes intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in terms of their range capability. A shorter-range GLBM or GLCM is a missile with a range capability equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 1000 kilometers. An intermediate-range GLBM or GLCM is defined as a missile with a range capability greater than 1000 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers.

Paragraph 5 of Article VII provides that the maximum number of warheads considered to be carried by an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is the number of warheads specified for missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU. The specification of the number of warheads associated with an existing type of intermediate-range missile is necessary in order to calculate compliance with the warhead limits pertaining to intermediate-range missiles provided for in Article IV.

Paragraph 6 of Article VII provides that each GLBM or GLCM will be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads for a missile of that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads on intermediate-range missiles to meet their obligations for the first phase of reductions, they will use the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of intermediate-range missile as specified in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 7 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs, respectively. This paragraph works in conjunction with the Treaty provisions that refer to the testing of GLBM launchers or GLCM launchers; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all launchers of a given type if a single launcher of that type has been tested to launch a GLBM or a GLCM, respectively. "GLBM launcher" and "GLCM launcher" are defined in paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of Article II.

Paragraph 8 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has contained, or has launched, a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM, respectively. This paragraph has the effect of a type rule. Thus, if one launcher of a type has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered GLBM or GLCM launchers, respectively, and thus will be subject to the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that each launcher of an existing type of GLBM or GLCM will be considered capable of carrying or containing the number of missiles specified in Section VI of the MOU for that type of launcher. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads associated with intermediate- range missile launchers, they will use the number of GLBMs or GLCMs that the launcher of that type is considered capable of carrying, as specified in Section VI of the MOU, and, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VII which provides the warhead counting rule for GLBMs and GLCMs, multiply that number times the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of GLBM or GLCM, as specified in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 10 of Article VII provides counting rules for GLBMs and GLCMs. These rules define how GLBMs and GLCMs are accounted for under the terms of the Treaty. The purpose of these provisions is to facilitate verification of compliance with the Treaty by identifying those features of the missile systems most easily observable by national technical means of verification.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLBMs stored or moved in separate stages (such as the Pershing II), the longest stage of an intermediate range or shorter-range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that each longest stage of such a GLBM will be counted as one complete missile. The Protocol on Elimination requires, however, that all stages of existing types of GLBMs be eliminated.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 of Article VII provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages (such as the SS- 20), a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate- range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that the canister does not contain such a missile. This means that such a GLBM canister will be counted as one complete GLBM. This canister counting rule serves an important verification purpose. Soviet missiles typically are kept in canisters. By virtue of this rule, if the United States detects a canister subject to the provisions of the Treaty, it will be entitled to consider that canister to contain a missile of the type associated with that canister, unless the Soviet Union can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the United States that the canister does not contain such a missile. Such a demonstration could involve on-site inspection, national technical means of verification, or cooperative measures. Absent such a Soviet demonstration, each Soviet canister counts as one missile for purposes of Treaty limitations. Also, pursuant to the Protocol on Elimination, canisters of prohibited types of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles must be eliminated along with their associated missiles. In addition, subparagraph (b) of Article 10 provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages, an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be considered a completed missile. Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that the airframe of a GLCM will be counted as if it were a complete missile.

Paragraph 11 of Article VII provides that a ballistic missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLBM launchers subject to the Treaty. Similarly, a cruise missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLCM launchers subject to the Treaty. These exceptions are necessary to permit the land-based testing of items not subject to the Treaty, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Paragraph 12 of Article VII gives each Party the right to produce and use existing booster stages in order to create booster systems with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. This provision permits each Party to produce and use booster stages that otherwise might, because of the range to which the booster system is launched and the payload that is tested, be considered for the purposes of the Treaty to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. In this regard, if a ballistic missile or cruise missile is

not a weapon-delivery vehicle, then pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2, respectively, of Article II it is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Paragraph 12 is essential to permit the United States to continue on-going research on advanced concepts for strategic reentry vehicles and defensive systems.

Paragraph 12 further provides that launches of such booster systems will not be considered to be flight testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as long as four conditions are met. First, the stages used in such booster systems must be different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III. Second, the booster systems must be used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than themselves. Third, the total number of launchers for such booster systems must not exceed 35 at any one time for either Party. Fourth, the launchers for such booster systems must be fixed and emplaced above ground. Such launchers must be located only at research and development launch sites that are specified in Section VII of the MOU. Such research and development launch sites are not subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 6 of Article IX, however, provides that each party must notify the other Party, at least ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in this paragraph. The purpose of such a notification is to enhance the verification by national technical means of such launches. ARTICLE VIII--LOCATION AND TRANSIT

Article VIII sets forth locational restrictions both for intermediate-range missiles and their launchers and for shorter- range missiles and their launchers. In addition, Article VIII limits the movement of missiles and launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The ability to verify compliance is enhanced if there are restrictions on the location and movement of Treaty-limited items during the period in which they are being eliminated.

Paragraph 1 of Article VIII provides that all intermediate- range missiles and their launchers must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "deployment areas," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 7, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missiles are specified in Section III of the MOU, and notification of missiles and launchers in transit is required pursuant to subparagraph 5(f) of Article IX.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII requires that stages of intermediate-range missiles must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c)

moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities, or between deployment areas and missile support facilities. Paragraph 2 complements paragraph 1 of Article VIII by placing restrictions similar to those for intermediate-range missiles on stages of such missiles. The terms "deployment area" and "missile support facility" are defined in paragraphs 7 and 9, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missile systems are specified in Section III of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article VIII provides that all shorter-range missiles and their launchers, until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V, must be: (a) located at missile operating bases, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Paragraph 10 of Article II requires that such transit can only be to elimination facilities. Shorter- range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "missile operating base," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II, and the location of such bases is specified in Section IV of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article VIII provides that the transit of a missile or launcher must be completed within 25 days. To facilitate verification of compliance with this provision, paragraph 5(f) of Article IX provides for notification of such transits within 48 hours after they have been completed. Such notification must include the location of the transiting missile or launcher once every four days during that transit.

Paragraph 5 of Article VIII states that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities are specified either in the MOU or in subsequent updates of data provided pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a), or 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. Also, paragraph 5 of Article VIII provides that neither Party will increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities from those set forth in the MOU. Elimination facilities are excepted from this prohibition in order to give each Party the flexibility to determine the most appropriate elimination site(s) during the three-year elimination period. Finally, paragraph 5 provides that a missile support facility will not be considered to be part of a deployment area even if it is located within such an area. Missiles, stages, and launchers located at missile support facilities are considered to be non-deployed. If a missile support facility located within a deployment area were considered to be part of the deployment area, then any missiles, stages, or launchers located at that facility would be deployed, rather than non-deployed.

Paragraph 6 of Article VIII provides that, beginning 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may locate: (a) intermediate-range missiles, (b) stages of intermediate-range missiles, (c) launchers of intermediate-range missiles, (d) shorter-

range missiles, (e) stages of shorter-range missiles, or (f) launchers of shorter-range missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, or test ranges specified in the MOU. This means that, after the 30-day period, locating a missile, a missile stage, or a launcher at a production facility or test range would be a violation. By providing that missiles, launchers, and stages may not be located in locations at which such items would be produced or tested, paragraph 6 makes compliance with the Treaty prohibitions on production and testing easier to verify.

Paragraph 7 of Article VIII provides that neither Party may locate any intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. The prohibition against locating missiles at training facilities is designed to guard against covert operation of those missiles at such facilities.

Paragraph 8 of Article VIII provides that a non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile may not be carried on, or be contained within, a launcher for such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities. This provision is designed to help ensure that non- deployed missiles are not covertly operational during the elimination period. Paragraph 9 of Article VIII provides that training missiles as well as training launchers for intermediate-range missiles and for shorter-range missiles are subject to the same locational restrictions as for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles that are provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article VIII. This means that training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range missiles must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit, while training missiles and training launchers for shorter-range missiles must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit to elimination facilities. Since some training systems are not readily externally distinguishable, particularly by national technical means of verification, from actual missiles and launchers, the requirement that they be located at the same facilities as operational systems helps to ensure that operational systems will not be covertly deployed under the guise of training systems.

ARTICLE IX--DATA EXCHANGES AND NOTIFICATIONS

Article IX sets forth the basic obligations for the data exchanges and notifications associated with the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. These data exchanges and notifications are of unprecedented scope and represent an important verification measure.

Paragraph 1 of Article IX states that the MOU contains categories of data relevant to the Treaty's obligations and that it lists all of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Paragraph 1 requires that updates of that data and notifications required by this Article be provided according to the categories contained in the MOU. While the data is updated in each category, the MOU itself, as well as its categories, does not change.

Paragraph 2 of Article IX requires that updates of data and notifications be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. As stated above, the Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

Paragraph 3 of Article IX provides that, not less than 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the MOU. Since paragraph 1 of Article IX requires that the data in the MOU be current as of November 1, 1987, paragraph 3 provides the mechanism by which the information initially provided by the MOU is updated for the period between November 1, 1987, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty. It is this updated data that lists the inventory of items to be eliminated under the Treaty.

Paragraph 4 of Article IX requires that, following the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must provide updated data for all categories in the MOU at six-month intervals. The updated data must be provided not later than 30 days after each six-month interval. The updates must inform the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, that have occurred during the six-month interval. The updates must also inform the other Party of the "net effect" of those changes.

Paragraph 5 of Article IX sets forth additional notification requirements imposed on each Party. These requirements will apply throughout the life of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 5(a) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility. Paragraph 8 of Article X calls for the elimination of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. Upon elimination, former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities (except missile production facilities) will continue to be subject to "short-notice" on-site inspections, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article XI, until 13 years have elapsed after the entry into force of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 5(b) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and date of a scheduled change. Elimination facilities, being a type of missile support facility, must themselves be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.

Subparagraph 5(c) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, stages and launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Such notifications must include the following five items:

- the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;
- the elimination site;
- the location from which intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and support equipment will be moved to the elimination site;
- except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI; and
- the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility.

Launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purposes of their elimination do not require notifications in accordance with subparagraph 5(c); rather, notice of such eliminations by launching must be provided in accordance with subparagraph 5(d) below.

Subparagraph 5(d) requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X. Such notifications must include the following information:

- the type of intermediate-range missiles to be eliminated;
- the location of the launch. If the elimination is by a series of launches, the location and number of such launches;
- the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty; and
- the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility.

Subparagraph 5(e) requires notification of changes, within 48 hours after they occur, in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their

launchers, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, resulting from elimination. Such notifications must include the following information:

- the number and type of items of a missile system that were eliminated; and
- the date and location of the elimination.

Subparagraph 5(f) requires notification of the transit, not more than 48 hours after it has been completed, of intermediate- range missiles or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Such notifications must include the following information:

- the number of missiles or launchers that were moved;
- the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival;
- the transport used; and
- the locations, and time at that location, at least once every four days during the period of transit.

Paragraph 6 of Article IX requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII. This provision facilitates monitoring, which helps to ensure that missile systems subject to the Treaty will not be covertly tested under the guise of research and development boosters.

ARTICLE X--ELIMINATION

Article X sets forth the basic obligations for the elimination of items or facilities whose destruction is required by the Treaty. Details concerning the elimination of specific items are provided in the Protocol on Elimination. This elimination regime helps to ensure that all elimination required by the Treaty will, in fact, be performed.

Paragraph 1 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its intermediate-range and short-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article X provides that on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination must take place in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspection, and the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 3 of Article X requires that when intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment are removed from deployment areas to elimination facilities, they must be removed in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States, such organizational units are batteries of Pershing II ballistic missiles and flights of BGM-109G cruise missiles. For the Soviet Union, such organizational units are SS-20 ballistic missiles regiments composed of two or three battalions. Elimination by complete organizational units will aid in verification of the elimination process.

Paragraph 4 of Article X provides that the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment must be carried out either at the elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities identified in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. If such items are eliminated in accordance with Section IV (i.e., elimination in situ) or section V (i.e., elimination through loss, accidental destruction, or static display) of the Protocol on Elimination, then they need not be eliminated at the facilities specified in the MOU or at the facilities as to which notification was made in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. Support structures, associated with Treaty-limited missiles or launchers, that are subject to elimination must be eliminated in situ.

Paragraph 5 of Article X permits each Party to eliminate, within the first six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, up to 100 intermediate-range missiles by means of launching. Section III of the Protocol on Elimination requires that such missiles must be launched from designated launch sites to existing impact areas. The purpose of the six-month time limit is to reduce any potential conflict between this means of elimination and the flight-test ban provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VI.

Paragraph 6 of Article X requires that certain intermediate- range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, must be eliminated within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, if such missiles meet the following three criteria: (a) they were tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, (b) they were never deployed, and (c) they are not listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. Such missiles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. These missiles are, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missile, and, for the USSR, the RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missile.

Paragraph 7 of Article X provides that elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment will be considered to have occurred after completion of the

procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon receipt of the notification required in subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX.

Paragraph 8 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. It is important to understand that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities that are listed in the MOU or, in the case of elimination facilities, those identified by means of a subsequent data update, must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8. A Party must notify the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of article IX of the Treaty, of the date of the eliminations, but only after three conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions that must be met before notification can be given are as follows:

- all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment have been removed from such areas, bases, or facilities;
- all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located at such areas, bases, or facilities have been eliminated; and
- all activities related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage, or deployment of such missiles and launchers have ceased at such areas, bases, or facilities.

Paragraph 8 of Article X further provides that such deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities will be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI (i.e., there has been a "close-out" inspection) or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination (for which notification was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX). Thus, inspection of eliminated locations is a right available to both Parties, but such inspections are not required by the Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility that met the three conditions specified above prior to entry into force of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, will be considered to have been eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI, any such location will be subject to an on-site "baseline" inspection in order to determine whether, in fact, it was eliminated.

Paragraph 9 of Article X provides that if a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the MOU for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to the Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30

days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted. However, while such a missile base can be converted, such a base must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X above. Conversion is not a substitute for elimination under the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI--ON-SITE INSPECTION

Article XI sets forth the plan for on-site inspections the Parties will conduct to assist in the verification of compliance with the Treaty. This Article provides for several different types of inspections, including "baseline" inspections (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections (paragraph 5), continuous "portal monitoring" inspections (paragraph 6), and "elimination" inspections (paragraphs 7 and 8). "Elimination" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 are the only on-site inspections that an Inspecting Party is obliged to carry out. All of the other types of inspections specified in this article are at the option of the Inspecting Party. Except for continuous portal monitoring, missile production facilities are not subject to any type of on-site inspection. This decision was made at the insistence of the United States for reasons of national security. Details concerning the procedures for each type of inspection are provided in the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Article XI provides that, for the purpose of facilitating verification of compliance with the Treaty, each Party has the right to conduct on-site inspections in accordance with this Article and the Protocols on Inspection and Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article XI provides that such inspections may take place within the territory of each Party and within the territory of the Basing Countries, i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. The Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom) provides the consent of the Allied Basing Countries to have inspections conducted within their respective territories pursuant to Article XI and the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 3 of Article XI sets forth the parameters of "baseline" inspections. These inspections are for the purpose of helping to verify the updated data exchanged pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX. Beginning 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, these inspections will afford each Party an opportunity to inspect all missile operating bases and missile support facilities (other than missile production facilities) specified in the MOU, as well as an opportunity to inspect all elimination facilities listed in the updated data. These inspections must be completed within 90

days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties will exchange updated data and, within 90 days after entry into force, conduct inspections to help verify the updated data. The procedures for a "baseline" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for the "close-out" inspection of bases and facilities once they are declared to have been eliminated. It establishes the right to confirm by on-site inspection the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities, except missile production facilities, for which notification of elimination was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX. "Close-out" inspections must be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled elimination date in order to confirm that such elimination did in fact take place. Once such bases and facilities are eliminated, they are, as former facilities, subject to the "short-notice" inspections provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Article rather than those provided for under subparagraph 5(a) of this Article. If a Party conducts an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article (i.e., a "baseline" inspection) after the scheduled date of elimination of a particular facility, then no "close-out" inspection will be permitted. The procedures for a "close-out" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Article XI provides each Party with the right to conduct two types of "short-notice" inspections for a period of 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. Such inspections are referred to as "short-notice" because, like "baseline" and "close-out" inspections, they require that an inspection team be transported to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the inspection team specifies which particular site it wishes to inspect. The "short-notice" inspection differs from "baseline" and "close-out" inspections because it is based on a quota system and is available to the Parties for 13 years after the Treaty enters into force. The two types of "short-notice" inspections are: (a) beginning 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to inspect missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities. The purpose of these inspections is to ascertain the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment located at the missile operating base or missile support facility that is being inspected; and

(b) each Party has the right to inspect former missile operating bases and missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty, other than former missile production facilities. This inspection right includes former missile operating bases that, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article X, have been converted for a use not limited by the Treaty after November 1, 1987. This inspection

right is extended to such converted bases because they must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.

The Parties have the right to conduct a total of 20 of the inspections described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of the Treaty, 15 such inspections per year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per year during the last five years. Thus, each Party will have an opportunity to conduct up to 185 such inspections over the course of 13 years. Neither Party may use more than half of its total number of inspections per year within the territory of any one Basing Country. The procedures for a "short-notice" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides the Parties with certain continuous monitoring inspection rights for a period of up to 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. These types of inspection are referred to as "portal monitoring." Each Party has the right to inspect by such portal monitoring: (a) the portal of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of GLBMs that use missile stages, any one of which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of solid- propellant GLBM subject to the Treaty, is accomplished. Subparagraph (a) is necessary because of the close physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the solid-propellant SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM; or

(b) if a party has no facility of the type described in subparagraph (a) above, the portal of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The existing types of GLBMs are specified in Article III.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 6 must ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous portal monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of the Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) above. If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of the Treaty, a Party does not conduct the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party will have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the first Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again.

Finally, paragraph 6 specifies that, upon entry into force of the Treaty, such facilities to be monitored are: for the United States, Hercules Plant #1, at Magna, Utah (as specified in the site diagram in the MOU), and, for the Soviet Union, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian

Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Both stages of the Pershing II intermediate-range GLBM were produced at the plant at Magna, Utah, while the SS-25 ICBM and the SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM have been assembled at the plant at Votkinsk. Paragraph 6 further specifies that the plant at Magna, Utah, will be monitored in accordance with subparagraph (b) above, while the plant at Votkinsk will be monitored in accordance with subparagraph (a) above. The procedures for a "portal monitoring" inspection are set forth in Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Article XI requires the inspection of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment to be carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Such inspections are required and include the obligation to inspect the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching.

Inspections made pursuant to this paragraph are for the purpose of determining whether the specified elimination processes have, in fact, been carried out. As stated above, the "elimination" inspections provided for in paragraph 7 are the only required on- site inspections specified in Article XI. Such "elimination" inspections are required in order to help ensure agreement between the Parties concerning the elimination of items and the status of the inventory of items subject to the Treaty. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 8 of Article XI establishes the right of the Parties to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of items that are eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination. Section V of the Protocol on Elimination sets forth the procedures for elimination by loss or accidental destruction as well as by static display. Paragraph 8 also establishes the right of the Parties to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers that are eliminated pursuant to Section II, IV, and V of that Protocol. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE XII--NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Paragraph 1 of Article XII states that, to help ensure compliance with the treaty, each Party will use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

National technical means include a broad range of systemsfor collecting intelligence. Such systems include reconnaissance satellites, ships and aircraft that are used to

monitor Soviet missile tests, and ground stations, such as the United States large phased-array radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

In subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2, the Parties state their commitment not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

In subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the Parties are prohibited from using any concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the Treaty. This provision is broader than similar provisions in earlier U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, which merely prohibited deliberate concealment measures. This prohibition does not apply to cover or concealment practices that both occur within a deployment area and are associated with normal training, maintenance, and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

Paragraph 3 of Article XII provides a unique measure to enhance observation by national technical means of verification. It establishes the right of each Party to request, and the obligation of the other Party to carry out, certain cooperative measures to improve verification by reconnaissance satellites. This right will exist until either a strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation agreement enters into force between the Parties or three years after entry into force of the Treaty, whichever occurs first. The cooperative measures relate to deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs capable of a range in excess of 5500 kilometers (and thus not limited by the Treaty), which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X and subsequently converted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article X. The Party making a request for cooperative measures must inform the other Party of the deployment base at which such measures shall be implemented. The following measures must be carried out by the Party whose base is to be observed:

- (a) not later than six hours after a request, the Party must have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, must have completely removed all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures, and must have displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and
- (b) the Party must leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until 12 hours after receipt of a request for such an observation.

Paragraph 3 further provides that each Party may make six such requests for cooperative measures per calendar year, and that only one deployment base may be subject to such cooperative measures at any one time. Paragraph 3 is designed to help

verify that mobile SS-20 intermediate-range missiles are not covertly deployed at bases for mobile SS-25 ICBMs. Under the terms of the Treaty, SS-25 bases that were not formerly declared SS-20 bases are not subject to on-site inspection. SS-25 bases that were formerly declared SS- 20 bases will be subject to on-site inspection. The United States currently does not have bases that would be affected by this provision.

ARTICLE XIII--SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION

Paragraph 1 of Article XIII provides that, in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties have established the Special Verification Commission.

At the request of either Party, the Parties will meet, within the framework of that Commission, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, and (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIII provides that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers be used by the Parties to: (a) exchange data and provide notifications (as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Article IX of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination); (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of the Treaty (relating to the conversion of a missile operating base); (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and (d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV--NO CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

Article XIV records the Parties' undertaking to comply with the Treaty and not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision thus reflects the duty of each Party under customary international law to comply with the Treaty (i.e. pacta sunt servanda). This provision does not impose any additional obligation on the Parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the Treaty. This provision refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore unaffected. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our Allies. Nor will this provision preclude cooperation with our Allies in modernization.

ARTICLE XV--DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Paragraph 1 of Article XV provides that the Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty is of unlimited duration because it eliminates two entire classes of weapon-

delivery systems, rather than merely place limitations on them for a specified period of time.

Paragraph 2 of Article XV contains the "supreme interests" withdrawal clause that is a standard provision in most modern arms control agreements. It establishes the right of a Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it concludes that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal under this provision requires a six- month advance notification and a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This right of withdrawal is in addition to any other rights a Party has under customary international law regarding termination or suspension of the Treaty, including its rights in the event of a material breach of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVI--AMENDMENTS

Article XVI provides that each Party may propose amendments to the Treaty and that any agreed amendments will enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII

governing the entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, it should be noted that the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection provide that technical changes to those Protocols necessary to improve their viability and effectiveness shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII--ENTRY INTO FORCE

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII provides that the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols (which are integral parts of the Treaty), is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVII states that the Treaty will be registered with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The final paragraph of the Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) consists of a Preamble and seven Sections.

The MOU provides the detailed data that are required to be exchanged between the Parties pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty. It is arranged by categories, and lists the location of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities, as well as the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment at those locations. The MOU also lists the technical parameters of each missile system, providing information on missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment limited by the Treaty. The data that appear in the MOU reflect the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems of the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Treaty, the initial update of this data will occur within 30 days of the entry into force of the Treaty, and will be subject to "baseline" on-site inspections provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty. Thereafter regular updates will occur at six-month intervals. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article IX of the Treaty, a variety of other notifications will be exchanged as Treaty- regulated events occur.

The data exchange in the MOU surpasses other such exchanges in previous U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. Given its scope and detail, the data exchange reflected in the MOU is itself an achievement.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data, current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their launchers, as well as on support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers.

SECTION I--DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the MOU, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection. Section I provides definitions for the following terms: (1) missile production facility, (2) missile repair facility, (3)

launcher production facility, (4) launcher repair facility, (5) test range, (6) training facility, (7) missile storage facility, (8) launcher storage facility, (9) elimination facility, (10) support equipment, (11) support structure, and (12) research and development launch site. Each of these terms represents a type of facility, structure, or site that is referred to in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines a "missile production facility" as a facility for the assembly or production of solid- propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs. Production of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles subject to the Treaty or stages of such missiles may not be located at missile production facilities 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile production facilities are not subject to inspections except--in certain cases--for continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI.

Paragraph 2 of Section I defines a "missile repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place, other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. This definition is necessary because missiles undergoing repair are nevertheless subject to the limitations of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines a "launcher production facility" as a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. This paragraph is the corollary of paragraph 1 of this Section, except that it defines production facilities for launchers rather than for missiles. Production of launchers subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, launchers may not be located at launcher production facilities 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a launcher production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher production facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines a "launcher repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place. The definition excludes a missile operating base in which inspection and maintenance is conducted. This paragraph is a corollary to paragraph 2 of this Section. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 5 of Section I defines a "test range" as an area at which flight-testing of an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile takes place. Flight-testing of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty may not be located at test ranges 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a test range is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Test ranges are subject to "baseline," "close- out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 6 of Section I defines a "training facility" as a facility, not located in a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II, a training facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII of the Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Training facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 7 of Section I defines a "missile storage facility" as a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, or stages of such missiles, are stored. The definition excludes any such facility located at a missile operating base. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, missile storage facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile storage facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 8 of Section I defines a "launcher storage facility" as a facility at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles are stored. The definition excludes any such facility located at a missile operating base. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, launcher storage facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher storage facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 9 of Section I defines an "elimination facility" as a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles, or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, elimination facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Treaty, a Party may increase the number of, or change the location of, its elimination facilities. This is allowed to assist the Parties in the elimination of items within Treaty time frames. Notice of any such change must be given 30 days in advance, pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Elimination facilities are subject to "baseline" and "close-out" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of Article XI. Also, former elimination facilities are subject to "short-notice" inspections pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI.

Paragraph 10 of Section I defines "support equipment" as unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launcher canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile are also included in this definition. Paragraph 10 notes that a listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launcher thereof, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV and paragraph 1 of Article V of the Treaty, support equipment must be eliminated during the same period as is set for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles, respectively. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X, such equipment must be eliminated in accordance with procedures established by the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 11 of Section I defines "support structure" as a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. As in paragraph 10, this paragraph notes that a listing of such support structures is contained in Section VI of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty, support structures must be eliminated during the same period as is set for the

elimination of intermediate-range missiles, which is three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X of the Treaty, such structures must be eliminated in accordance with procedures established by the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 12 of Section I defines a "research and development launch site" as a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched. Such booster systems are permitted by paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty. Research and development launch sites are listed in Section VII of the MOU.

SECTION II--TOTAL NUMBERS OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER- RANGE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES

Section II lists, for each Party, the total number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and the launchers of such missiles, that are subject to the Treaty. These data are required to be listed in the MOU pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IX. Paragraph 1 of Section II lists the number of intermediate- range missiles and launchers, while paragraph 2 lists the numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers. Each paragraph contains the following categories: deployed missiles, non-deployed missiles, aggregate number of second stages of missiles, deployed launchers, non-deployed launchers, and aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers.

SECTION III--INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS

Section III provides the locations of the intermediate-range missiles, launchers, support equipment, and support structures that the Treaty requires to be destroyed. Because such items are required, unless in transit, to be located in deployment areas, at missile operating bases, or at missile support facilities, the data are organized by such areas, bases, and facilities. Not only have the Parties specified the precise geographical coordinates of such areas, bases, and facilities, but site diagrams of all missile operating bases and agreed missile support facilities have been appended to the MOU. Also, any missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit are listed in the MOU. Section III is, therefore, an example of the unprecedented scope of the data exchange required by the Treaty regime.

Paragraph 1 of Section III contains the numbers and locations, for each Party, of deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment and support structures associated with such missiles and launchers. The data in paragraph 1 are listed by the

deployment areas and missile operating bases at which such items are located. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base is appended to the MOU. The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated in the text of paragraph 1 by geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, including national boundaries, rivers, railroads, or highways.

The deployed intermediate-range missiles listed under paragraph 1 include, for the United States, the Pershing II GLBM and the BGM-109G GLCM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-20 GLBM and the SS-4 GLBM. In addition to the numbers and locations of deployed missiles and their bases, paragraph 1 contains information concerning: (a) the number of launch pad shelters, training stages, and operational spares for U.S. Pershing II GLBMs; (b) the number of operational spares, training missiles, and training launch canisters for U.S. BGM-109G GLCMs; (c) the number of launch canisters, missile transporter vehicles, training missiles, and fixed structures for launchers of Soviet SS-20 GLBMs; and (d) the number of missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, and training missiles for Soviet SS-4 GLBMs.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides information on all non- deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the number of such non-deployed intermediate-range missiles, the number of launchers of such missiles, and the number and types of support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed for each missile support facility at which such non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and their associated equipment are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU.

The non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed under paragraph 2 include, for the United States, the Pershing II GLBM and the BGM-109G GLCM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-20 GLBM, the SS-4 GLBM, and the SS-5 GLBM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. The types of missile support equipment and structures listed in paragraph 2 are specified for each Party. They include, as appropriate for each type of missile system, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, training missiles, launch canisters, fixed structures for launchers, training launch canisters, launch pad shelters, and training missile stages. Paragraph 2 also lists any missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit. Paragraph 3 of Section III lists, for each Party, vehicles used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, and

stipulates that such vehicles must be considered to be training launchers for purposes of the Treaty. The number of such vehicles is 29 for the United States and 65 for the Soviet Union. The paragraph requires that such vehicles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol on Elimination.

SECTION IV--SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS

Section IV parallels Section III by providing comparable information with respect to deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles, launchers, and associated support equipment.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides the numbers, for each Party, of deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, of launchers of such missiles, and of the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed by the missile operating base at which such items are located. The location of such missile operating bases is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base is appended to the MOU. Since the United States has no deployed shorter-range missile systems, only information pertaining to Soviet missile systems, i.e., the SS-12 and SS-23, is included in paragraph 1. Support equipment listed for the SS-12 and SS-23 includes missile transporter vehicles and training missiles. Paragraph 2 of Section IV provides information on all non- deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the number of such non-deployed shorter-range missiles, the number of launchers of such missiles, and the number and types of support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed for each missile support facility at which such non-deployed shorter-range missiles and their associated equipment are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, for each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU.

The non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed under paragraph 2 of Section IV include, for the United States, the Pershing IA GLBM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-12 GLBM and the SS-23 GLBM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. The kinds of support equipment listed under paragraph 2 include training missile stages, missile transporter

vehicles, and training missiles. Paragraph 2 also lists missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

SECTION V--MISSILE SYSTEMS TESTED BUT NEVER DEPLOYED

Section V provides information on all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty but never deployed and that are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the numbers of all such missiles and of all launchers of such missiles. This information is listed by the missile support facility at which such items are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X, these missiles, together with their launchers, must be eliminated within six months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Such missile systems listed under Section V include, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range GLBM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SSC-X-4 intermediate-range GLCM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. Section V also lists missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

SECTION VI--TECHNICAL DATA

Section VI provides the technical data for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, for their launchers, and for their associated support structures and support equipment. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment listed in this Section are appended to the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI provides the relevant data for intermediate-range missile systems. Such missiles include the U.S.

Pershing II GLBM, the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, the Soviet SS-20 GLBM, the Soviet SS-4 GLBM, the Soviet SS-5 GLBM, and the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM. Missile characteristics, launcher characteristics, and the characteristics of associated support structures and support equipment are provided for each missile system. The characteristics listed for each missile include: (a) the maximum number of warheads per missile, (b) the length of the missile, (c) the length of the first and second stages of the missile, (d) the maximum diameter of the first and second stages of the missile, and (e) the weight of the missile and its stages. The characteristics listed for each

launcher include: (a) its dimensions, (b) the maximum number of missiles it can carry or contain, and (c) its weight. The characteristics listed for associated support structures include: (a) the dimension of fixed structures for a launcher, and (b) the dimensions of the launch pad shelter. The characteristics listed for support equipment include the dimensions of the: (a) launch canister, (b) missile transporter vehicles, (c) missile erector, and (d) propellant tank.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI provides the relevant data for shorter-range missile systems. Such missiles include the U.S.

Pershing IA GLBM, the U.S. Pershing IB GLBM, the Soviet SS-12 GLBM, and the Soviet SS-23 GLBM. Missile characteristics, launcher characteristics, and the characteristics of associated support equipment are provided for each missile system. The characteristics listed for each missile include: (a) the maximum number of warheads per missile, (b) the length of the missile, (c) the length of the first and second stages of the missile, (d) the maximum diameter of the first and second stages of the missile, and (e) the weight of the missile and its stages. The characteristics listed for each launcher include: (a) its dimensions, (b) the maximum number of missiles it can carry or contain, and (c) its weight. The characteristics listed for support equipment include the dimensions of the missile transporter vehicle.

SECTION VII--RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOOSTER SYSTEMS Section VII provides the number and location, for each Party, of launchers of research and development booster systems. Such booster systems are permitted by paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty.

FINAL PROVISIONS

In the first paragraph of the Final Provisions, each Party acknowledges that, in signing the MOU, it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data and that signing of the MOU constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained in them.

The second paragraph affirms that the MOU is an integral part of the Treaty and that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

The third paragraph records that the MOU was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Elimination (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and five Sections.

The Protocol sets forth the detailed procedures for the elimination of items subject to the Treaty as required by Articles IV, V, and X of the Treaty. The Protocol is notable in that, unlike past arms control agreements, it specifies procedures for eliminating each type of missile system item-by-item (e.g., the SS- 20 GLBM), rather than establishing a single elimination procedure for an entire class of items subject to elimination (e.g., GLBMs). For example, in the case of the class of intermediate-range GLBMs, specific and separate elimination procedures are provided for the Pershing II, SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missile systems. Furthermore, in the case of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM, for instance, specific and separate procedures are set forth for elimination of the SS-20 missile, its launch canister, its launcher, its missile transporter vehicle, and the fixed structure for its launcher. Each item is required to be eliminated in a specified manner that will help to ensure that it can never again serve the purposes for which it was originally intended.

PREAMBLE

In the Preamble, the Parties state that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, they have agreed upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

SECTION I--ITEMS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION

Section I lists the specific items for each type of missile system that must be eliminated.

For the United States, the specific items for each missile system to be eliminated are: for the Pershing II intermediate- range GLBM: missile, launcher, and launch pad shelter; for the BGM-109G intermediate-range GLCM: missile, launch canister, and launcher; for the Pershing IA shorter-range GLBM: missile and launcher; and, for the Pershing IB shorter-range GLBM: missile.

For the Soviet Union, the specific items of each missile system to be eliminated are: for the SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM: missile, launch canister, launcher, missile

transporter vehicle, and fixed structure for a launcher; for the SS-4 intermediate-range GLBM: missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand, and propellant tanks; for the SS-5 intermediate-range GLBM: missile; for the SSC-X-4 intermediate- range GLCM: missile, launch canister, and launcher; for the SS-12 shorter-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and missile transporter vehicle; and, for the SS-23 shorter-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and missile transporter vehicle.

Also, for both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers, as well as all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs and all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles, must be eliminated.

SECTION II--PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION AT ELIMINATION FACILITIES

This Section, which forms the bulk of the Protocol, establishes the detailed procedures to be followed in eliminating systems at elimination facilities. Subsequent Sections provide for elimination at other locations.

Paragraph 1 of Section II introduces the next several paragraphs of this Section, which establish procedures that the Parties must fulfill in order to ensure reliable determination of the type and number of items being eliminated and to preclude the possibility that such items could be restored for purposes that would violate the Treaty. These items, which are listed in Section I, include missiles, missile stages, front sections of missiles, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers. Paragraph 2 of Section II provides for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures for the items listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.

Such on-site inspections must be conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. With respect to the excepted items related to training, the Parties may conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures described in paragraph 11 of Section II. Not less than 30 days in advance of such an inspection, the Party possessing the training items must provide the other Party with the name and geographic coordinates of the elimination facility at which such an on-site inspection may be conducted and the date on which the inspection may take place.

Paragraph 3 of Section II states that before a missile arrives at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed. Nuclear warhead

devices and guidance elements are not required to be eliminated because destroying them would be meaningless unless the manufacture of new such items was also prohibited. Also, since warheads are small, verifying compliance with such a prohibition would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the retention of the fissionable material from the warheads conserves resources necessary to U.S. national security.

Paragraph 4 of Section II gives each Party the right to select the technological means to implement the elimination procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and to allow for on-site inspection of those elimination procedures in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol, and the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Section II provides that the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section will signal the initiation of the elimination of the items of the missile systems.

Paragraph 6 of Section II provides that immediately before the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector, from the Party receiving a notification required by subparagraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty concerning scheduled eliminations, must confirm and record the numbers and the types of missile systems that are to be eliminated. This can include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters, if the Inspecting Party deems it necessary.

Paragraph 7 of Section II requires that a missile stage that is being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section must not have instruments for data collection. An inspector must confirm this lack of instrumentation through an inspection before the elimination procedures are set in motion. Continuous observation by the inspector of such missile stages is required until the burning is completed.

Paragraph 8 of Section II requires that the completion of elimination procedures must be confirmed in writing by both the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and the inspection team leader of the other Party. Such a report must include the number and type of items of missile systems for which the procedures have been completed. However, in the case of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers, paragraph 8 stipulates that elimination will be considered completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and upon notification as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty; thus, no report is required after the elimination of such training equipment.

Paragraph 9 of Section II records the agreement of the Parties that all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, along with their associated reentry vehicles, must be eliminated not later than 15 days before the end of the overall period of elimination for all such missiles. As specified in Article IV and V of the Treaty, all such missiles shall be eliminated by the end of three years after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 also requires that, during the last 15 days of the overall (i.e., three-year) elimination period, a Party must withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles that, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation, and eliminate them during the same time frame.

On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty. Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that point, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S.

territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation. The important U.S. principle, that systems belonging to third countries will not be subject to bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, has thus been preserved.

Paragraph 10 of Section II sets forth the specific procedures that must be used to eliminate the items of missile systems listed in Paragraph 1 of this Section, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result. This paragraph addresses all items of missile systems except those related to training, which are addressed in paragraph 11 of this Section. The elimination procedures for specific missile systems set forth in paragraph 10 are as follows: For the U.S. Pershing II GLBM, the elimination procedures provide for destruction of missile stages by demolition or burning. Solid fuel, rocket nozzles, and motor cases not already destroyed in that process must be eliminated by burning, crushing, flattening, or

destruction by explosion. Destruction by burning includes static firing of a missile stage, which results in the burning of the fuel, followed by crushing or flattening of the remainder of the stage; this is the method most frequently used in the past by the United States to destroy missiles. The front section of the missile, without the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, must be crushed or flattened. The procedures for elimination of the Pershing II launchers include the removal of the erector-launcher mechanism from the launcher chassis; cutting all components of erector-launcher mechanisms, at places that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size; removal of missile launch support equipment from the launcher chassis; and cutting the launcher chassis, at a place that is not an assembly joint, into two pieces of approximately equal size. The procedures require the cutting of certain items at places that are not assembly joints in order to make it substantially more difficult to reassemble them.

For the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, the elimination procedures require that the missile airframe be cut longitudinally into two pieces and that the wings and tail section be severed from the airframe at locations other than assembly joints. The front section of the airframe must be crushed or flattened after removal of the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements. The BGM-109G launch canister must also be destroyed, by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size, or explosion. Elimination procedures for the BGM-109G launcher parallel those for the Pershing II launcher described above.

The elimination procedures for the U.S. Pershing IA missile and launcher are identical to those for the Pershing II missile and launcher described above.

The elimination procedures for the U.S. Pershing IB missile are identical to those for the Pershing II missile described above.

For the Soviet SS-20 missile, the elimination procedures are similar to those described above for the U.S. Pershing II missile, with the exception that the front end of the missile, along with its reentry vehicles, must be crushed or flattened. The elimination procedures for the SS-20 launch canister require that it either be destroyed by explosive demolition along with the missile or be destroyed separately from the missile by explosion, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushing, or flattening. The elimination procedures for the SS-20 launcher do not require that the launcher chassis be cut into two approximately equal pieces (as the United States proposed for its Pershing II and GLCM launchers), but contain other procedures for rendering it inoperable as a launcher. Finally, the elimination procedures for the SS-20 missile transporter vehicle require that: (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting be removed; (b) all mounting of such mechanisms be cut off the

missile transporter vehicle chassis; (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting be cut into equal pieces at places that are not assembly joints; (d) external instrumentation compartments be removed from the transporter vehicle chassis; (e) transporter vehicle leveling support be cut off the transporter vehicle chassis and be cut, at locations that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the SS-20 transporter vehicle chassis at least 0.78 meters in length must be cut off from behind its rear axle.

For the Soviet SS-4 missile, the elimination procedures provide for cutting off propulsion system nozzles; cutting propellant tanks into two pieces of about the same size; cutting instrumentation compartments (after the guidance elements have been removed) into two pieces of about the same size; and destroying the front section of the missile, without the warhead device, by crushing or flattening. The elimination procedures require that the SS-4 launch stand components be cut, at locations that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size. Regarding the SS-4 missile erector, the elimination procedures require that the missile erector jib and missile erector leveling supports be cut into two approximately equal pieces and that they, along with the missile erector mechanism, also be cut off of the missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints. Regarding the SS-4 missile transporter vehicle, the procedures require that the mounting components for a missile and a missile erector mechanism, as well as the supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher, be cut off from the missile transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the Soviet SS-5 missile, the elimination procedures are similar to those described above for the SS-4 missile, except that the front end of the SS-5 missile is not required to be crushed or flattened.

For the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM missile, launch canister, and launcher, the elimination procedures are the same as for the U.S.

BGM-109G GLCM, except that the SSC-X-4 launcher chassis must be severed at a point no more that 0.70 meters behind the rear axle, mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports must be cut off the launcher chassis, and launcher leveling supports must be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles, launchers, and missile transporter vehicles, the elimination procedures parallel those for the SS-20, except that the front sections of the SS-12 and SS-23 missiles do not include reentry vehicles, and destruction of their front sections may be done by explosive demolition together with the missile.

Also, for the SS-23, the control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading must be removed from the transporter vehicle.

Paragraph 11 of Section II provides specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers listed in Section I. All of these items, except for training launchers, must be eliminated by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of about equal size, or destroying by explosion. The procedures require training launchers to be eliminated by cutting the chassis of the training launcher at the same location specified in paragraph 10 above for the launcher of the same type of missile.

SECTION III--ELIMINATION OF MISSILES BY LAUNCHING

Section III sets forth the procedures by which intermediate- range missiles may be eliminated by means of launching them in order to destroy them. In this regard, paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty gives each Party the right to eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles in this manner during the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty. Note, however, that subparagraph 1(a) of Article VI of the Treaty prohibits the flight- testing of intermediate-range missiles. The purpose of Section III is to provide procedures that permit elimination by launching, while ensuring that such elimination will not be used effectively as a flight-test, which would provide the launching Party with militarily useful data. Shorter-range missiles may not be eliminated by launching.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching is subject to on- site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty (which provides for "elimination" inspections) and Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection. Paragraph 1 requires that, immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the Inspecting Party will confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

Paragraph 2 of Section III requires that all missiles being eliminated by launching be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile may be used as a target for ballistic missile interceptors.

Paragraph 3 of Section III provides that missiles being eliminated by launching must be launched one at a time with at least six hours between each launch.

Paragraph 4 of Section III requires that launches must involve ignition of all missile stages. Also, neither Party is permitted to transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by launching, except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, must be confirmed in writing by the representative of the launching Party and by the inspection team leader of the Inspecting Party. Paragraph 6 of Section III provides that a missile is considered eliminated by launching: (1) after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and (2) upon notification required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

SECTION IV--PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION IN SITU

Certain of the items that must be eliminated pursuant to the Treaty are structures that cannot be moved to elimination facilities, or training items that are not required to be moved to elimination facilities. Accordingly, Section IV provides procedures for the elimination, in situ, of support structures, propellant tanks of Soviet SS-4 missiles, and certain training items.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides the procedures for the elimination of support structures. Support structures are associated only with intermediate-range missile systems; shorter- range missile systems do not possess such structures. Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II provides that support structures are located at missile operating bases of intermediate-range missiles.

Subparagraph 1(a) of Section IV states that the support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol must be eliminated in situ, i.e., at the sites at which they are presently located.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that the initiation of the elimination of support structures will be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures specified in subparagraph 1(d) below.

Subparagraph 1(c) provides that the elimination of support structures is subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for "close-out" inspections at missile operating bases in order to confirm that the elimination has, in fact, occurred. The procedures for "close-out" inspections are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Subparagraph 1(d) specifies the elimination procedures for support structures. The procedures are as follows:

- the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter must be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;

- the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter must be destroyed by excavation or by explosion; and
- the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter must remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty.

Upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures will be considered to have been completed.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV requires that the fixed and transportable propellant tanks of the Soviet SS-4 intermediate- range GLBM be removed from launch sites.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV specifies the procedures for the elimination, in situ, of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers.

Subparagraph 3(a) requires that such training equipment that was not eliminated at elimination facilities must be eliminated in situ.

Subparagraph 3(b) requires that such training equipment being eliminated in situ must be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of the Protocol. Subparagraph 3(c) provides each Party with the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures.

Subparagraph 3(d) requires that a Party possessing such training equipment must inform the other Party of the place-name, and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in subparagraph 3(c) above may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information must be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the date of the scheduled on-site inspection.

Subparagraph 3(e) provides that elimination of such training equipment will be considered accomplished upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to subparagraph 3(d) above.

SECTION V--OTHER TYPES OF ELIMINATION

Section V provides for elimination due to loss or accidental destruction, and for elimination by placing items on static display.

Paragraph 1 of Section V provides procedures in the case of elimination resulting from loss or accidental destruction of an item listed in Section I of the Protocol. Notice of such elimination must be given by the possessing Party within 48 hours as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. Such notice must include a statement of the relevant circumstances surrounding the loss or accident, including its approximate or assumed location and the name or type of item that was eliminated by such loss or accidental destruction. In order to provide confidence that the elimination actually occurred, the other Party has a right to conduct an inspection at the specific site of the accident.

Paragraph 2 of Section V provides the Parties with the right to eliminate certain items that are listed in Section I of the Protocol by placing them on static display. The items that may be eliminated by this procedure are missiles, launch canisters, launchers, training missiles, training launch canisters, and training launchers. Each Party may eliminate a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters, and 15 launchers by placing them on static display. The totals for each of the three categories include both operational and training items. The procedures require that, before being placed on static display, the items be rendered unusable for any purpose inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant must be removed, and erector-launcher mechanisms must be made inoperative. For purposes of verification, the other Party has the right to conduct an on-site inspection of the item or items to be placed on static display within 60 days of receipt of notification by the possessing Party. Such notification is required by paragraph 2, and this notification must include: (a) the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the missile, launch canister, or launcher is to be on static display, and (b) the location at which the on-site inspection may take place. After all of the above procedures have been completed and notification has been given as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, elimination of a missile, launcher, launch canister, training missile, training launch canister, or training launcher by placing it on static display will be deemed to be completed.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty, that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and that it will remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The paragraph also provides that the Parties may agree upon measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol, through the Special Verification Commission established pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Such measures will not be deemed to be amendments to the Treaty. Thus, while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed amendment to the Treaty, minor matters relating

to the detailed elimination procedures may be altered through agreement of the Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty regime.

The final paragraph records that the Protocol was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Inspection (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble, 11 Sections, and an Annex on privileges and immunities of inspectors and aircrew members.

The Protocol provides the detailed procedures to implement the Treaty's on-site inspection regime, as required by Article XI of the Treaty. These on-site inspection procedures, unprecedented in scope and detail, will work with our national technical means of verification and with the data exchanges required by Article IX of the Treaty to help provide effective verification of Soviet compliance with the Treaty limitations.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have agreed upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

SECTION I--DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the Protocol, the Treaty, the MOU, and the Protocol on Elimination. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) Inspected Party, (2) Inspecting Party, (3) inspector, (4) inspection team, (5) inspection site, (6) period of inspection, (7) point of entry, (8) in-country period, (9) in-country escort, and (10) aircrew member.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines the "Inspected Party" as the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Note that this refers to a "Party," meaning either the United States or the Soviet Union. When an inspection takes place on the territory of a Basing Country, as defined in paragraph 15 of Article II of the Treaty, either the United States or the Soviet Union, as appropriate, will be the "Inspected Party." Paragraph 2 of Section I defines the "Inspecting Party" as the Party carrying out the inspection. As in the case of paragraph 1, the "Inspecting Party" will be either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines an "inspector" as an individual who is designated by a Party to carry out inspections and who is included on the Party's list of inspectors, prepared in accordance with the provisions of Section III of the Protocol. Section III sets forth the detailed procedures for designation and acceptance of inspectors. Inspectors are granted privileges and immunities pursuant to the Annex to the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines an "inspection team" as a group of inspectors assigned to carry out a particular inspection. Each person on an "inspection team" is an "inspector." Paragraph 15 of Section VI establishes the number of inspectors per team.

Paragraph 5 of Section I defines an "inspection site" as the area, location, or facility at which an inspection takes place. Site diagrams of missile operating bases and agreed missile support facilities are appended to the MOU.

Paragraph 6 of Section I defines a "period of inspection" as the time from the arrival of the team at the site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of any pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures. Paragraph 14 of Section VI establishes the time limits for certain types of inspections as well as for pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures.

Paragraph 7 of Section I designates the "points of entry": for the United States as Washington, D.C. or San Francisco, California; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Moscow or Irkutsk; for the Kingdom of Belgium as Brussels (National Airport); for the Federal Republic of Germany as Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase); for the Republic of Italy as Rome (Ciampino); for the Kingdom of the Netherlands as

Schiphol; for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as RAF Greenham Common; for the German Democratic Republic as Schkeuditz Airport; and for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as International Airport Ruzyne. Paragraph 5 of Section IV establishes procedures to be followed if these points of entry are to be changed.

Paragraph 8 of Section I defines "in-country period" as the period of time that the inspection team is in the country from the arrival at the point of entry until departure from the country through the point of entry.

Paragraph 9 of Section I defines an "in-country escort" as individuals specified by the Inspected Party to accompany and assist inspection team and aircrew members throughout the in- country period. Paragraph I of Section V and paragraph 5 of Section VI provide detailed procedures concerning the in-country escort. When an inspection takes place in a Basing Country, that country will have the right to representation in the in-country escort.

Paragraph 10 of Section I defines an "aircrew member" as an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of the Protocol.

Aircrew members are granted privileges and immunities pursuant to the Annex to the Protocol. SECTION II--GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

This section sets forth the basic obligation to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to the Protocol on Inspection and the Treaty. It also notes that there are other agreements (e.g., the Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries) pertinent to the conduct of these inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section II obliges each Party to help ensure verification of compliance with the obligations of the Treaty by facilitating inspections.

Paragraph 2 of Section II states that each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the Basing Countries to the effect that the Basing Countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections pursuant to the Protocol on their respective territories. The Basing Country agreement provides the legal basis for these assurances by the United States. The five Allied Basing Countries are the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. The German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia are the two Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located.

SECTION III--PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

This section sets forth the actions that must take place before inspections may be conducted. Inasmuch as these actions are required within specified periods of time, a Party would be in violation of the Treaty if the Party delayed an inspection by not completing pre-inspection requirements.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that inspections are to be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section III.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides that, within one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with a list of aircrew members; a list of inspectors to carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI; and a list of proposed inspectors to carry out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. No list may include more than 200 individuals.

Paragraph 3 of Section III requires each Party to review the other Party's lists of aircrew members and inspectors; inspectors must be citizens of the Party on whose list they appear. If an inspector proposed for conducting inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty is unacceptable to a Party, that Party has 20 days from the time it receives the proposed list to object to the inclusion of that person on the list, in which case the individual must be deleted from the list. Each Party must inform the other Party of its agreement to the lists of aircrew members and inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty within 20 days of such receipt. While there is no initial right of refusal for aircrew members, or for inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, paragraph 7 of Section III enables a Party to remove under certain conditions, an inspector or aircrew member from the other Party's list before that person ever engages in inspection activities.

Paragraph 4 of Section III provides that each Party has the right to amend its list of inspectors and aircrew members in the same manner as the initial designation. The other Party must respond to the amendments in the same manner as provided for with respect to initial designations in paragraph 3 of Section III.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that, within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes to such lists, the Party receiving such information must provide or ensure the provision of visas and other documents necessary to enable each inspector and aircrew member to enter and remain in the territory of the Party or Basing Country where an inspection site is

located for the in-country period. Thus, the United States or the Soviet Union, as appropriate, will ensure that visas and other necessary documents will be provided for inspections in Basing Countries. Visas and documents will be valid for at least 24 months.

Paragraph 6 of Section III provides that inspectors and aircrew members will be accorded privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site, throughout the in-country period, as set forth in the Annex on privileges and immunities. Thus, these privileges and immunities will apply to all inspections, including those in the Basing Countries.

Paragraph 7 of Section III provides that inspectors and aircrew members must respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory the inspection is carried out and must not interfere in the internal affairs of the State. It further provides that, if the Inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection activities, has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the Inspected Party or a Basing Country, or has ever been expelled by an Inspected Party or a Basing Country, the Inspected Party making such a determination will notify the Inspecting Party, who must immediately delete the individual's name from the list of inspectors or aircrew members and at the same time remove that individual from the territory of the Inspected Party or Basing Country, if such individual is there at that time.

Paragraph 8 of Section III provides that each Party will, within 30 days of entry into force of the Treaty, inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the airplanes of the Party transporting inspectors and equipment into and out of the territory of the Party or Basing Country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings are to be long established international airways agreed upon by the Parties.

SECTION IV--NOTIFICATIONS

Section IV contains detailed provisions concerning the notification that must be given prior to arrival at the inspection site and the specification of the type of inspection that the inspecting Party is planning to conduct.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides that notification of an intention to conduct an inspection will be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and that receipt of such a notification will be acknowledged through those centers by the Inspected Party within one hour of its receipt. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction

Centers, dated September 15, 1987. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., a "baseline," "Close-out," or "short-notice" inspection, respectively), such notification will be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, and shall include: the point of entry, date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; date and time when specification of the inspection site will be provided; and the names of inspectors and aircrew members. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., an "elimination" inspection), such notification will be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and will include: the point of entry, date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV states that the date and time of the specification of the inspection site for "close-out" and "short- notice" inspections will be neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry. In the case of the "baseline" inspections, the date and time of the specification of the inspection site shall be neither less than four nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV provides for the transmittal by the Inspecting Party to the Inspected Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, of a flight plan from the last departure airfield outside the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry. The plan must be provided not less than six hours before scheduled departure from the last departure airfield, must contain specified information, and must be filed in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) procedures applicable to civil aircraft.

Paragraph 4 of Section IV provides for approval of the flight plan described in paragraph 3 not less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place. This is necessary to ensure that the inspection team arrives on time at the point of entry.

Paragraph 5 of Section IV allows the Parties to change the points of entry set forth in Section II of the Protocol for the countries in which their deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities are located by notifying the other Party. Such changes become effective five months after receipt of such notice.

SECTION V--ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY

Section V contains detailed provisions regulating activities at the point of entry to facilitate the entry of inspectors and their equipment into the country where the inspection will take place.

Paragraph 1 of Section V provides that the in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort will meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry on arrival. The number of aircrew members for each airplane may not exceed ten. The in-country escort will expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew members, as well as the entry of their baggage, equipment, and supplies, into the country in which the inspection is to take place. The diplomatic aircrew escort will have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In-country escorts in a Basing Country may include representatives of that Basing Country.

Paragraph 2 of Section V provides that an inspector will be considered to have begun his duties at the point of entry and to have ended his duties when he has left the territory of the Inspected Party or Basing Country. Pursuant to the Annex on privileges and immunities, the inspector's privileges and immunities apply during this entire period, and thereafter with respect to acts performed in the exercise of his official functions during that period.

Paragraph 3 of Section V requires each Party to ensure that the equipment and supplies necessary for inspection are exempt from all customs duties. However, such equipment will be subject to examination pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V.

Paragraph 4 of Section V provides that the equipment and supplies the Inspecting Party brings into the country in which the inspection site is located are subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought in. This examination will be conducted by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members before departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. It shall be for the purpose of ascertaining that any such equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Equipment or supplies found unacceptable to the Inspected Party will be impounded at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team. Storage of the Inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry will be within tamper-proof containers in a "dual-key" secure facility.

Paragraph 5 of Section V requires the Inspected Party to furnish inspection teams and aircrews with meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and necessary medical care during the in- country period. While the Inspected Party furnishes or provides for such

services for inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, all costs connected with their stay will be borne by the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 6 of Section V requires the Inspected Party to provide, at the point of entry, parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The fuel and servicing shall be at the Inspecting Party's expense.

Paragraph 7 of Section V states that, for inspections on the territory of a Party, the point of entry used must be that which is closest to the inspection site. The inspection team leader for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty will inform the in-country escort at the point of entry of the type of inspection and the inspection site no later than the time specified according to subparagraph 1(a) of Section IV of the Protocol.

SECTION VI--GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS

The general rules governing the conduct of inspections are set forth in Section VI. These rules are diverse, governing what inspectors may and may not do, what may be brought into a country where an inspection is to take place, and include safety procedures and procedures for the completion of an inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI states that inspectors will discharge their functions in accordance with the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI forbids inspectors to disclose information they receive during an inspection except as authorized by the Inspecting Party. It also states that this obligation applies even after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

Paragraph 3 of Section VI requires inspectors not to interfere directly with any ongoing activities at the inspection site and to avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of the facility or taking actions affecting its safety. While inspectors may, as required to conduct the inspection, request their escorts to undertake actions that would interfere with normal activities at a site, this provision is designed to prevent inspectors from undertaking such actions themselves.

Paragraph 4 of Section VI requires that inspections be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified.

Thus, if a Party specifies that it is going to conduct a particular type of inspection (e.g., a "close-out" inspection), it must then conduct the inspection in accordance with the objectives specified in Article XI for that type of inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Section VI states that the in-country escort has the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members during the in-country period. Movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members will be at the discretion of the in-country escort, except as otherwise provided in the Protocol.

Paragraph 6 of Section VI states that inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty may, with the permission of the in-country escort, undertake local leisure travel within 50 kilometers of the inspection site. The distance of 50 kilometers is calculated on the basis of a 50 kilometer radius extending from the inspection site. At the discretion of the Inspected Party, such inspectors undertaking local leisure travel may be accompanied by the in-country escort.

Paragraph 7 of Section VI ensures the right of inspectors to be in communication by telephone with their embassy within the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using the telephone communications provided by the Inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 of Section VI states that representatives of the inspected facility will be included among the in-country escort at the inspection site.

Paragraph 9 of Section VI provides that inspectors may bring to the inspection site documents, linear measurement devices, cameras, portable weighing devices, radiation detection devices, and other equipment that has been agreed upon. The characteristics and method of use of this equipment will be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5(a), 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors may use any of the above listed equipment, other than cameras which will be operated only by the Inspected Party upon the request of the Inspecting Party. Upon the request of inspectors, the in-country escort will take duplicate, instant development photographs of inspected facilities with the Inspecting Party's cameras. Each Party will then receive one copy of every photograph. Thus, for all inspections, cameras will be operated only by the Inspected Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements, including photographs, will be made by the Inspected Party at the Inspecting Party's request.

Paragraph 10 of Section VI provides that, for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors will permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection.

Paragraph 11 of Section VI provides that the measurements recorded during inspections must be certified by a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort at the time of measurement. Such certified data will be included in the inspection report. Thus, measurements taken by either Party shall be observed by the other Party in order to certify the accuracy of that information.

Paragraph 12 of Section VI provides that inspectors may request (through the in-country escort) clarifications of ambiguities arising during an inspection. The in-country escort will provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions about buildings or objects remain, the Inspected Party will photograph the object or building as requested by the Inspecting Party. If questions still remain, a description of them, any clarification provided, and a copy of any photographs taken will be included in the inspection report. Unresolved issues may be discussed within the framework of the Special Verification Commission established by Article XIII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 of Section VI requires inspectors to observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including regulations relating to the protection of controlled environments within a facility and regulations relating to personal safety. The Inspected Party is required to provide any protective gear that is needed.

Paragraph 14 of Section VI provides that, for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, all pre-inspection procedures must be completed within one hour of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site. Thus, this provision applies to all inspections except for continuous portal monitoring activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. Inspections are to begin immediately upon completion of pre-inspection procedures and may not exceed 24 hours except for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The 24-hour limit may be extended for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, with the agreement of the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, including completion of the inspection report, are to be completed at the site within four hours after completion of the inspection.

Paragraph 15 of Section VI limits the number of inspectors on inspection teams. Inspection teams may include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection

team carrying out an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, which may include no more than 20 inspectors, and except for inspection teams conducting inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, which may include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the Inspected Party. An inspection team will operate under the direction of a team leader and a deputy team leader. At the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each, and only one inspection team will be allowed at a particular site at any one time.

Paragraph 16 of Section VI provides that, except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, an inspection team will, upon completion of post-inspection procedures, return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities, and then leave the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located within 24 hours. A party may conduct sequential "baseline," "close-out," and "elimination" inspections with the same inspection team. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it will notify the Inspected Party of its intent either upon return to the point of entry (using the procedures specified in paragraph 7 of Section V and paragraph 1 and 2 of Section VII of the Protocol) or upon completion of post-inspection procedures at the previous inspection site. The Inspecting Party will be transported to the new inspection site by the Inspected Party, without unjustified delay, by means and routes chosen by the Inspected Party.

SECTION VII--INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3, 4 OR 5 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VII sets forth the detailed procedures for "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section VII provides for the Inspected Party to implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site within one hour of specification of the inspection site by the Inspecting Party. During this period of restrictions, no missile, stage of a missile, launcher, or support equipment subject to the Treaty may be removed from the site.

Paragraph 2 of Section VII provides that the Inspected Party will transport the inspection team from the point of entry so as to ensure the arrival of the inspection

team at the inspection site within nine hours of specification of the site to be inspected.

Paragraph 3 of Section VII provides that, for inspections in Basing Countries, the aircrew of the Inspected Party may include representatives of the Basing Country.

Paragraph 4 of Section VII provides that neither Party may conduct more than one "short-notice" inspection pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one "short-notice" inspection pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than ten "baseline" inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

Paragraph 5 of Section VII provides that the boundaries of inspection sites will be the boundaries set forth in the MOU.

Paragraph 6 of Section VII provides that, in the case of a "baseline" inspection or "short-notice" inspection of a declared facility, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site the in-country escort will inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty at the inspection site and provide a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of such items.

Paragraph 7 of Section VII provides that the inspection team may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8 through 14 of Section VII, inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers, and vehicles with dimensions equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the MOU for the missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 of Section VII sets forth the procedures for physical on-site inspections: (i) external visual observation only (including measurement of dimensions) of missiles, stages of such missiles, or launchers subject to the Treaty, and of containers that the Inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of such missile of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty and that are not large enough to contain more than one such missile or missile stage of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty; (ii) inspection only by weighing or visual observation of a container's interior, for containers large enough to contain missiles or stages of such missiles subject to the Treaty that the Inspected Party declares do not contain a missile or missile stage of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty (except as provided in subparagraph (iii) below, or during "short-notice" inspections of formerly declared facilities); (iii) external inspection only (including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation, and linear measurements of the dimensions of the canister) of launch canisters associated

with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty and declared by the Inspected Party to contain such a missile.

Paragraph 9 of Section VII provides that structures or containers not large enough to contain a missile, stage of such missile, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty are subject to external visual inspection only (including measurement of dimensions) to confirm that they are not large enough to contain a missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

Paragraph 10 of Section VII states that if the Inspected Party satisfies an inspection team that an interior space within a structure is not accessible by the smallest missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty, that space may not be inspected further. Moreover, if an inspector can ascertain by means of visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrances that the space does not contain any missiles, missile stages, or launchers of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty, that space may not be inspected further.

Paragraph 11 of Section VII provides that an inspection team may patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and may station inspectors at the exits for the duration of the inspection.

Paragraph 12 of Section VII provides that the inspection team may, during inspections, inspect any vehicles capable of carrying missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty and that no such vehicle will leave the site during the inspection until it has been inspected.

Paragraph 13 of Section VII provides that, prior to inspection of a building, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits that are large enough to permit passage of missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the period of the building inspection, no vehicles or objects capable of containing missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty may leave the building until inspected.

Paragraph 14 of Section VII provides that during a "short- notice" inspection of a formerly declared facility conducted pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it will be the responsibility of the Inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected item that is equal to or larger in size than the smallest missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, such an item. This may be accomplished by partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, by measuring or weighing the covered item, or by other methods. There may be no further inspection of the object if the Inspected Party

satisfies the inspection team that the object is not a missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty (and so declared by the Inspected Party), it is subject to external inspection only (including the use of radiation detection devices, visual observation, and linear measurement).

SECTION VIII--INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7 OR 8 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VIII provides detailed procedures for inspections of elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment subject to the Treaty. The precise actions that must be undertaken in order to accomplish such elimination are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. As required by paragraph 7 of Article XI, inspectors are required to be present during the process of elimination.

Paragraph 1 of Section VIII states that inspections of the elimination process carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty will be conducted according to procedures in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

Subparagraph 1(a) states that inspectors will be provided with a schedule of elimination activities upon arrival at the elimination facility.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that inspectors will compare the data provided by the Inspected Party, in its notification of elimination required in subparagraphs 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty, with the actual number and types of missile systems to be eliminated at the elimination site, prior to the initiation of elimination.

Subparagraph 1(c) states that (subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of the Protocol) inspectors will observe the execution of elimination procedures as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination and will have the right to call to the attention of the in-country escort the need for strict compliance with such procedures. The completion of such procedures will be confirmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 8 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

Subparagraph 1(d) states that inspectors may ascertain visually that a missile to be eliminated by launching is a missile of a type subject to elimination and may observe such a missile (from a safe location specified by the Inspected Party) until completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches, the Inspected Party will determine the means and route for the transportation of the inspection team between inspection sites. Paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty stipulates that each Party may eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles by launching, provided that it does so within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Section VIII states that inspections of the elimination of items carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., elimination in situ, or by loss or accidental destruction, for training items, or by static display) will be conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

SECTION IX--INSPECTION MONITORING CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section IX contains the procedures to be followed by the Parties for the establishment and operation of continuous portal monitoring systems on each other's territory. Upon entry into force, such systems shall be established in the Soviet Union at the SS-25 final assembly facility in Votkinsk, and in the United States at those parts of the Hercules Plant Number 1 in Magna, Utah, as specified in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party will maintain an agreed upon perimeter around the periphery of an inspection site and will designate one portal for each site through which not more than one rail line and one road will pass, and through which all vehicles that can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM must exit. Note that only this single exit from a facility is referred to as a "portal." Paragraph 2 of Section IX states that, for the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty will be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the Inspected Party and to the longest stage of such GLBMs. Subparagraph 10(a) of Article VII stipulates that, for GLBMs that are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile will be counted as a complete missile. Subparagraph 10(b) provides that, for GLBMs that are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used to launch an intermediate-range GLBM will be counted as a complete GLBM, unless the Inspected Party proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the Inspecting Party. Thus, throughout Section IX, wherever the phrase "intermediate-range GLBMs of the Inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs" appears, the last part of that phrase applies to GLBMs that are stored and moved in separate stages, and the first part applies to other GLBMs.

Paragraph 3 of Section IX states that inspection site exits other than the portal designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section IX will be monitored by appropriate sensors and that there will be no more than two such exits at each site. The perimeter and the inspection site exits may be monitored in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Protocol. Thus, all exits may be monitored with sensors and inspectors.

Paragraph 4 of Section IX provides that the Inspecting Party may establish continuous portal monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 above, and may establish appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 above. It may also carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair, and replacement of monitoring systems.

Paragraph 5 of Section IX states that, with respect to the monitoring systems, the Inspected Party will provide, upon the request and at the expense of the Inspecting Party: all necessary utilities for their construction and operation; basic construction materials; site preparation; transportation of necessary installation tools, materials, and equipment from the point of entry; and telephone lines and high frequency radio equipment for in-country communication with the embassy of the Inspecting Party. Thus, although the Inspecting Party pays the costs, the Inspected Party is required to provide necessary support for the monitoring systems.

Paragraph 6 of Section IX states that the Inspecting Party may, outside of the inspection site perimeter, construct up to three buildings of a specified size for a data center and inspection team headquarters and one additional building for supply and equipment storage; install systems to monitor exits (including sensors and measuring equipment); install measuring equipment at the portal; install power sources; and use agreed-upon data authentication devices.

Paragraph 7 of Section IX provides that, during installation or operation of monitoring systems, the Inspecting Party will not deny the Inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems or take any other actions with respect to such structures without the consent of the Inspected Party. The Inspecting Party will compensate the Inspected Party for any agreed upon rebuilding or demolition of such structures.

Paragraph 8 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party will not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict inspecting team access thereto.

Paragraph 9 of Section IX states that, subject to the Inspected Party's radio power and frequency restrictions, the Inspecting Party may use its own radio systems for communications between inspectors and data collection centers.

Paragraph 10 of Section IX states that aircraft may not land within the perimeter of a monitored site except for emergencies and with prior notification to the inspection team.

Paragraph 11 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party must make a declaration with respect to any shipment large and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM of the Inspected Party. Such shipments

must pass through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above. The declaration will specify whether the shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than, and as heavy or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM.

The declaration will be made prior to the arrival of the shipment at the portal.

Paragraph 12 of Section IX provides that an inspection team may weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site. If such a vehicle is not large or heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM, then that vehicle will not be subject to further inspection.

Paragraph 13 of Section IX provides that vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, but are declared by the Inspected Party not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, will be subject to inspection. The Inspecting Party will have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles. If the vehicle has no container or shrouded object large enough to be or contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, there will be no further inspection; if the vehicle does contain such a container or object, the Inspected Party must demonstrate that the container or object is not and does not contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM.

Paragraph 14 of Section IX states that vehicles, exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above, that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than, and as heavy or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM are subject to the following inspection procedures:

- (i) the integrity of the inspected missile or stage shall be preserved by the Inspecting Party;
- (ii) measurements will be made by the Inspecting Party using approved equipment, which will be placed only outside the launch canister or shipping container, and the measurements will be observed and certified by the in-country escort;
- (iii) launch canisters and shipping containers declared to contain such a missile or missile stage may be weighed and measured, and their contents imaged by the Inspecting Party in the presence of the in-country escort. The Inspecting Party may view the interior of launch canisters or shipping containers brought out from the inspection site eight times per calendar year. During such viewing,

the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container will be opened, the missile or missile stage will not be removed from its canister or container, and the length and diameter of the stages of the missile will be measured in accordance with agreed methods so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage that is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM; and (iv) the Inspecting Party may inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside a vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage pursuant to paragraph 13 above.

SECTION X--CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

Section X provides that inspections shall be canceled if they cannot be carried out by reason of force majeure (i.e., a "superior or irresistible force" outside the control of the Parties that could not be avoided by the exercise of due care). In addition, if the inspection team performing a "baseline," "close-out," or "short-notice" inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5, respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty is delayed and fails to arrive by the specified time, the inspection may be canceled or carried out at the Inspecting Party's option. Inspections canceled by reason of force majeure or delay will not reduce the number of inspections to which the Inspecting Party is entitled. Thus, this provision gives only the Inspecting Party the option to cancel or carry out an inspection.

SECTION XI--INSPECTION REPORT

Section XI specifies the procedures the Parties will follow in filing reports concerning inspections made pursuant to the Treaty. These reports will provide a written record of the inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section XI states that, with respect to inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., all types of inspections except inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring), the inspection team leader will provide the in-country escort with a copy of the inspection report no later than two hours after an inspection is completed. The report will include the type of inspection; the inspection site; the number of missiles, missile stages, launchers, and support equipment observed during the inspection; and any measurements recorded during inspections. All photographs taken during the inspection and the inspection site diagram will be attached to the report, and the report will be written in both English and Russian.

Paragraph 2 of Section XI states that, with respect to inspections carried out pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring), a report similar to that called for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be provided within three days of the end of each month.

Paragraph 3 of Section XI provides that the Inspected Party may make written comments with respect to inspection reports required by this Section.

Paragraph 4 of Section XI states that the Parties will resolve, to the extent possible, ambiguities regarding factual information in inspection reports, and record any relevant clarifications in the report. Reports are to be signed by the inspection team leader and by one in-country escort. Each Party will retain a copy of the report.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty, that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and that it will remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The paragraph also provides that the Parties may agree upon measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol, through the Special Verification Commission established pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Such measures will not be deemed to be amendments to the Treaty. Thus, while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed amendment to the Treaty, minor matters relating to the detailed inspection procedures may be altered through agreement of the Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty regime.

The final paragraph records that the Protocol was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

ANNEX ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

Much as diplomats everywhere are generally granted diplomatic privileges and immunities in order that they can carry out their duties without interference, the Parties have agreed in this Annex that inspectors and aircrew members acting pursuant to the Treaty shall also be entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities. The privileges and immunities set forth in the Annex apply to inspectors and aircrew members during the in-country period, and thereafter with respect to acts performed during the course of their official functions as inspectors or aircrew members. The Annex draws upon the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961

(the Vienna Convention), which is the primary international agreement governing such privileges and immunities.

Paragraph 1 of the Annex provides that inspectors and aircrew members will enjoy the inviolability accorded diplomatic agents under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity." Paragraph 2 of the Annex provides that the living quarters and office premises of inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty will be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides, in pertinent part: "1. The private residence of a diplomatic agency shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission." Paragraph 3 of the Annex provides that the papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members will enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, and that the aircraft of the inspection team will be inviolable. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides, in pertinent part: "2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability." Paragraph 4 of the Annex provides that inspectors and aircrew members will be accorded the immunities of diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, but that these immunities may be waived by the Inspecting Party if that Party believes that immunity would impede the course of justice and if it believes that the waiver would not prejudice implementation of the Treaty. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provide:

- 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
- 2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
- 3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under sub- paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph

> 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.

Paragraph 5 of the Annex provides that inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty will have the same exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention provides that:

- A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except: (a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in the price of goods and services; (b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 39 [of the Vienna Convention]; (d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State; (e) charges levied for specific services rendered; (f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provisions of Article 23 [of the Vienna Convention].

Paragraph 6 of the Annex states that inspectors and aircrew members may import, without payment of customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, except for articles that are prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

Paragraph 7 of the Annex states that inspectors and aircrew members may not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the Inspected Party or that of a Basing Country.

Paragraph 8 of the Annex states that the Parties will consult in the event that the Inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities specified in the Annex.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement (the Agreement) consists of seven Articles and an Annex on the privileges and immunities of inspectors and aircrew members.

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles confers the right to conduct inspections not only in the United States and the Soviet Union, but also within the territory of other countries within which U.S. and Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. In order for the United States to guarantee Soviet access to the territory of its Western European Allies for the purpose of conducting inspections, the authorization of the Allies had to be obtained. In the Basing Country Agreement, the Basing Countries agree to permit inspections on their territory and to facilitate on their territory the implementation by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The undertakings of the Basing Countries in the Basing Country Agreement correspond to the underlying undertakings of the United States in the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article I sets forth the general provisions of the Agreement, including authorization of Soviet inspections in the Basing Countries, facilitation by the Basing Countries of U.S.

obligations under the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, various reservations of rights by the Basing Countries, and the undertaking by the United States to remain responsible for its obligations and to protect and preserve the rights of the Basing Countries under the Agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article I constitutes the basic agreement of the Basing Countries that the inspection activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty may take place on

their territories. Paragraph 1 also stipulates such inspections must be carried out in accordance with requirements, procedures, and arrangements set forth in the Protocol on Inspection. Article XI of the Treaty describes the various types of inspections which each Party may conduct, including "baseline" initial inspections to verify the updated data provided immediately following entry into force of the Treaty (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections of specified facilities (paragraph 5), inspection of the process of elimination (paragraph 7), and inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination (paragraph 8). The Protocol on Inspection specifies the procedures that govern the conduct of each type of inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article I constitutes the Basing Countries' undertaking to facilitate implementation by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty with respect to inspection activities taking place on their territories.

Paragraph 3 of Article I confirms the principle that, except as otherwise agreed, the Basing Countries reserve their sovereign authority to enforce their laws and regulations with respect to persons entering, and activities taking place within, their jurisdiction.

Paragraph 4 of Article I sets forth the understanding that the Basing Countries assume no obligations and grant no rights deriving from the Treaty or the Protocol on Inspection other than those expressly undertaken or granted in the Agreement.

Paragraph 5 of Article I confirms that the United States remains fully responsible to the Soviet Union for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection with respect to U.S. facilities located in the Basing Countries. Paragraph 5 also sets forth the commitment of the United States to the Basing Countries to take such action, in exercising its rights under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection, as may be required to protect the rights of the Basing Countries under the Agreement.

ARTICLE II--DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of the terms used in the Agreement. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) Treaty, (2) Inspection Protocol, (3) Inspected Party, (4) Inspecting Party, (5) Inspection Team, (6) inspector, (7) diplomatic aircrew escort, (8) inspection site, (9) period of inspection, (10) point of entry, (11) in-country period, (12) in- country escort, and (13) aircrew member.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines "Treaty" as the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines "Inspection Protocol" as the Protocol Regarding Inspection Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines "Inspected Party" as the United States.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines "Inspecting Party" as the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines "inspection team" as those inspectors designated by the Inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity. Paragraph 6 of Article II defines "inspector" as an individual who is proposed by the Soviet Union to carry out inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, and who is included on its list of inspectors in accordance with section III of the Protocol on Inspection. Section III of the Protocol provides for the naming of proposed inspectors and aircrew members by each Party to the Treaty and specifies the grounds on which the other Party may object to an individual.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines "diplomatic aircrew escort" as that individual who is accredited to the government of the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located and who is designated by the Inspecting Party to assist the aircrew of the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 8 of Article II defines "inspection site" as the area, facility, or location in a Basing Country at which an inspection provided for in Article XI of the Treaty is carried out.

Paragraph 9 of Article II defines "period of inspection" as the period from initiation of the inspection at the inspection site until completion of the inspection at the inspection site, exclusive of the time spent on any pre-inspection and post- inspection procedures.

Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "point of entry" as: Brussels (National) for Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase) for the Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino) for the Republic of Italy; Schiphol for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and RAF Greenham Common for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Paragraph 11 of Article II defines "in-country period" as the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to depart the country.

Paragraph 12 of Article II defines "in-country escort" as the official or officials specified by the Inspected Party, one or more of whom may be nominated by the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection site is located, who shall accompany an inspection team throughout the in-country period and provide appropriate assistance to an inspection team in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection, throughout the in-country period.

Paragraph 13 of Article II defines "aircrew member" as an individual, other than members of an inspection team, diplomatic aircrew escort, and in-country escort, on the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The paragraph also stipulates that the number of aircrew members per aircraft shall not exceed ten.

ARTICLE III--NOTIFICATIONS

Article III sets forth the commitment of the United States to provide each Basing Country with advance notice of any inspections to be conducted by the Soviet Union in that Basing Country. The notifications to be provided by the United States to the Basing Countries will replicate the relevant information which the Soviet Union must provide to the United States under the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Article III provides that, upon entry into force of the Agreement, the United States and the Basing Countries will establish a method of communication (described as "channels") to receive and acknowledge receipt of notifications on an around- the-clock basis.

Paragraph 2 of Article III provides that the United States will notify the Basing Country concerned, immediately upon receipt of notice from the Soviet Union, of a pending Soviet inspection in that Basing Country, including the date and estimated time for the Soviet inspection team's arrival at the point of entry, the date and estimated time of its departure to the inspection site, the names of aircrew and inspection team members, the flight plan filed by the Soviet Union, and any other relevant information provided by the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Article III establishes that the United States will inform the Basing Country concerned of the precise location of the inspection site not less than one hour prior to the estimated departure time of the Soviet inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site (or, in the case of successive inspections, from one inspection site to another inspection site).

ARTICLE IV--PRE-INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

Article IV sets forth various pre-inspection arrangements, including mechanisms for the Basing Countries to object to Soviet inspectors or aircrew members, the provision of visas and other documentation to Soviet inspectors and aircrew members, and the furnishing by the Basing Countries of standing diplomatic clearance numbers and established routes for Soviet aircraft conveying inspection teams. Article IV also addresses the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members, the waiver of customs duties, expedited customs processing, the provision of food and lodging for inspectors and aircrew members, and examination of equipment used in conducting inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that upon receipt of the initial list of proposed Soviet inspectors and aircrew members (or subsequent changes thereto) the United States will provide the lists to each of the Basing Countries, which must in turn notify the United States, within 15 days, of any objection to a person on the list based upon that person's having previously committed, or having been sentenced for committing, a criminal offense in, or having been expelled from, the United States or the Basing Country making the objection. If such an objection is made by a Basing Country, the United States is committed to exercise its right under the Protocol on Inspection to prevent such a person from serving as an inspector or aircrew member.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV sets forth the Basing Countries' commitment to furnish all necessary visas and related documents, within 25 days of receiving the initial list of inspectors and aircrew members (or subsequent changes thereto), to enable such personnel to carry out their inspections. Visas and documentation are to be valid for a least 24 months. The United States will immediately notify the Basing Countries of the removal of an individual's name from the list of inspectors and aircrew members, whereupon the Basing Countries may cancel such individual's visas and related documentation.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Basing Country will notify the United States, within 25 days of entry into force of the Agreement, of the standing diplomatic clearance numbers and established international airways for the Soviet aircraft that will be transporting inspectors and equipment into its territory.

Paragraph 4 of Article IV sets forth the Basing Countries' commitment to extend to Soviet inspectors and aircrew members the privileges and immunities set forth in the Annex on privileges and immunities to the Basing Country Agreement. The Basing Countries may withdraw such extension of privileges and immunities in the event the Soviet Union fails to remove, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of the

Protocol on Inspection, any inspector or aircrew member who violates the conditions governing inspections. Paragraph 7 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection states that inspectors and aircrew members are obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the country on whose territory an inspection is carried out and not to interfere in that country's internal affairs. It specifies the circumstances under which they may be removed from the lists of inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 5 of Article IV provides that the Basing Countries will waive customs duties and will expedite customs processing for inspection equipment at the point of entry.

Paragraph 6 of Article IV constitutes the Basing Countries' agreement to provide, upon request, food and lodging for inspectors and aircrew at the point of entry.

Paragraph 7 of Article IV provides that the Basing Country concerned and the United States have the right to examine jointly each item of Soviet equipment to confirm that it cannot be used to perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Any equipment unconnected with such inspection requirements will be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the Basing Country concerned.

ARTICLE V--CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

Article V describes the role of the Basing Countries in the conduct of inspections on their territories including facilitation of movement, granting of clearances, establishment of communication capability, and the furnishing of aircraft servicing as well as housing, food, and services for inspectors and aircrew members. It also discusses extensions of inspection periods.

Paragraph 1 of Article V sets forth the Basing Countries' agreement to grant approval to the United States for Soviet aircraft to fly to the point of entry via the filed routing (or, if necessary, an amended routing) within 90 minutes of receipt of notice from the United States that a flight plan conforming to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements has been filed for the pending Soviet inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article V states that the Basing Country concerned will facilitate entry into its territory and expedite customs processing for Soviet inspectors and aircrew members and their baggage and equipment.

Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that upon notification by the United States of the inspection site, the Basing Country concerned will expedite Soviet travel to the inspection site for arrival within nine hours of Soviet notification to the United States

of the site to be inspected. The Basing Country and the United States will consult on the appropriate mode of transportation to the site, and the Basing Country may designate the routing to the site.

Paragraph 4 of Article V provides that each Basing Country will assist the United States in establishing two-way voice communication capability for a Soviet inspection team between the inspection site and the Soviet Embassy within its territory. Paragraph 5 of Article V provides that the Basing Country concerned will consult with the United States on aircraft servicing and on meals, lodging, and services at the point of entry and at the inspection site for Soviet inspectors and aircrew members, and that the United States will pay the costs of any such services it requests.

Paragraph 6 of Article V states that the United States will immediately notify the Basing Country concerned of any extension of the original 24-hour period of inspection, said extension not to exceed eight hours.

ARTICLE VI--CONSULTATIONS

Article VI describes means of consultation between the United States and the Basing Countries on implementation of inspection activities and other matters. It also describes disqualifications of inspectors and aircrew members, changes in points of entry, required notification and briefing of Basing Countries by the United States upon completion of inspections, and the requirement for the Basing Countries' assent to certain amendments to Article XI of the Treaty and to the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that the United States and the Basing Countries will meet within five days of entry into force of the Basing Country Agreement to coordinate implementation of inspection activities.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI states that a meeting between the United States and any Basing Country to discuss implementation of the Basing Country Agreement will be held within five days of a request therefor by the United States or a Basing Country.

Paragraph 3 of Article VI establishes that a Basing Country may, if it deems it necessary, contact directly the U.S.

inspection notification authority on urgent questions. The United States will immediately acknowledge receipt of any such inquiry or question and will give the question or problem its urgent attention.

Paragraph 4 of Article VI provides that if a Basing Country determines that a Soviet inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection within

its territory, it may so notify the United States, and the United States will then notify the Soviet Union of the disqualification of such an inspector or aircrew member and require the individual's removal from the list of inspectors or aircrew members.

Paragraph 5 of Article VI provides that a Basing Country may change its point of entry upon six-months' prior notice to the United States.

Paragraph 6 of Article VI states that the United States will advise the Basing Country concerned upon completion of an inspection and will, upon request, brief the Basing Country on the inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Article VI establishes that the United States will not propose or accept an amendment to Article XI of the Treaty or to the Protocol on Inspection that directly affects the Basing Countries without prior consent of the Basing Countries.

ARTICLE VII--DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT

Article VII provides that the Agreement is subject to approval by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. Upon required notification by each Party to each of the other Parties of such approval, the Agreement will enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty. The Agreement will remain in force for 13 years.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Basing Country Agreement records that a single original of the Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987. The paragraph also provides that the single original will be deposited in the archives of the United States Government and that the United States will transmit a duly certified copy of the Agreement to the other signatory Governments (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

[Note: The Agreement has an Annex entitled "Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members," which is substantially the same as the identically titled Annex to the Protocol on Inspection, discussed at pages 108-111 of the Report, with conforming changes to reflect its status as part of the Basing Country Agreement rather than the Protocol on Inspection.]